SINGLE COPY - $7.50 ISSN 1055-145X

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Vol. IV, No. 2 Winter 1993-94

This Quarter's Theme:

An International Perspective on Migration

New Zealand Immigration and the Political Economy
Ranginui J. Walker

Americanizing the Immigrant, Past and Future
Otis L. Graham, Jr. and Elizabeth Koed

Canada — Troubled Neighbor **Mark Wegierski**

Author's Comment on *Camp of the Saints* **Jean Raspail**

Immigration to French Canada **Francois Berger**

PLUS
ESSAYS, OPINION PIECES, REVIEWS AND REPORTAGE ON:
population growth, citizenship, assimilation, culture, and the environment.

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A STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Just over two decades ago, concern over rapidly growing human population led to the development of the so-called "population movement" aimed at reducing the rate of population growth, both at home and abroad. At home, for a variety of reasons, birth rates fell sharply to sub-replacement levels. However, immigration grew steadily due, in significant measure, to the burgeoning population overseas. Today, human numbers world wide expand at about 10,000 per hour, a quarter of a million each day, 90 million a year.

The combined circumstances of low birth rates and high immigration pressures pose for all the developed countries the three most fundamental questions of immigration policy:

1. **How** many people shall we admit, and **what factors** should be taken into account in setting this limit?
2. **Who** should be chosen to immigrate, and **what criteria** should be used for choosing?
3. **How** shall we humanely enforce the rules we decide upon?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT seeks to explore and illuminate these questions by publishing new material, and also by pulling together and reprinting existing works from many now-scattered sources. Our goal is to provide a periodical devoted to the interrelated topics of:

- **Human population** questions, including its absolute size, rate of growth, and distribution. In nations with low natural increase and high immigration, the latter is a significant component of population growth. (In an ideal world, policy on immigrant numbers would derive from a national population policy.)
- **Immigration policy**, especially as it relates to the three basic policy questions mentioned above: how many, who, and how?
- **Language, assimilation, and national unity** considerations, which in large measure derive from and are driven by immigration and assimilation policies.
- **The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities** since, as with many issues today, population, immigration and language questions are often framed in terms of 'rights.' What is the proper balance of individual and community rights and interests?

Our method for approaching these connected issues is the time-honored concept of "The Social Contract." Most great public issues are basically moral and ethical ones: What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When 'rights' collide, which ones shall take precedence? The discipline of thinking through these issues in terms of a Social Contract allows one to achieve a balance: of individual and community interests; of the short and the long term; and of utopian idealism and the realities of the world in which we live.

But most importantly, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is not a detached forum for discussion in some backwater of life. Our issues are all in the forefront of public policy discussions in the United States, which is our primary focus. Our Editorial Advisors are drawn from many of the main organizations trying to influence the course of policy in the issue areas we have chosen. Our journal is one of the tools they use to raise questions, debate themes, and communicate ideas — to encourage vigorous public debate and subsequent changes in our laws and public policies.

We invite you to take part in this Great Debate by reading and contributing to THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is published quarterly.
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Editorial & Subscription offices at:
316 1/2 E. Mitchell Street, Petoskey, Michigan 49770
Phone (616) 347-1171, Fax (616) 347-1185

Third Class Postage is paid at Petoskey, MI.

Printed on Recycled Paper

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The International Migration Scene

Editorial

Once or twice a year THE SOCIAL CONTRACT sponsors what we call Writers' Workshops, where professional writers, academics and activists who write on migration topics gather for discussions. These have turned into international affairs — at last October's session we had people from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany, though the majority still came form the United States. Despite this effort at internationalism, one of our overseas guests commented on his evaluation form:

> *The USA is so big that I felt there was a tendency among some Americans to think that theirs was the only battle ground that mattered. In fact, as you well know, there is a great value to be gained in 'pooling' our knowledge, ideas and strategies and looking beyond national borders, the better to serve our own.*

One of the goals of this publication is to reflect the world-wide nature of the migration dilemma, and to make the point that it is not just an American concern. To that end, we have published a good deal of material from immigrant-receiving nations all over the globe.

This issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is our most international to date with a clear majority of the articles, or the writers of the articles, from overseas. We're pleased with this, and the opportunity it provides to show some of the ways in which the problems of other industrial nations are the same as — or are different from — ours. As our guest commented, there is great value to be had in looking beyond our several national borders for knowledge, ideas and strategies, and in trying to learn from and in turn teach others.

Our lead article this quarter is by Ranginui Walker, a New Zealander of Maori descent, who presents a native peoples' viewpoint on immigration. Not surprisingly, he and his people are not interested in being submerged through immigration in a gorgeous *multi*cultural mosaic. Rather, he argues for the maintenance of the Maori culture as one of the two partners in a *bi*cultural society. This naturally raises the question of the position of the American and Canadian Indians in the immigration policy debate, which they have not yet entered in any significant way.

Further in this section, Canadian writer Mark Wegierski analyzes the political situation in Canada as it applies to immigration, our long time associate Gerda Bikales translates an article from Quebec on the role of migration in the decline of the French language in that province, Australian Mark O'Connor writes on moral arguments in the immigration debate, and his countrymen Evonne Moore and Joseph Wayne Smith grace our book review section. Welshman Jack Parsons' two books on immigration are reviewed. Our Washington editor, Roy Beck, analyzes the 1993 Annual Report of the UN Population Fund — which deals extensively with the role of population "push" pressure in migration.

We also call your attention to the Graham and Koed article on the Americanization movement at the time of the last turn of a century. They see it in a more favorable light than is customary. Professor Graham has written for us before on the uses and misuses of history in the immigration debate, which was the theme of Vol. I, No. 2 of our journal, Winter 1990-91.

One of our readers called recently to say how much he enjoyed reading THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, but after a pause added, "but I don't really understand why — it's just a collection of horror stories!" We agree that a lot of what we publish is not bedtime reading, and could even get depressing ... there are so many problems in every direction.

But, our hope is that despite the dire prospects, those bold souls who cannot or will not give up will find in these pages some of the knowledge, ideas and encouragement they need to press on in the quest for a more sane immigration policy.

John Tanton
Editor and Publisher

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Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Re: Brimelow's article on the nation-state [THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Vol.III, No.4, Summer 1993], I am not fully informed on the subject and did appreciate his reflections. There is a point where, as a French Québécois or French Canadian, I disagree with the author and would like to see him elaborate on some rather grave accusations left unexplained in his text. On page 231, at the end of the first paragraph, he wrote: "[t]he two language communities in Canada are continuing to separate themselves, the Anglophones being helped out of Quebec by twenty years of *ethnic cleansing* legislation passed by both the separatist and nominally provincial governments" [my emphasis].

I feel this is going a bit too far in calling legislation aimed at protecting one's majority language "ethnic cleansing." What then would Brimelow have to say about the Francophone majority of Manitoba who were reduced to an insignificant minority in less than a century thanks to immigration from English-speaking European countries. Mr. Brimelow has probably never experienced being asked in his own town to "speak white" because one's usage of French was discouraged and spat at. In my eyes, Mr. Brimelow discredits his argument with such an unjustified low blow to a very natural reflex. As he himself points out on page 233: "...the nation-state is a product of modernization, there's a corollary: *modernization puts a premium on linguistic unity.*"

So it comes as no big surprise to have the author use the famous 1972 novel, *Two Solitudes*, in depicting the country's dual cultural and linguistic condition. (This [reading] was probably the only chance he had to get in touch with our side of reality.) This is typical for a generation of public figures who are still caught in the '60s and '70s frame of reference and can't get a clear picture of the changing world. They can't understand why we should start to realize that though we have loved to hate each other for years, we are reaching a point in history where our differences are part of our own respective personalities as groups, and that these differences are very benign compared to the culture-gaps that are now building up thanks to undiscriminating mass-immigration policies put in place in the mid-sixties.

Anytime Mr. Brimelow wishes to visit Quebec I will open my door to him and show him why the *Two Solitudes* is a *vue de l'esprit* of the intellectual — an interesting way to look at the world, but nevertheless not to be confused with reality.

Pierre Deschênes
Montréal, Quebec

Peter Brimelow responds:

M. Deschênes' letter is a fine example of why separate political cultures need to be expressed in separate nation-states. The entire logic of my speech was supportive of Quebec's official unilingualism and, indeed, its separation from Canada. Nevertheless, M. Deschênes is upset by the relatively minor detail of my describing repeated legislation aimed at making the Anglo-Quebec minority assimilate or leave as "ethnic cleansing." His position seems to be that (a) this didn't happen, and (b) it was justified anyway.

Since the Québécois have not actually killed people, at least not since the 1970 FLQ kidnappings, I suppose we can see why the term stings. But the fact remains that what they have done lawfully to their English-speaking minority is not pretty — any more than what Americans must do to regain control of their polity will be pretty. So, were I in M. Deschênes' position, I would have shrugged it off, in my phlegmatic Anglo-Saxon way.

Or, as his countryman Sir Wilfred Laurier put it in 1902: "For us, sons of France, politics is a passion; while, for the Englishman, politics are a question of business."

We are in agreement on immigration and on Hugh McLennan, whom I quoted — not on Quebec society (he's against separatism) — but we have one key difference between Anglophone and Francophone folkways. It illustrated, I believe, the hopelessness of the *Two Solitudes*' relationship, as well as its fundamental humanity.

(Incidentally, *The Two Solitudes* was published in 1945. The edition I cited was a 1972 paperback.)

Peter Brimelow
New York City

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Editor:

The free trade agreement with Mexico (NAFTA) has passed, and America is now part of a corrupt third-world oligarchy, much of whose economy is based on child labor, and whose population will soon exceed our own. As much as I feel that this is a disaster, the nature of the public "debate" bothers me even more.

Not only did the media present ten pro-NAFTA articles for every one against, but certain points were simply not allowed in the discussion. You didn't hear about Mexico's enduring poverty. You didn't hear about child labor, or the potential for Mexican companies to import unlimited numbers of "guest" workers. Continue to write your elected officials, but writing to the media is a waste of time, because they are not shy about filtering what they print.

We need to build new institutions that will at least allow a full discussion of the issues. We need to support publications like *The Social Contract*. To have an impact, they must grow beyond preaching to the converted. Perhaps a few articles of more general interest, a more pleasing visual format, and some color photographs, could be of long term benefit. I know that all costs money, and can't be done tomorrow. I merely propose this as something that might be worked towards.

I am not suggesting that *The Social Contract* lose its focus and try to become another *Newsweek*. However, if the average person picking up a copy in a doctor's office finds nothing of interest, then this publication will be a largely sterile exercise. This is not a peer-reviewed journal for specialists. Writing is communication, and the clearest and most rational articles are useless if nobody reads them.

The Social Contract might also consider soliciting articles from or conducting interviews with some of the more interesting people who participated in the NAFTA debate, such as Jesse Jackson, Ralph Nader, Pat Buchanan, and Lane Kirkland, to name a few. They don't get a whole lot of exposure in the regular press, and the occasional article by a "big name" is a time-honored method of building circulation.

Timothy Gawne
Silver Spring, MD

[Editor's Note: We always welcome suggestions from our readers, take them seriously and try to respond where they seem justified and we are able to do so. Please let us hear from you. As to Mr. Gawne's suggestions, we're trying to include more graphics and photographs — as a starter.]



Q: WHAT DO THESE KITCHEN UTINSILS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY HAVE IN COMMON?

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Dr. Ranginui Walker is professor of Maori studies at the University of Aukland, New Zealand. Himself a member of the indigenous Maori people, he has been a leader in the effort to have Maori treaty rights recognized by the government of New Zealand.

New Zealand Immigration and the Political Economy

Indigenous Decry Switch from Biculturalism to Multiculturalism; Claim Right to Restrict

By Ranginui J. Walker

The Treaty of Waitangi signed on February 6, 1840, between the tribal chiefs of Aotearoa and the British Crown, brought into being the nation state of New Zealand. The treaty is the charter of constitutional government in the country. The signatories were Captain Willaim Hobson on behalf of the British Crown, and 540 chiefs of the land on behalf of their respective tribes. In the first clause of the treaty, the chiefs ceded the power of governance to the Crown. They understood this to mean the establishment of a system of government to provide laws that would control British settlers, and bring peace among warring tribes.

Under the second clause of the treaty, the Crown guaranteed the absolute chieftainship of the chiefs over their lands, homes and treasured possessions. The chiefs understood this to mean the confirmation of their own sovereign rights in return for a limited concession of governance. Consequently, the chiefs continued to behave as sovereigns over their own territories, while the Governor went about asserting dominion over all of them. Contrary to this end, the Governor used state force to subdue independent chiefs, and the power of parliament to make laws to expropriate their lands by purchase, confiscation or legal artifice. These acts of colonial despoliation contravened article two of the treaty. They also contravened the democratic principles of freedom, equality and justice implicit in the third article of the treaty, whereby the chiefs and their people were granted the rights and privileges of British citizenship.

At the outset of colonization, the chiefs resisted colonial despoliation by electing a Maori King in 1858, defending their land from invasion in 1863, and establishing a Maori Parliament in 1892. But it was to no avail. By the turn of the century, the chiefs were completely disempowered by the loss of their lands, forests and fisheries to the Crown. Thereafter the leadership passed to organic leaders and the intelligentsia. Over the next 75 years, these new leaders presided over a population recovery, a cultural renaissance, and the urbanization of 75 percent of the Maori people.

The decade of the 1970s was characterized by the rise of urban activism which crystallized into a Maori land rights movement. Political activists mounted potent demonstrations at the government-sponsored, annual celebration of nationhood — the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in the Bay of Islands. The Government responded by establishing the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 to inquire into Maori grievances after the tribunal came into being. The activists were not mollified by this token gesture. Demonstrations continued unabated in the form of a march to the capital and occupations of disputed lands in different parts of the country. The demonstrations, beamed into the living rooms of the nation by television, and outward to the international arena, were an embarrassment to the Government. Eventually it succumbed to the pressure and made the tribunal's power of inquiry into grievances retrospective to 1840.

The subsequent findings of the Tribunal in favor of Maori claims deconstructed the historic narrative of the colonizer and paved the way for successful actions in the High Court. Two key judgments signalled the advent of the post-colonial era and the contemporary treaty discourse around the notion of partnership between Maori and the Crown. The first

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judgment in the Appellate Court in June 1987 ruled that the transfer of Crown land to State Owned Enterprises, when it was under claim before the Waitangi Tribunal, contravened the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The second judgment in the High Court in October, 1987, ruled that the Government's Fisheries Quota Management System breached Maori fishing rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. The Court could find no evidence of Maori fishing rights being sold or transferred to the Crown. The Court ordered an interim stop to the issue of Individual Transferable Quotas to companies for designated species of fish and advised the Government to negotiate with its treaty partner for the recognition and use of those rights. In the negotiation of a settlement for the Maori fisheries claim, Maori leaders used to advantage the Court's characterization of Maori and the Crown as treaty partners. Subsequently, the concept of partnership became the central bargaining position of Maori leaders in the contemporary discourse with the Government on a wide range of issues. For Maori, parity with Pakeha (Anglo-Europeans) in health, education, employment, and indeed all fields of human endeavor, would be achieved by the implementation of treaty partnership.

The Treaty and Immigration Policy

While the concept of partnership is now routinely applied in the settlement of treaty claims pertaining to land and fisheries, it is still embryonic in the business of government. Partnership is readily overlooked in some areas where the Executive has taken for granted the unilateral exercise of power. This is the case with immigration policy, where the Government declared that decisions about who shall be permitted to enter New Zealand are for the Government alone to make and are the prerogative of the Executive. In keeping with that unilateral determination of immigration policy, the Government did not consult its Maori treaty partner over admitting up to 25,000 immigrants per annum from 97 countries around the world.

The original charter for immigration into New Zealand is in the preamble of the Treaty of Waitangi. There, it states that Her Majesty Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom:

> *has deemed it necessary, in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty's subjects who have already settled in New Zealand, and the rapid extension of Emigration from both Europe and Australia which is still in progress, to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of her Majesty's sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands.*

The present generation of Maori leaders abide by the agreement of their ancestors to allow immigration into New Zealand from the countries nominated in the preamble of the treaty, namely Europe, Australia and the United Kingdom. But, for any variation of that agreement to be validated, they expect the Government to consult them as the descendants of the Crown's treaty partner. The Human Rights Commission endorsed that position with its recommendation to government that the Treaty of Waitangi should be considered in any decisions on immigration policy. The Commission's advice was not properly heeded.

"This glossing over of Maori opposition is consistent with the procedure of elites generating policy from above and imposing it on the people below."

In March 1991, the Government Working Party on Immigration reported to Mr. Birch, the Minister of Immigration. The report recommended the adoption of a points system for the selection of immigrants with skills and money for business investment in New Zealand. The Minister called meetings with a limited selection of thirteen Maori leaders in Auckland and fourteen in Wellington to consider the report. They were mainly leaders of voluntary organizations. Few represented tribal groups. Although many speakers spoke against the immigration proposals, they were ignored. When the Minister was questioned in Parliament during the debate on the Immigration Amendment Bill, he cited all those in attendance at the Maori meetings as being "broadly positive" towards his immigration scheme. This glossing over of Maori opposition is

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consistent with the procedure of elites generating policy from above and imposing it on the people below. The report was a *fait accompli*, and the Minister's restricted discourse with Maori leaders after the fact, gave an illusion of democratic consultation. The select committee hearings on the Bill were also a charade. Of the 75 submissions made to the committee, 73 were opposed to the Bill. The two submissions in favor were made by immigration consultants, the people who earned substantial fees from processing immigration papers for clients wanting to get into New Zealand.

How Did "Business Immigration Policy" Begin?

New Zealand's contemporary immigration policy is driven by the new and different partnership between corporate business interests and government in the political economy. Desperate for a quick fix to rising unemployment and a stagnant economy, governments of both the left and right were readily persuaded that a pro-active immigration policy would create jobs and stimulate growth in the economy. Particularly influential was the Business Roundtable with its capacity to hire mediocre academics to write seemingly authoritative reports on the benefits of immigration to feed into government policy. Although the primary agenda was an economic solution to New Zealand's stagnant economy, there was also the underlying agenda of countering the Maori claim to first nation status as *tangata whenua* (people of the land).

When the Labor government came to power in 1984, it began the process of reviewing New Zealand's immigration policy as a prelude to changing immigration laws. The policy was to some extent influenced by the counter-hegemonic struggle of the Maori against the state, the Maori ideology of biculturalism, and the need to legitimate the colonizing presence of Pakeha in New Zealand. This subsidiary agenda was made explicit in the 1986 review of immigration policy by the Minister of Immigration, Kerry Burke.

The review asserted that New Zealand is a country of immigrants, including the Maori, thus denying their prior right of discovery and millennial occupation of the land. Defining the Maori as immigrants negates their first-nation status as people of the land by lumping them in with the European immigrants who took over the country, as well as later immigrants from the Pacific Rim. Furthermore, the review disguised the monocultural and Euro-centric control over the governing institutions of the country by claiming that immigration has molded the national character as a multi-cultural Pacific country. This multi-cultural ideology is a direct negation of the Maori assertion of the primacy of biculturalism. The review states that the aim of the new immigration policy is to

> *enrich the multicultural fabric of New Zealand society through the selection of new settlers principally on the strength of their potential personal contribution to the future well-being of New Zealand.*

In this scenario, enriching the multicultural fabric of New Zealand society entailed turning away from traditional sources of immigrants from Europe and turning towards Asia by abolishing national origin as a factor in immigrant selection. This expansion of the sources of immigrants was founded more on economic motives than the liberal rejection of the former racial preference for European migrants. The Government felt that the inflow of capital is more likely to proceed in an environment which welcomes human as well as financial investment.

"Despite that admission [that the program was not a success], the review advocated a business immigration policy whereby people with entrepreneurial skills and capital for investment would be selected for immigration."

Selection on occupational grounds is based on an occupational priority list and job skills which cannot be filled internally. The review defined a sub-category of economic migration as "entrepreneur immigration" which is expected to create employment for others. In the seven years that entrepreneur immigration was in operation, 225 business immigrants from Germany, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States brought in capital amounting to $106,866,000. Although the review commented that this was a "useful result," it

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admitted that this was not a significant element in the total immigrant inflow on the nation's economic development. Despite that admission, the review advocated a category whereby people with entrepreneurial skills and capital for investment would be selected for immigration. The only other requirement was that the principal applicant, spouse, and children over 12 years of age, would be fluent in English.

When the National Government came to power in 1990, it continued and expanded the immigration policy of its predecessor. It cited the Poot Report in support of its scheme to bring in 20,000 immigrants per annum. Poot and associates asserted that New Zealand's standard of living can be maintained only under high levels of immigration when the associated expansion of the economy generates productivity improvements through technical change and economies of scale.

"Kaspar's assertion of the success of America's 'melting pot' in generating economic wealth is grossly misleading."

Another advocate of immigration to create an economy of scale is Douglas Myer, vice-chairman of the Business Roundtable. In an address to a business seminar in Auckland, Myer asserted he wanted an Asian-type labor market in New Zealand. He maintained that freeing up the labor market would generate high profits from high growth and efficiency. To buttress this position, the Business Roundtable commissioned Wolfgang Kaspar, Professor of Economics, at the University College (Australian Defense Academy) of the University of New South Wales, to make a case for a business immigration scheme. The report, entitled "Populate or Languish" was produced in July 1990. Kaspar's report makes a number of assertions in favor of a pro-active immigration policy without adducing any evidence for the benefits claimed, or balancing them off with the costs to the host country. For instance:

> *Immigrants may often work as catalysts for change in static industries. Less restrictive immigration, and a policy that disbars interest groups from shaping it, would have the potential for greatly enhancing the responses for the labor market to the new challenges and of helping launch New Zealand on to a path of sustained economic growth.*
>
> *Stepped up immigration can therefore assist adjustment and promote overall growth because numerous marginal profit opportunities would appear in a new and more promising light when more settlers arrive.*
>
> *Immigration could make the country culturally more exciting and economically more dynamic.*

Kaspar's assertion of the success of America's "melting pot" in generating economic wealth is grossly misleading. It ignores the despoliation of American Indians, and the expropriation of their land and mineral resources — a foundation of American wealth. It also ignores the draining of wealth out of Central America by the United Fruit Company.

Kaspar's suggestion that immigrant Mexicans in California have established relationships with their employers differently because they see striking as a waste of production and a loss of income is also misleading. Kaspar makes no mention of the historic struggle of the Chicano hero Chavez to improve the working conditions of so-called "wetbacks" — the illegal immigrant workers who were shamelessly exploited in the orchards and gardens of the San Joaquin Valley. That struggle was recorded in graffiti throughout the horticultural region of California. Its most stunning memento, which can still be seen today, is a mural on the pylons of an overpass in San Diego depicting Chavez's struggle.

Paulo Freire defines oppression as "any situation in which A objectively exploits B or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation." The oppressed, says Freire, "as objects, as 'things', have no purposes except those that their oppressors prescribe for them." In the case of migrant workers, they are defined merely as a source of cheap labor and profits for employers. It is unconscionable for an academic such as Kaspar to advocate the admission of migrant workers, who, because of their political weakness, have no choice but to organize their relationship with employers "differently" to the point of becoming victims of exploitation. The gain to the employer from an exploitive regime is only temporary, as the oppressed will inevitably organize, as did Chavez

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and his followers, to improve their conditions of employment.

The uncritical acceptance by Kaspar of a statement quoted from J. L. Simon that the crucial capital nowadays is "human capital" is disturbing. It reduces humans to the level of economic work units whose *raison d'etre* is to increase capital in the economic system. The reduction of humans to capital units is dehumanizing and fosters unprincipled and predatory attitudes to people around the world. This attitude is exemplified by the assertion that New Zealand is favorably placed to recruit well-educated young adults from Third World countries as a crucial production factor for economic growth. The likely debilitating effect of such a policy on the development of Third World countries received no consideration.

"Despite the flaws in the argument that a proactive immigration policy will resolve New Zealand's economic problems ... immigration is put forward as the answer."

Although New Zealand might be seen to be an attractive place for immigrants because of its political stability, moderate climate, excellent natural environment, low taxation, cheap housing, high moral standards, and good education and welfare system, Kaspar thinks these assets are not enough to attract immigrants. He cites poor economic growth, poor labor relations, unreliability of suppliers, and concern over racial harmony as disincentives. Kaspar argues that man-made interventions enhance the attractiveness of a country for capital, skills and entrepreneurs. These include tax laws encouraging business, regulations affecting labor costs and flexibility of work practices. To this end we see corporations exhorting the government to "identify winners" and back them by doing away with the "level playing field" and to implement such a measure as the Employment Contracts Act, the intent of which is to lower the wage structure of New Zealand labor in order to attract trans-national corporations to relocate in New Zealand as they have done in Taiwan, Korea and Mexico. But this policy does not take into account the fact that New Zealand is a primary producing country, it is resource poor in terms of minerals and oil, and is the most distantly placed country from world markets. It is difficult to produce competitively priced manufactured goods with the plussage of high freight costs on top of manufacturing costs.

Despite the flaws in the argument that a proactive immigration policy will resolve New Zealand's economic problems, and the lack of evidence that it will do so, immigration is put forward as the answer. Kasper concluded:

> *If immigration is to be a means of breaking with a stagnant past, sizeable migrant numbers should be admitted. ...With an annual intake of 20-40,000, and an annual population growth rate of 1.7 percent between now and the year 2021, the New Zealand population would then reach 6 million.*

The long-term down stream costs of immigration-driven economic growth are not considered by its protagonists. If Kasper's suggestion is implemented, the population would be 2 million above the projected four million from natural increase. The doubling of New Zealand's population in a mere thirty years by a "man-made" intervention has serious implications for increased pollution, traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and maintenance of the quality of life which New Zealanders have hitherto taken for granted. In metropolitan Auckland for instance, in-fill housing has already increased traffic congestion. Commuting times are more than double what they were ten years ago. Infilling will inevitably culminate in overload of the Mangere sewage treatment plant and increase the incidence of overflow into the Manukau Harbor. The down stream cost will be an expanded sewage reticulation system and an on-shore treatment plant which will have to be paid for by ratepayers.

In the near future, Auckland city will have to augment its water supply from the polluted Waikato River. The quality of the treated water, like the water taken from similar rivers to supply cities overseas, will not be as high as it is now. Although one might learn to live with hard water where soap does not lather easily, and clothes come out of the wash less than white, these minor changes when aggregated with other consequences of economic growth, amount to a reduction in the quality of life.

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The most cogent contradiction of the government's immigration policy is endemic unemployment which has lingered at 10 percent. But for Maori in rural areas, such as Northland and the East Coast, it is as high as 50 and even 70 percent in some communities. The government needs to demonstrate that it is capable of educating, training, and providing employment for the present population before entertaining doubling its problems by increasing the population through immigration.

"The reduction of the Maori to a position as one of many minorities negates their status as the people of the land ... new immigrants have no commitment to the treaty."

The people of New Zealand have already opted for zero population growth by limiting family size to an average of 2.1 children. That intuitive decision of the people to balance human reproduction with the internal resources of the country is being contradicted by the government determining unilaterally to mount a pro-active immigration policy. Their consent is manufactured by silencing critics with the argument that skilled and entrepreneurial migrants will promote economic growth and create jobs. Throughout the three years that this mantra was being recited, there were continuous redundancies in forestry, mining, television, railways, freezing works and telecommunications. Despite that evidence, journalists used this well-rehearsed government mantra as a riposte against critics of immigration. If they persist, then their opposition is construed as racially motivated since over 50 percent of migrants are visibly Asian.

Kaspar's views on Maori policy are also a matter for concern. With few exceptions, most Maori would reject his sooth-saying that they should not fear becoming a smaller minority in a situation where land and resources would be "competed away." Like Job's comforters, he says: "They (Maori) could instead live in a nation of many minorities where the Maori minority fitted in much better as an equal social group." Kaspar's view is advanced with the ignorance and naivete of the outsider who knows nothing of the 150-year struggle of the Maori against an unjust colonial regime. The reduction of the Maori to a position as one of many minorities negates their status as the people of the land with bi-cultural treaty rights and enables the government to neutralize their claims for justice more effectively than it does now. Furthermore, new migrants have no commitment to the treaty. For these reasons, the ideology of multiculturalism as a rationale for immigration must be rejected. Although its primary rationale is economic, the government's immigration policy must be seen for what it is — a covert strategy to suppress the counter-hegemonic struggle of the Maori by swamping them with outsiders who are not obliged to them by the treaty.

The Business Roundtable, which promoted immigration as an economic stimulus, also queried the use of abundant "free goods" including clean air, water resource, wilderness areas and other collectively owned assets. The Roundtable argued that the ill-defined ownership of some of these assets weakens the incentive to use them well, to strike a balance between conservation and development, to achieve socially desirable trade-offs between competing uses. To this end the Roundtable wanted resource management reforms aimed at clarifying property rights to the country's natural assets. The Labor Government obliged the Roundtable by introducing the Resource Management Act of 1990. This act enables New Zealand's "free goods," by the way of scenic assets, to be turned to profit by means of the government granting licenses to developers.

The ownership and use of the assets referred to by the Roundtable is precisely what Maori have challenged in recent years before the Waitangi Tribunal. The Kaituna and Manukau claims over the water of the Kaituna and Waikato rivers are cases in point. The Maori fisheries claim in the High Court is another. These are examples of Maori claims standing in the way of local government and corporate business plans for development based on the use of those resources. Measures to accommodate Roundtable concerns in the Resource Management Act are likely to generate further claims, particularly challenging the government's power to sell licenses to business interests for development projects along New Zealand's coastline and inland waterways.

"Working Party" on Immigration

When the National Government came to power late in 1990, the Minister of Immigration, Mr. Birch, appointed a working party on immigration. It

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consisted of three members. Neither Maori nor women were represented. The role of the group was to work out how to implement a dynamic Business Immigration Policy incorporating supervision of investments, and an appraisal process for a "skilled occupational migrants" program. The brief also included a review of the role of immigrant consultants, and an advisory on a points system of accreditation for immigrants.

"In other words, the motives of immigrants are more likely to be egocentric rather than altruistic toward the host country."

The working party did not question the government's premise that there was a need to attract business and qualified immigrants in substantial numbers for the economic development of New Zealand. Nor did the working party attempt to substantiate the need itself. It was merely accepted as an article of faith, which, if repeated often enough would become a reality. Delivered to the Minister in March, 1991, the working party's report warned that since New Zealand was in competition with Canada and Australia as the preferred destination of quality migrants, appropriate policies promoting New Zealand would have to be put into place.

The Immigration Act of 1987 provided the legislative framework for the admission of immigrants under the economic, social and humanitarian streams for permanent entry. In the economic stream are occupational and Business Immigration Policy sub-groups. The occupational sub-group aims to facilitate entry of skilled immigrants to fill gaps in New Zealand's labor market. Those gaps are not defined. Employers are simply required to demonstrate that a position cannot be filled from the local labor market, whereupon they are allowed to recruit outside the country.

The BIP (Business Immigration Policy) sub-group was introduced by the Labor Government with the aim of attracting self-employed business migrants with capital to invest in New Zealand. The naivete of this first scheme was reflected in the low level of capital required, set at $100,000, the average price of a house. This amount was hardly enough to set up manufacturing businesses likely to provide employment. There was also no monitoring to ensure that businesses were established or that the money was not remitted back to the home country to allow another migrant to use it as a ticket of entry. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that this was the case.

The report noted there were four significant changes in immigration policy in recent years. There was a doubling of immigration applicants from 10,000 to 20,500 between 1986 and 1990. There were increases in the social category to 153 percent, the economic category to 89 percent, and the humanitarian category to 31 percent. There was also an increase in overstayers from 13,000 in 1986 to 20,000 in 1990. A radical change in the source of immigrants was also noted. Immigrants from the United Kingdom fell from 36 percent in 1986 to 16 percent in 1990. On the other hand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia became major countries of origin. The report did not question why immigration from Asia increased. The imminent hand-over of Hong Kong to Mainland China is one obvious explanation; overcrowding, pollution and repressive governments are other reasons for immigrants to abandon their own countries. In other words, the motives of immigrants are more likely to be egocentric rather than a sense of altruism towards the host country.

The Points System

The working party recommended the introduction of a points system in an attempt to control the number and quality of immigrants into New Zealand. A scale of 1-10 points was allocated to two out of four sub-sections for the category of employability, namely education/qualifications, business/work experience, special skills (including entrepreneurial), and offers of skilled employment. A candidate could score a maximum of 20 points for employability. The age factor of immigrants was also assessed on 10 points with the maximum going to immigrants 25 and 29 years of age. In the financial independence category, $100,000 dollars for settlement and purchase of a house gained 5 points, and one point could be gained for each additional $100,000 to be remitted. This category had a maximum of 10 points. Other settlement factors include language skills (1-4 points), and one point for a New Zealand sponsor, relative in the country, and a local authority or group sponsor.

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The points system implies quality control in the selection of immigrants for permanent residence. But it is no more than cosmetic camouflage to manufacture consent from the people. The screening for facility in English on the part of the chief applicant and dependents over twelve is not rigorous. Some secondary schools have had to put resources into teaching English as a second language for students who have been granted permanent residency. Concern at Auckland University over student failure because of inadequate English is such that tutorials are offered in Mandarin. Another immigration cost comes from the inability to screen out criminals. New Zealanders now have the dubious honor of sharing their country with Asian Triads. In fact, enough criminals have slipped through the screening process for the police department to set up an Asian unit in Auckland, the preferred destination of Asian migrants.

The Asian Invasian

To implement the government's proactive immigration policy, the working party recommended the establishment of a marketing section of the Immigration Service to promote New Zealand as a destination for migrants.

Statistics supplied by the Immigration Service list 97 countries as the source of immigrants coming into New Zealand. But the numbers are not evenly distributed. A total of 21,927 immigrants entered the country in 1990. Of that number, 11,219 came from Asian countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, et al. On the other hand, immigrants from our own region in the South Pacific were down by 50 percent from 10,227 in 1989, to 4,320 in 1990. This alteration in our immigration pattern is dollar-driven by the government's BIP and "skilled immigrants" policy. Asian capital is now wanted ahead of Pacific Island labor.

Under the BIP scheme, on which hope is pinned for an economic miracle, the price of citizenship is measured in dollars. With the previous government the price of entry was $100,000. In all the time that scheme was in operation, unemployment continued to rise. Anecdotal evidence suggests that business immigrants used their money to relocate families while continuing to operate businesses in their home countries. Those that do establish themselves in New Zealand tend to buy into small businesses such as small supermarkets, retailing, restaurants and fast-food outlets. They usually employ their own people in these enterprises.

The BIP scheme under the Labor Government was not doing what the government hoped it would do, simply because it was brought in as an ad hoc act of faith with no controls or system of monitoring. Now, in an attempt to make the system work, the present government has raised the ante to $500,000 and belatedly put into place a system of vetting business immigrants and controlling their investment funds. But, even then, there is no assurance that the scheme will provide employment for New Zealanders because that criterion has not been built into the BIP scheme. Moreover, the controlling oversight of a panel of New Zealand businessmen over the type of business to be established, might prove to be a disincentive to entrepreneurs used to a free reign in exploiting whatever niche appears in the marketplace.

Businesses established by Asians on the amount of capital designated by the BIP scheme will have certain characteristics. First, they are likely to be small enterprises with few employees. Second, they will probably be launched on family labor or personnel from the same ethnic stock as the entrepreneur to minimize start-up costs. Third, such businesses will have a low wage structure, particularly in cases where employees are illegal overstayers. Some are likely to pay wages in cash so there will be no record of taxable income on immigrant workers. Yet immigrants, on gaining residency, become immediately eligible for the host country's education, health and social benefits.

"Only when accurate data can be provided by the government through stringent research can the worth of the scheme be proved and its continuation countenanced."

At the outset, the government should have kept records of who came in under the BIP scheme and run spot checks to see what businesses they started and how many New Zealanders they employed. Only when accurate data can be provided by the government through stringent research can the worth of the scheme be proved and its continuation

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countenanced. Without that data the validity of the BIP scheme has yet to be proved. As it is, the Business Immigration Policy is being promoted by the Minister of Immigration like a monk uttering a mantra — if it is repeated often enough it supposedly will bring about the desired economic miracle.

"...[if] we continue the policy being followed now ... then it would be only a matter of time before the conditions from which the immigrants have escaped will be replicated in New Zealand."

The nearest thing we have as a justification for the BIP scheme comes from Dr. Manying Ip of Aukland University who said the "Asian Invasion" should be welcomed so as to capitalize on the wealth and success of the Asian migrants. Dr. Ip cited data from the Commerce Ministry indicating that Chinese migrants moved $800 million into New Zealand during 1988-89. Over 200 businesses were established, 770 jobs created and $13.4 million was paid in wages. Impressive as these data are they are qualitatively deficient. They do not tell us whether these were manufacturing or service businesses, nor how many New Zealanders were among those employed. Assuming that Asian immigrants with an annual inflow of 11,000-plus will take up some of those jobs, the number of jobs created is insufficient for their own needs let alone those of the rising number of unemployed New Zealanders.

The Beneficiaries

If there is as yet no evidence of unemployed New Zealanders benefitting from the government's immigration policy, who are the beneficiaries of the scheme? The most obvious, of course, are the immigrants themselves. They have escaped from overcrowded, traffic-congested, pollution-plagued homelands — often with repressive governments — to a land which is idyllic by comparison. The good fortune is theirs to be allowed into New Zealand, the last "lifeboat" on earth. But, should we continue the policy being followed now of doubling our population every thirty years, then it would be only a matter of time before the conditions from which the immigrants have escaped will be replicated in New Zealand.

The growing inflow of Asian immigrants creates some employment for immigrants who arrived in the first wave. They act as mediators in the settlement of later immigrants into the host society. Trevor Mok, a Chinese from Malaysia for instance, did well selling real estate to business immigrants settling in Wellington. In the Queen city, the Aukland Savings Bank appointed Anthony Wang manager of the bank's new Immigration and Financial Advisory Division. His job is to meet the financial and banking needs of Asian immigrants. New employment was also created for Asians in 12 suburban branches of the ASB. Migrants from the Pacific were never given this kind of consideration by the bank.

There are other beneficiaries of the BIP scheme, but they are less obvious. They are the immigrant consultants who, through private practice, have increasingly taken over from the Immigration Service the function of processing immigrant papers and facilitating entry into New Zealand for a fee. The fees are lucrative. They range from $2,000 up to $100,000. Typically, a business migrant employing a consultant would agree to a fee of $10,000. There is a group of varied organizations involved in immigration consultancy. Accounting and legal firms process immigration papers as an adjunct to their main activities. But since the inception of the BIP scheme in 1987, private individuals have set themselves up as immigration consultants. Some of the high-profile consultants are ex-politicians with inside knowledge of the operation of government bureaucracies and immigration laws. One of the better known is Malcolm Consultants Limited whose principal is the Hon. A. G. Malcolm, former Minister of Immigration. He has offices in London, West Germany, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Malcolm's advertisement in the New Zealand/Taiwan Trade and Investment Year Book states:

> *For any individual wishing to gain permanent residence in New Zealand, the most difficult part of all is to be accepted as a Malcolm Consultants client. On becoming a client, however, success is guaranteed. ...a great strength of the Company is a close working knowledge of New Zealand government procedures and New Zealand government personnel.*

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The business of immigration consultancy grew so rapidly in a space of two years that Malcolm Consultants was able to form the New Zealand Association of Immigrant Consultants in July, 1991. It was timely, because the lure of easy profits attracted some people into the industry who were deficient in business skills or professional integrity. One such consultancy firm, Dunlop Kidd Limited, targeted the lucrative niche of business immigrants. It tried to emulate Malcolm Consultants by persuading former politicians to join its ranks. For a time it had among its personnel Sir Roger Douglas, a former Minister of Immigration during 1989-90, and Dr. Michael Bassett, former Minister of Internal Affairs. But, despite having high profile former politicians on its books as employees, Dunlop Kidd went into receivership.

But the primary beneficiaries of immigration are employers for whom the occupational category of the government's immigration policy was specifically designed. This provision enables employers to recruit off-shore personnel if they can demonstrate there are no suitable candidates for a particular job in New Zealand. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of the practice, employers and immigration consultants have been known to collude in tailoring job descriptions to eliminate local candidates and recruit overseas personnel. Some of the job descriptions are so prescriptive — citing foreign language skills that do not appear to be necessary for the job — that it is impossible for New Zealanders to even apply. This escape clause in the law enables employers to shop around the world for the cheapest production units and thereby depress internal wages and salaries.

Overseas Experience

Immigrants from non-European countries require housing, education, hospitals, health care, English Second Language schools, and capital investment to create jobs. In Australia, the cost is put at $80,000 per immigrant to the host society. The total cost to Australia for settling immigrants is almost $8 billion. This cost was added to the deficit in the balance of payments. A study by the Australian Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs concluded that immigration as a tool for short-term management was not suitable. Added to the economic cost was the social cost of lack of public accountability in immigration procedures, maladministration, and inadequate screening of immigrants with criminal backgrounds. The macro-economic consequences were negligible.

Dr. Baker, chairman of the Australian Academy of Science, and Dr. Flannery cite environmental degradation as a negative feature of population growth due to immigration. In overcrowded countries, people resort to destroying the environment in order to survive. The competition for food is so intense that there is no ethic of conservation. In the host country, immigrants with their own cultural values take limpets, sea urchins, undersize fish — indeed anything with flesh to eat — from hundreds of inter-tidal areas and rock pools.

The Australian experience of wholesale harvesting of marine life by immigrants is also being replicated in New Zealand. A newspaper headline, "Shellfish being stripped by immigrants unaware of law," sounded an early warning of the impact on the environment of bringing people into New Zealand who do not embrace a conservation ethic. The Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society is concerned over people "strip-mining" rock pools at Muriwai of marine creatures. Sea-eggs, starfish and Chitons are taken by the sackful as are mussels and other species. An even more serious threat to marine resources is posed by entrepreneurs exporting undersize and illegally-taken paua (*haliotic australis*) to Asia. Two Asian company directors, along with four others, appeared in the Aukland District Court in July, 1990 charged with 225 offenses against the Fisheries Act. We need to remind ourselves and the government that the people we are inviting to share our country are the very people who introduced destructive drift-net fishing to the world.

In view of the mounting evidence against immigration as a method for stimulating economic growth, Australia has rejected it as a solution. The head of the Australian Economic Planning Advisory Council concluded that the capital demand on a host country exceeds the gains, so he recommended scrapping the BIP scheme.

Immigration, particularly the illegal immigration of refugees, is of vital concern in overcrowded European countries. They are tightening up entry procedures. France, for instance, rejected 100,000 foreigners and Italy 30,000. Switzerland is concerned over thousands of illegal refugees who have entered the country from Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

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In East Germany there were 85,000 *gastarbeiters* (guest-workers) from Vietnam, Angola, and Mozambique. They did the community dirty work as unskilled laborers and construction workers. But with the unification of Germany, unemployment has risen in the Eastern sector. Associated with rising unemployment is an outbreak of xenophobia and racism. The guest workers are being thrown out and told to "go home" before things get nasty.

The Losers in Proactive Immigration

There is no question that a large-scale proactive immigration policy will transform the host society. The Maori are the prime example of the consequences of such a policy. In the nineteenth century, Maori leaders welcomed immigrants from Europe for trade and for the economic benefits they brought to New Zealand. In the first two decades after the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), the hoped-for prosperity was realized as tribes planted wheat, processed it with their own flour mills, and transported the flour and other products from the land to the markets by way of their own coastal vessels. But after 1858, when the immigrants achieved numerical superiority and political dominance, the hegemony of the nation-state over the indigenous population was asserted by violence. Maori land and resources were expropriated through the judicial apparatus of the state and the Maori were consigned to the underclass status of a "brown proletariat."

Although the consequences of the present immigration policy might not be as disastrous for the nation as it was for the Maori, nevertheless, some of the negative outcomes of immigration are already being replicated here. They impinge on both Maori and Pakeha.

While advocating business immigration on one hand, Mr. Birch, the Minister of Immigration, is aiming to expel from New Zealand our own guest-workers from the South Pacific. Now that their labor is no longer needed by the economy, 7467 Samoans, 4920 Tongans, and 1035 Fijians are classed as over-stayers who are wanted out. In the meantime, illegal immigrants and foreign workers from China, India, and elsewhere are being exploited by the kiwi fruit farmers in the Bay of Plenty, the orchardists of Nelson, and on the industrial sites of our cities.

Kiwi fruit contractors in the Bay of Plenty claim there are 200 illegal immigrants, mainly Indians, working in the Katikati-Omokoroa area for as little as $2 per hour. The contractors resent their livelihood being undermined and they want the immigrants out. Similarly, the New Zealand Workers Union has declared opposition to illegal foreign workers who are picking fruit in Nelson without work permits. Some Chinese cooks brought out from Hong Kong in 1989 to work in the Orient Towers Restaurant arrived to find the building incomplete. They were employed illegally on the site as electrical laborers and in their employer's house as cooks in the evening. They were left destitute when dismissed by the employer.

"Although the consequences of the present immigration policy might not be as disastrous for the nation as it was for the Maori, nevertheless some of the negative outcomes of immigration in other countries are already being replicated here."

In 1987, the government allowed citizens from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand to enter New Zealand without visas. This policy of easy access has opened New Zealand to criminals from overseas and to unethical practices by visitors wanting to gain permanent residency. Headlines proclaiming New Zealand a "target of big racket in passports," "marriage scams and welfare fraud linked," "Thai woman tells of prostitution trap," and "police bust immigrant crime ring" indicate the government's naivete in opening up the country to the rest of the world at a time when nations of Europe are trying to insulate their borders against outsiders. It is futile on the part of Minister Birch to warn immigration consultants to insure that business migrants bring in "clean money" when neither they nor the Government have the capacity to investigate the *bona fides* of a business immigrant. The consultant's sole interest is in the fee for getting their client into the country. As far as they are concerned they have discharged their responsibility for character screening if the client signs the statutory declaration that they have not been convicted of criminal activity nor are they wanted for a crime in their own country. Harvey Misbin, the most celebrated business

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immigrant in this category, established the freight carrier Southern World Airline New Zealand. A *Frontline* television documentary reported that Misbin, who was granted New Zealand residency and later citizenship, was wanted in the U. S. for alleged smuggling of cocaine from South America to the United States. The other high-flying entrepreneur, Ralf Simon, who planned to buy the Pakatoa Island resort, is wanted in Germany on criminal charges. Before that disclosure, the media adulated Simon with a caption under his picture: "This man can buy anything he wants." Official investigations of business immigrants such as Simon and Misbin who make false declarations about their criminal past are a charge on the New Zealand taxpayer.

Conclusion

The government's "skilled" and Business Immigration Policy emanates from the Business Roundtable. It was initiated by the Labour Government in 1987 in the belief that it would stimulate the economy and create jobs. When the hoped-for economic miracle did not materialize, the incoming National Government in 1990 did not question the theory behind the policy. Instead, the government affirmed its faith in immigration as a cure for the economy by introducing more selective screening through a points system, and increasing the capital sum for admission from $100,000 to $500,00. Government and media promotion of BIP misleads many New Zealanders into believing that immigration is in their best interest when there is mounting evidence that this is not the case. The strictures raised against immigration in this paper have not been addressed by the government.

- The government has defaulted on its obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi to consult widely with Maori people on its immigration scheme. In the eyes of Maori leaders, the government is vulnerable once again to an embarrassing claim before the Waitangi Tribunal.

- Unemployment of Maori people stands at 27 percent. These people will be marginalized even further by bringing in skilled and business immigrants. Working class Pakeha will share the same fate.

- The general New Zealand populace is also put at risk (as Maori were in the previous century) to the neo-colonialism of international capital, as evidenced by the sale of state assets, land, and even citizenship to foreigners.

Finally, the last word on BIP comes from immigrants themselves. Some say it is too difficult to make money in New Zealand's depressed economy, let alone create jobs. Business income was so low that some businessmen were looking to return to Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Executive Director of the Hwa Hsia Society for Taiwan migrants, Karl Chen, said it was very hard to set up industrial plants or other businesses here — the local market is small, labor costs are high, unions are too strong, New Zealand is too far away from material suppliers, and sea freight costs are too high. In view of these admissions, together with mounting evidence of the negative impact of immigration on the quality of life in New Zealand, the "skilled" and Business Immigration Policy of the government should be suspended pending a full public inquiry. ■

[Editor's note: This paper also contains extensive footnotes citing newspaper and government reports which are not being reprinted here but which are available by contacting the editorial offices of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.]

Enlight or Invite?

Scholars of the Statue of Liberty are clear that it was intended by those who created it, sponsored it and accepted it as a symbol for other nations to emulate America's republican form of government and the concept of individual liberties. It was called *Liberty Enlightening the World* not *Liberty Inviting the World*. If Lady Liberty could talk, she probably would advise migrants to stay home and help to fight for their own people to be able to breathe free.

— Roy Beck, Washington Editor of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
in a letter to the *Boston Globe*, December 3, 1993

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This essay is reprinted from The Public Historian, *Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 1993). Not only is the subject of interest, but also the work is an excellent example of what historians call "gray literature:" that is, historical studies that are commissioned by a client — a corporation, a foundation, or a committee — rather than being written for the general reading public. Though not published for general distribution, such reports can be significant literature.*

Americanizing the Immigrant, Past and Future:

History and Implications of a Social Movement

By Otis L. Graham, Jr. and Elizabeth Koed

[Authors' introduction: *It is commendable that a U.S. philanthropic institution interested in immigration-related issues should seek guidance from the historical record. In an effort to assist your institution in making decisions in this area, we have, at your request, surveyed the secondary historical literature on the Americanization movement of the early years of the 20th century, as well as some published accounts of the Americanizers themselves, and offer here an assessment and analysis of that historical experience and its implications for contemporary policymaking on immigrants and their assimilation.*]

An Overview of the Project

America in the 1990s is being reshaped by a surge of large-scale immigration now in its third decade. Such massive immigration has not been experienced in the United States since the three decades prior to World War I, a situation almost no one alive today can remember. In those years the perceived benefits of immigration were countered by complaints of a wide range of social costs — job displacement and downward wage pressures, urban congestion, crime, unsanitary conditions, boss politics, and much else. Such complaints led to two major policy responses to large-scale immigration — a movement aiming at immigration restriction, which was ultimately successful, and an effort to "Americanize" the immigrant.

The Progressive-era efforts to reinforce and accelerate the assimilation process do indeed deserve renewed attention in our own circumstances. Massive immigration to the U.S. has resumed, with the annual volume now exceeding the totals experienced prior to World War I, and concerns about the assimilative process are again being voiced. Commentators cite contemporary evidence that the incoming millions of immigrants are increasingly tending to cluster in linguistic and geographic isolation and note that the expanding Latino population, especially in a border belt of states from Texas to California, receives constant cultural reinforcement by communication and transportation across the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border, which can only become more active and porous if the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) becomes a reality. Assimilation may also be impeded by a central theme in our contemporary intellectual life: praise and encouragement for any group that maintains its culture intact, as a sort of anthropological resource for today and tomorrow.

Concerns over assimilation and national cohesion are intensified by evidence from outside the U.S. — the breakup of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, along with separatist movements in Canada, India, and tribal civil wars across Africa. Inside the U.S., evidence may be found that the attractions of adaptation to American norms remain strong among immigrants. Yet this evidence must contend with a stream of reports of social tensions between ethnic, religious and racial communities, reaching a crescendo in what could be called the nation's first immigration riot in Los Angeles in June, 1992. In this climate, the general public, some of our intellectual elites and many civic and political leaders, including voices from racial and ethnic minorities, express concern about the faltering process of assimilation. For several reasons, this concern is likely to strengthen.

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At least three factors that made the assimilation of foreigners easier a century ago are no longer present — a robust, even arrogant host culture of British origins, a growing industrial economy with an appetite for low-skilled labor, and a fortuitous, four-decade lull (1921-1965) between immigration waves so that assimilative processes were not overwhelmed. Some would add that the nation's public schools, perhaps the central institution transmitting the national culture, are caught in a crisis that makes them far less effective than in the earlier period of massive immigration.

In light of these changed circumstances we are likely to hear more, rather than less, of the need both to restrict immigration numbers and to intervene to assist and accelerate the assimilative process. Many private groups and public agencies at local levels around the country are actively involved in what a historian would call Americanization efforts, such as English-language education or programs to acquaint immigrants with the steps to be taken toward naturalization and/or to become politically active. Some of these activities are made possible by foundation funding. But such efforts are not seen as a national movement, and have not taken on a generic name.

"...we are likely to hear more, rather than less, of the need both to restrict immigration numbers and to intervene to assist and accelerate the assimilative process."

Today's situation thus invites reflection upon the years just prior to and after the turn of the century, when assimilation-assisting efforts by many local groups were vigorously pursued, especially in eastern cities. These at first operated without a national framework or sense of purpose. In time they were perceived as the Americanization movement, and both the errors and achievements of that enterprise should be pondered by any institution contemplating activity in this area. The lessons of the past that are ignored often allow the misdirection of future policy. As often, policy error comes from the influence of superficial and incomplete presumed lessons that are hastily assembled from a single historical source, or worse yet, from individual or collective hazy memory.

Have the historians supplied us with a usable history of the Americanization movement of nearly a century ago? The answer appears to be: yes and no. A small number of historians have addressed the Americanization movement of the first years of this century, and a considerable body of knowledge has been compiled. Yet there are many unanswered questions, and if one consults only the most recent literature, the one-sided account mostly presented there carries misleading implications for today. What follows, at your request, is a report on what has been written since the topic first engaged historians, and an assessment of the implications of this historical knowledge for contemporary policymaking in this area.

In Response to the Great Wave

Throughout most of American history, concerns about assimilation of aliens were never absent, but a conscious social effort to assist that process did not emerge. This contrasts with the experience of many nations, where governments made strenuous and organized efforts to suppress minority cultures and to encourage primacy of some national set of norms and traditions. In the U.S. much ethnic and cultural variety has always been tolerated by society and its government, as it was usually assumed that the mechanisms of assimilation were sufficiently robust to absorb the non-English stock immigrants — German and Irish, primarily, in the first century of nationhood. This level of confidence in assimilation of immigrants was to erode at several points in the 19th century, producing at the end of the century the "Americanization" campaigns which are our topic. That effort should be distinguished from the much smaller contemporaneous reform efforts to do something to promote the integration of African Americans and Native Americans. It was assumed for at least a century after the nation's founding that Blacks and Native Americans were not expected to assimilate, and there was no issue when they did not. Thus we take Americanization to be the nationwide effort usually meant by that term in the decades of the 1890s to the 1920s, one aimed at the European populations, most especially the "new immigration" from southern and eastern Europe.

For the European immigrants under consideration, the good fortune of geography, which supplied an oceanic separation from the homeland, meant that

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these white non-English immigrant groups tended to come to the New World with assimilationist expectations and to find the Old World ties attenuated by distance. Benjamin Franklin's fears about German separatism were not well founded. The assumption across the 19th century was that these fair-skinned groups would become Americans (whatever that meant) because they intended to do so and anything else was unthinkable. In the words of John Higham:

> *In Europe most minorities were fixed in place and rooted in the soil of an ancient culture they were determined to preserve. But immigration brought the U.S. uprooted peoples who wanted to share in large degree in the new national life; cohesion developed without coercion.*

When this did not seem to be the case, when either the scale or composition of immigration eroded native residents' confidence in assimilation, as in the 1840s and '50s or the 1890s, there arose conscious social efforts to restrict immigration. Thus, as the 20th century arrived, two main modes of reacting to immigration had developed — confident acceptance, alternating with efforts to restrict the flow.

A third idea, social intervention to assist assimilation by "Americanizing" the immigrant, arrived with the Progressive-era enthusiasm for social engineering. The Americanization movement was never a single enterprise, but flowered in many forms under many sponsors — immigrant leaders themselves, employers such as U.S. Steel or the business leadership in the Chamber of Commerce, churches, the YMCA, unions, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and — in time — governments. "The extent of the movement is difficult to exaggerate," is the view of one scholar. More than thirty state governments and many cities joined in, launching programs to educate the new immigrants in citizenship and hygiene, or to celebrate American national holidays and heroes. The Americanization effort, directed by governments as well as voluntary associations, and operating throughout the country, lasted for more than two decades. It peaked after World War I, and, when immigration restriction in 1921 drastically reduced the flow of foreigners, shrank back to a residual role mostly in the public schools and organizations such as the YMCA. Americanization as a prominent social movement had ended.

A Closer Look Is Needed

This generation-long experiment with Americanization has not attracted enough attention among historians. An early book, Edward Hartmann's *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant* (1948), was a sound, informative, and little-read account which depicted Americanization as having two faces: a generous and welcoming visage, and an anxiety-driven, coercive one. It remained for the influential historian John Higham, in his widely-read *Strangers in the Land* (1956), to give this interpretation a clarity and a wide recognition it could not have achieved when contained within a dry academic monograph.

Higham also discovered two varieties of Americanization, which he called the nativist and the democratic — or, in another place, 100% Americanization and Liberal Americanization. He believed the liberal version, which came first, was born in the settlement houses and among social workers, civic leaders, and some immigrant groups. It preached the doctrine of "immigrant gifts," worked to convey a sense of national welcome, and combined acceptance of foreign cultural inheritances with assistance to accelerate the transition to the American norm. The "100% American" version derived mostly from cultural anxiety — worries that middle-class values would be inundated by rural, peasant hordes, that American democracy would be undercut by the influx of millions who had not known liberty and its responsibilities.

Higham described the two decades of Americanization as an evolution toward a collision between these two emphases. You could see both impulses at work in two branches of the same organization, the North American Civic League. The Boston branch focused on what Higham summarized as "the menace of ignorant, incendiary foreigners." Since the businessmen who were the League's founders hoped to keep immigration flowing to provide cheap labor, they believed Americanization had to be tried. Boston's League sponsored evening lectures on patriotism, while sending spies into immigrant communities to keep track of unionist sentiment. By contrast, the New York branch, under leading liberal Americanizer Frances Kellor, investigated living and

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working conditions, sponsored protective legislation to reduce housing and workplace abuses, and arranged evening classes in English language skills. "Nation building is to be in the future a deliberate formative process," she wrote, "not an accidental ... arrangement." By 1912, there seemed to be a rough balance between these inclinations. Henry Ford was already attempting to remake his immigrant workers into ideal employees, believing that "these men of many nations must be taught American ways, the English language, and the right way to live." Ford's Americanization plan authorized investigation of all aspects of the immigrant workers' lives to be sure they celebrated American holidays and exhibited proper company loyalty.

"The Great War engulfed America in 1917, and decisively tilted Americanization toward the nativist impulse, but this did not mean the end of the liberal agenda."

At the same time, the Progressive Party platform of 1912 denounced "the fatal policy of indifference and neglect which has left our enormous immigrant population to become the prey of change and cupidity," and went so far as to propose federal legislation to "promote their assimilation, education and advancement."

The Great War engulfed America in 1917, and decisively tilted Americanization toward the nativist impulse, but this did not mean the end of the liberal agenda. As before, its main force came from social workers and progressive educators. Liberal Americanizers welcomed "the best of the culture, the arts, and the crafts of the Old World, that ... we may be enriched with this spiritual inheritance." Educator and philosopher John Dewey and social worker Jane Addams continued to sing the praises of immigrant gifts, and, as historian Rivka Shpak Lissak explained, "preferred a looser or more liberal definition [of Americanization], namely, like-mindedness" on certain unspecified civic principles, while tolerating considerable cultural difference in matters marginal to citizenship.

When war came, however, the issue of national unity came to overshadow all else. Was the recent immigrant — the "Hyphenate" — loyal to the Allied cause? Many suspected or feared disloyalty, especially in those of German and Irish origin, anarchists, socialists, or pacifists. As feelings intensified, culminating in the Red Scare of 1919-20, the repressive sort of Americanization seized the upper hand. "Much creditable work continued to be done," Higham wrote, "with humanity and understanding, in teaching English to foreigners ... but as a general movement Americanization now took on its most frightened and feverish aspect."

Patriotic societies adopted Americanization programs, which to them now meant hortatory, patriotic lectures and pamphlets in the schools, instructions to immigrants to revere the Constitution, to refrain from dropping rubbish in the streets, and sermons against Bolshevism. There were calls for federal aid to the states for the teaching of English to aliens, heightened interest in citizenship classes in public schools, all of which Higham cast in the context of the Red Scare — that is, as coercive and reactionary. Earlier educational opportunities, night classes in English or civics, had been voluntary, and immigrants had flocked to them. With the war, compulsory classes made their appearance, along with a hard note of insistence that native languages be given up. The U.S. Congress in the Revenue Act of 1918 doubled income tax rates on "non-resident" aliens — an ill-defined term, but clearly intended to increase pressures to naturalize. Fifteen states in 1919, Higham reported, decreed that English would be the sole language of school instruction; other states required that schoolteachers be citizens, an Oregon law required foreign-language newspapers to publish English translations, and a California law mandated that aliens pay a special poll tax of $10.20. Thus, the war had decisively shifted the balance of sentiments and forces within the Americanization movement. According to one historian:

> *The conformist tendency became paramount and the permissive, humanitarian side almost vanished. Frances Kellor herself, in her book* Straight America *published in 1916, called for loyalty, discipline, and universal military service. The national crisis had tipped the delicate balance of this reform effort toward its hard, repressive aspect. To be American-*

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ized after 1917 meant to be watched, to be forced to stop attending the local socialist club or workers' meetings designed to organize the shop.

The Tension of Dualism

Higham's seminal portrait of Americanization, rendered in his classic *Strangers in the Land* (which was to go through two hard-cover editions and sell over 116,000 paperback copies, reaching college classrooms as well as the general public) was a subtle and balanced picture that left many questions unanswered. Americanization, he explained, was not one thing, but a continuum with many possibilities. On occasion, Higham presented a dualism between two poles:

> *One ideal called on America to enlarge its national character by accepting contributions, the other to protect that character by a quarantine of infections. One pictured the nation as great in the universal range of its ties and sympathies, the other as great in the purity of its separateness. One looked toward the future growth of a still unfinished nationality; the other looked back to the past perfection of a completed pattern.*

Always there had been a mixture of and a tension between the "liberal/democratic" and the "100% American" impulses. The narrow version, with which Higham obviously had no sympathy, seized the upper hand just at the end of Americanization's generation of activity.

This style of Americanization was not only unattractive to contemporary sensibilities, it was possibly counter-productive. Immigrant communities, especially toward the end of World War I, began to fight back to defend traditional cultures against the Americanization reform movement, and a surge of cultural self-assertion arguably more than offset the assimilation promoted by Americanizers. Formerly and for two decades enthusiastically receptive to the English-language classes and other assistance of the Americanizers, immigrant spokesmen hardened against the war-transformed movement. "The future of the United States belongs not to Americanization but to Americanism," editorialized a Russian-American newspaper in 1919, groping for a distinction between invited and coerced assimilation.

This was the portrait of Americanization brought forward by Higham's 1955 book. In his account, the movement had an attractive, positive side, and was perhaps in some of its forms an important element in the process of assimilation that accelerated social adjustments beneficial to individuals and society. But this crusade also had the potential, especially under pressure of total war, to veer off into coercive and intolerant channels. Even in that national emergency of 1917-1919, however, it had been "mild indeed" when compared to similar movements in other countries, Higham thought.

The Dark Side Dominates

If Americanization efforts in the past could turn out to be either a positive complement for the natural processes promoting assimilation in times of heavy immigration, or futile exercises and a source of social friction, the history of the Americanization movement should help us to understand how such efforts are channeled in one direction or the other. Unfortunately, historians and other students of immigration have displayed too little interest in the topic, most of them mis-reading Higham to mean that the movement was a dark passage with no light, carrying only harmful potential. "Americanization is an ugly word," summed up one Italian editor in a judgment on the movement in 1919, a verdict that has come to dominate the few references to this vast effort to bring outsiders into the American mainstream.

Daniel Weinberg and Stuart Ewen offer what became a typical assessment: Americanization was an arrogant effort by a small professional class of social workers to remake immigrants in accordance with their image of what the modern world required, and nothing good can be said for it. Another historian, John F. McClymer, found an even more sinister purpose: to wed a certain definition of patriotism to the power of the State, as when national patriotic organizations arranged federal programs to disseminate textbooks and teaching aids of a propagandistic nature. This reached its peak under the Department of Justice. "More threatening both to aliens and to other federal agencies," wrote McClymer, "were the activities of the Department of Justice, which defined Americanization as the prevention of espionage and sabotage." The roots of McCarthyism can be found in this, he thought. Daniel Horowitz described an effort by a "crumbling genteel culture" to resist a "mass culture" which the historian assumed to be

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healthy and admirable by contrast. A composite of such views is found in Milton M. Gordon's influential *Assimilation in American Life* (1964), in which the only Americanization we see is the extreme version emerging at the end of World War I:

> *Anglo-conformity received its fullest expression in the so-called Americanization movement, which gripped the nation like a fever during World War I. ... The semi-hysterical attempt at pressure-cooking assimilation which was the Americanization crusade after World War I, while it contained worth-while instrumental elements [although not specified], was fundamentally misguided in its demand for a rapid personal transformation and a draconic and abrupt detachment from the cultural pattern and memories of the homeland.*

Roger Daniels, in his recent *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (1991), barely distinguishes Americanization from the harsh nativism of the period. Lawrence Fuchs' *American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture* (1990) is a more balanced account, describing the Americanization impulse as initially well-meaning, aiming only at civic loyalty:

> *The leaders of the movement acted on the assumption that immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and their children could be remade by the American environment ... the path to Citizenship was still clear, quick, and simple. The obligations of citizenship, far from being onerous, called for participation in the American system of self-government.*

But under pressures brought on by the war, Americanizers then and after insisted upon more, upon a cultural conversion which required that ethnic schools and other institutions and values be given up. "Acceptance into the political community was tainted," Fuchs thought, "by inhospitable actions towards expressions of ethnicity...." Americanization, in this view, erred when it concerned itself with language and other cultural issues. Participation in political life was common bond enough as a goal, and did not really need the reinforcement of Americanization campaigns, which were a mischievous, when not futile, mistake.

In Defense of the Defenders

The historical literature on Americanization is thus an instructive but ultimately unsatisfactory one. It consists of a number of articles and passages in books on larger topics, and one book-length monograph published forty-four years ago. Recent articles increase our information, but there has been no effort at book-length synthesis for half a century. "Americanization may well be the least studied major social movement in American history," astutely observed John F. McClymer. Beyond the disappointing size and the fragmentation of the literature on a topic of this importance, a major insight of the first two historians to investigate the subject has not been further developed, but instead has been distorted into a decidedly incomplete picture with misleading policy implications.

"...many historians conclude that the [Americanization] movement was harmful in several ways."

Thus America approaches a fourth decade of large-scale and mounting immigration with an historical memory — assuming anyone is paying any attention to the historians of Americanization — that seems to condemn those who contemplate active assistance to the assimilation process rather than trusting to social forces. The historians, especially if one consults only recent work and reads Higham too quickly, seem to have concluded that the natural processes of assimilation were working quite well in that pre-World War I time of massive immigration despite many worries to the contrary. The clear implication, even if unstated, is that Americanization was entirely unnecessary, and many historians conclude that the movement was harmful in several ways. It focused and intensified nativist resentments, and reinforced middle class and corporate management fears of radicalism. It offended and antagonized immigrant communities with its imperious demands that their culture and languages be given up at once, both in public and private. Observing Americanization as it expressed itself in 1919 at the height of the Red Scare, historian Philip Gleason was justified in saying, in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic*

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Groups, that "the major legacy of the movement was to make Americanization a bad word, even in its generic sense of assimilation."

This, in our view, is truncated history: one part of the past allowed to distort the larger story. Hartmann and Higham found a movement which began in immigrant communities a generation before the Red Scare, and one that developed two faces and sets of effects. Americanization of the "100% American" variety did flourish amid the strains of war, but it never entirely superseded the original "liberal Americanization" that arose out of a desire to welcome immigrants and enfold them in the American community.

"...recently historian John Bodnar pointed out that the most effective Americanizers were often the immigrants themselves..."

The original impulse combined a cordial acceptance of much of the ethnic cultural inheritance of these newcomers even as it vigorously promoted a core of American values thought to be the key to the future well-being of the immigrants. It wished to accelerate political empowerment and social mobility by insisting that American civic norms and the English language be adopted. And it was vigilant to defend the immigrants from exploiting "scamps" ("con men" might be the contemporary term) who met them at the dock and preyed upon them thereafter, as well as from unscrupulous slum lords and employers. (Note that the largest Chicago organization promoting Americanization named itself the Immigrant Protective League.)

These motives and the methods chosen to advance them — stressing voluntary education, and working through settlement houses, religious and civic institutions located in immigrant neighborhoods, and the schools — have been largely forgotten. So too the fact that immigrant leadership itself often launched such initiatives, and immigrant participation in the evening classes and meetings was voluntary, substantial, and therefore can be taken as an endorsement not to be dismissed. This face of Americanization has almost completely fallen out of the recent synthesis of the role of immigration in American life, while the "100% American" side remains to teach us very different lessons.

A few journal articles keep the larger picture intact, for those who search them out. Neil Batten, for example, has written that Gary, Indiana's Americanization program deserves a decidedly positive interpretation. Its emphasis on the work ethic improved corporate profits in Gary's mills but also worker compensation. Knowledge of the English language and the ability to read and understand safety manuals and instructions improved safety records. Gary's Polish-American steelworkers did not reject management-sponsored evening classes and education, and responded well to patriotic messages that defined the meaning of America in terms of liberty, democracy, and equality. Historian Robert Carlson noted that state adult education legislation "might not have passed so easily had it not been for the crusading zeal of the Americanizers." And, recently, historian John Bodnar pointed out that the most effective Americanizers were often the immigrants themselves, a point made by Hartmann in 1948 and obscured or neglected since. It was a "German-American archbishop," Bodnar writes, "who sought to curtail the use of the German language in Cincinnati," German socialists who supported public rather than private (Catholic German) schools, German Jewish leaders in New York who took part in Americanization programs in that city, and Mexican-Americans who organized the League for Latin American Citizens (LULAC) in 1929 in part to resist pressures within their community to limit school attendance — so that "excessive education" in American schools would not render young women of Mexican descent unfit for marriage. Joseph Dorinson has recently written that New York's Educational Alliance, a Jewish social work organization founded in 1889, possessed an "Americanizing, educational, social and humanizing character." Indeed, immigrants were known to use the word themselves, suggesting long-forgotten attractive qualities. Finnish-American women in Calumet, Michigan, just prior to World War I, organized an "Americanization Club" to learn American songs, history, civics, and the English language, all "to eliminate the hyphen" so that Finnish-Americans might become more American. The point is worth special emphasis. In Alan M. Kraut's words, "often, newcomers were pressurized most heavily by members of their own group to

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quickly become Americanized and not be embarrassingly different." Americanization was very substantially an immigrant-generated enterprise, impressive evidence that rapid assimilation was seen as the key to making it in America.

Recovering the Positive Side

What are the policy implications of this more balanced, sounder view of the Americanization experience? The historians of the topic do not deal explicitly with the implications of their work for future policy. Yet, implicitly, most of their writing shouts policy advice of a misleading sort. Americanization, most recent historical accounts convey, was — and thus presumably still remains — an effort both ineffective and possibly a source of new problems. The implication is that citizens and governments, as well as foundations such as yours, should leave immigrant assimilation out of their social causes and organizational work. It has been tried and found wanting.

"...["Liberal" Americanizers] would allow respected place for foreign cultures while insisting on and assisting immigrants toward that common core of values and skills that promoted the upward mobility of individuals and reinforced the country's working consensus."

It is our view that critical dismissals of the Americanization efforts of a century ago as either ineffective or shamefully "nativist" are based on the story of only one wing of the movement, toward the very end of the entire enterprise. They ignore the record of a more substantial wing that struck a positive response among immigrants themselves, and often originated there. Those Higham called "Liberal" Americanizers sought to strike a constructive balance between unity and diversity, out of a conviction that the social forces of their own era were not producing it. Unity and inclusiveness was their starting point, but they pursued it with a positive emphasis upon immigrant cultures and a commitment to sort out the claims of each. They would allow respected space for foreign cultures while insisting on and assisting immigrants toward that common core of values and skills that promoted the upward mobility of individuals and reinforced the country's working consensus.

Recognizing this dual aspect of Americanization alters the policy implications of that history. Did the Americanizing reformers do useful work, or useless and even harmful work? And what do the answers mean for us, at the other end of this century?

Most historians, at least in recent years, have found no useful work done, and have dismissed the Americanizers' concerns. This seems to us insupportable and mistaken. While some Americanizers, especially during and after World War I, certainly were unhelpful either at securing national unity or accelerating the incorporation of immigrant communities into the larger union, it goes too far to strip the many others of any credit for what followed. The social crisis of the pre-war era eased, and national divisions were manageable. A workable national consensus has been sustained throughout (we must hope) this century, no small achievement. A substantial degree of upward social mobility has fortified the American middle class and even ruling elites with the daughters and sons of people of Ireland, Italy, East and Central Europe, Africa, Mexico, Japan, and elsewhere. A Roman Catholic has been elected President, the son of a Greek immigrant nominated for President, a Native American now sits in the U.S. Senate. Assimilation has been slower than anyone's ideal, especially for African Americans and Native Americans whose years in this nation reinforce their claims to full participation. Even so, the American record with respect to both social unity and inclusiveness, in comparative focus, is an admirable one — indeed, the best in the world, among multi-ethnic societies.

How much of this achievement should be credited to three decades of Americanization campaigns early in the century, followed by similar efforts in the public schools and other remnants of this period, extending well into the second half of the century? Historical and social science scholarship has no firm answer to this question. To begin with, no one should exaggerate the role of organized social intervention in a process such as assimilation, which is primarily driven by underlying social trends and forces. Assimilation moves forward on the fast rails

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of participation in the economy, the influence of the mass media, the experience of public education and military service, and through that quintessentially private decision: intermarriage. Social intervention, of course, can under certain circumstances wield a powerful hand. The assimilation of the millions of pre-World War I immigrants was given a major, probably indispensable assist by the four-decade pause from million-a-year immigration between the 1921-24 immigration restriction laws and before the 1965 immigration law once again widened the gates. The unifying experience of World War II, another public policy measure, also accelerated the formation of a more unified and ultimately more tolerant society.

"...it is clear from the histories we have that engagement in the Americanization effort was a positive influence in the building of a more unified democracy..."

Even so, somewhere below these forces on the list there may be a respected place for the work done in settlement houses, night classes, and free public lectures of the years before World War I. The historical literature is almost mute on this question because historians have not been interested in it, and have in any event not looked in the right places. Any positive contributions from Americanization efforts must be measured primarily in the lives of individual immigrants themselves. But historians of the movement have not drawn much from immigrant sources with respect to the question: In the struggle to become an American in the fullest sense, what helped the immigrant the most, what were the turning points? No Studs Terkel moved among the immigrant masses, drawing out the oral histories of their gradual adjustment to American life. The Carnegie Foundation in 1918 initiated studies of the immigrant experience with respect to assimilation, and some of the resultant ten volumes were informed by interviews with immigrants. These fragments, along with immigrant biographies, letters and similar primary evidence, deserve more analysis. The Carnegie volumes, which are not histories but contemporary reports, made it clear that foreigners became Americans in the public schools, working in urban, English-language settings, marrying out of the group, or through exposure to mass media, and that some ethnic and racial groups moved up into the mainstream more quickly than others, the children of all groups most effortlessly and the elderly and rural most haltingly. The limited evidence has been poorly analyzed, but suggests that evening classes for adults, study groups and lectures on American traditions and the rest of the Americanization movement apparatus were thought useful in principle by both immigrants and natives, and surely in practice they made some contribution to accelerating the process where it lagged. It is even more clear that the "coercive," "compulsory," or in the words of Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut "subtractive" assimilation that surfaced so suddenly in 1916-17 was resented, and some historians theorize without much direct evidence that it delayed assimilation in some way.

Yet even now it is clear from the histories we have that engagement in the Americanization effort was a positive influence in the building of a more unified democracy, through its impact on the older-stock natives themselves. For while all Americanizers, whether old-stock or immigrant, wanted the unassimilated immigrants to change in important ways, it was perceived at the time, by the settlement community especially, that assimilated Americans of northern-European extraction had some changes of their own to make. For them there was an agenda of opening up, of enlarging themselves while including others, and some, such as Jane Addams, expressed great excitement at the prospect. The receptivity of progressives such as Addams to new immigrant cultures, their "buoyant optimism" in Hartmann's phrase, made the pre-war social crisis appear as a time of opportunity, and lent an important affirmative tone to public life.

The alternative to plunging into Americanization activities in order to unite the nation was to withdraw into apathy and separatism, retreating to the enclaves of the middle and upper-classes already assimilated into Anglo culture, abandoning human contact with the immigrant masses. Instead, liberal Americanizers worked to break down ethnic divisions. If current historical research leaves us unsure whether the immigrants were transformed in positive ways by

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such efforts, we have solid historical evidence that the Liberal Americanizers most certainly were. They placed themselves back into the ghettos, intellectually and emotionally engaging the social realities of the turn-of-the-century American city. To stigmatize this impulse as "nativism" and ineffective is by implication to discourage it in the United States of the 1990s, a judgment that would be based upon a mistaken and partial reading of history.

Cautious Affirmation

Thus the policy implications of a closer look at the historical literature on Americanization are not the implications loudly implied by the most recent historians who have forgotten the original version of that movement and remember only the wartime aberration. That aberration, "100%" or "subtractive" Americanization, was indeed a poor way of going about a good cause that needed doing — social activism aiming to hasten individual and group advancement and social assimilation, and promote national unity. In similar circumstances, if we are ever in similar circumstances, we should not go about Americanization in that way.

But an interpretation of the Americanization campaign ought not to begin with a distorted form of it, coming toward the end. We should first reach an appraisal of the original version, with its little-studied two decades of experience before the unexpected emergency of world war transformed the social and political dynamics. Both immigrants and altruistic older-stock natives, believing that immigrant assimilation was not proceeding satisfactorily when left to itself, organized to devise forms of intervention primarily through voluntary associations. The evidence suggests that the results were beneficial in a limited way, more clearly so for the old-stock volunteers who had a habit of leaving behind diaries, letters, and autobiographies, than for the immigrants whose story is less well documented. Presumably the policy implications of this assessment of this part of our history point toward a cautious affirmation of the value of social intervention to assist the assimilation process, should there come a time of massive immigration in which there is convincing evidence of impaired or uneven assimilation. Such activism runs the risk of perversion into decidedly negative formulations should war engulf the society. Finally, the best ally to the assimilation process is a lower rate of immigration itself.

Is There a Future for Americanization?

The problem with such history lessons ought to be acknowledged. The America of today is not the same country described by the historians of this earlier period. Our charge was to review the historical literature with an eye to its applications, and we should point out the hazards of deriving and applying history lessons. Some historians lean toward what might be called the "Santayana" end of the spectrum, impressed by his dictum that those who forget their history are condemned to repeat it. For them, history teaches lessons for future policy, and ignoring them leads to trouble. Others incline toward the view allegedly expressed first by Heraclitus, that you can't step in the same river twice, implying that historical analogies are a bad guide to policy in a changing world. We offer our thoughts on the implications and even applications of early 20th century Americanization history from a middle position, respectful of both viewpoints.

"...Americans in the 1990s have many reasons to compare their circumstances to a century ago. There is again large-scale immigration, and worries about assimilation."

Despite the truths embodied in the comment about rivers never being the same, Americans in the 1990s have many reasons to compare their circumstances to a century ago. There is again large-scale immigration, and worries about assimilation. A foundation considering avenues of intervention to address the problems of the 1990s will find in the history of the earlier Americanization movement both cautionary stories and strategic hints.

Organized Americanization efforts of the Liberal Americanization variety at the beginning of this century might well be a part of the solution as the century ends. We hope that this paper has adequately defined the essential character of this approach to Americanization, and also of the coercive aberration that was so unhelpful. Certainly, the notion that immigrant assimilation should be seen as a "two-way street" was an insight of the most perceptive and

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creative Americanizers of a century ago, an affirmation of the importance of mutual cultural respect.

Yet even a review of this liberal experience in organized altruism must conclude with a cautionary observation to any institution contemplating activities of this sort. Giving up native languages and customs is the hardest work of life in immigrant-receiving societies, and the voyage to assimilation is always contested. The immigrant, especially the young and the ambitious, wishes nothing so strongly as to become American for purposes of economic success and reasonable social acceptance. But history reveals that from within the immigrant community itself, from established elites in churches, political groupings, elders in the family or ethnic clubs, comes fierce resistance to "losing our own," to individuals moving outside the group. There have always been immigrant chieftains building walls around the ghetto and the flock, quick to denounce the very idea of assimilation, fearful of the loss of constituents and heirs. Americanization efforts by foundations should therefore expect to attract critics in the name of immigrant group solidarity.

"There have always been immigrant chieftains building walls around the ghetto and the flock, quick to denounce the very idea of assimilation..."

Conflict thus comes with the territory, a reality which underlines the importance of the liberal Americanizers' growing awareness that "change agents" or successfully assimilated immigrants were valuable allies. Historical perspective also confirms their instinct that negotiating the passage between cultures is best assisted not through governments, whose programs have a role to play, but primarily through voluntary associations such as that durable institution still present in most American cities — the settlement house.

If such direct involvement in institutional activities in the assimilation-assisting area are thought too risky for the most risk-averse foundations of today, there are other opportunities. The Americanization efforts early in this century lacked a national association or clearinghouse to transmit information and insights among the disparate parts of the enterprise. There is that same institutional vacuum at the apex of today's assimilation-helping efforts by foundations, governments, ethnic and community groups. And there are rich opportunities in sponsored research. The Carnegie Corporation's ten-volume study of immigrant assimilation, launched in 1918 and completed in 1921 after intensive field work, has preserved and analyzed much contemporary experience and stands as a model of social research in this field. More sponsored research could provide vital knowledge for a new era of assimilation policy.

Beyond such research, there is a need for intellectual work of a more reflective nature. Repeatedly, in our reading of the accounts of historians as well as in contemporary testimony, we encountered a confusion of purpose which invited misunderstanding and discord. To what were immigrants expected to assimilate? We can see especially well in Hartmann's meticulous history that the Americanizers (of both types) simply assumed that there was a core culture superior to all options, and that all agreed upon what that was. But there was always some confusion about what was in the core. Hartmann concludes that the immigrants were expected by Americanizers to adopt what we would in the 1970s begin to call (without agreeing what it was) America's civil religion — political participation, competence in the English language, respect for the law, some commitment to the egalitarian ideal, the work ethic. But he was hard put to find consensus on this, for Americanizers rarely discussed the matter and thus failed to clarify their internal disagreements. In practice there were widely diverging conceptions of what defined an American, and of the permissible or desirable methods for moving immigrants within those perimeters. Liberal Americanizers tended to promote a minimalist core, a blend of skills, behavior, and values. Immigrants should become literate in the English language (a skill), learn punctuality, hygiene and a healthy diet and regimen (behavior), and become committed to America's democratic political habits and the rule of law (values). These were essentially non-negotiable, but outside the core they were increasingly tolerant of "immigrant gifts" that were quite different from mainstream American habits in cuisine, dress, religion, and other customs.

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As for methods, they preferred voluntarism and assumed coercion to be unnecessary.

But the "100%ers" added to these traits a larger agenda. Thrift and sobriety defined an American (behavior), as did respect for the capitalist system and loyalty to the Ford Motor Company, perhaps conversion to Christianity, certainly the repudiation of radical/terrorist political doctrines (values). Today some would add that an American must be feminist and "ecolate" as well as literate and numerate. The Right had a larger agenda earlier in this century, but the Left could easily move in the same direction. As for methods of the 100%ers: rapid assimilation was in those earlier days a matter of pressing urgency, and some coercion and pressure was deemed to be necessary.

A conversation between these divergent conceptions of goal and method never really occurred in the first two decades of this century. There are no easy or permanent answers to the vexing questions that arise when we ask what changes immigrants should be expected to make in themselves, what aspects of themselves we are happy to leave intact, and how urgently the natives feel about the speed of the process of cultural change. But these fundamental issues are attached to this assimilation issue you have inquired about, and it would be a gift to the discussion ahead of us if someone would sponsor deeper reflection on these fundamental aspects of acculturation. Certainly if the Liberal Americanizers had made these questions of goals and methods clearer, and had better defined their definition of the core, historians might not have submerged them into the 100% faction of the movement and then virtually forgotten the distinction. ■

[*Editor's Note: The original of this essay contained a considerable number of footnotes which we elected not to print to conserve space. Interested readers should consult a fully documented version in* The Public Historian, *Vol. 15, No. 4, (Fall 1993).*]

A Novel Approach

A television newsman, overhearing the argument, asked her: "But if the Mexicans and Central Americans keep pressing in, won't this mean that eventually most of Texas will become Mexican?" and she said, looking defiantly into the camera: "If Hispanics in Central America have many babies and anglo mothers in Texas have few, I suppose there will have to be an irresistible sweep of immigrants to the north. Yes, Texas will become Spanish."

And even as she spoke, the American Congress, debating in Washington, refused to pass the reasonable Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, thus destroying any attempt by the United States to control the influx of illegals across its borders. For the most venal reasons the citizens of Texas were in the forefront of this cynical rejection of common sense; they were willing to accept immediate profits while ignoring future consequences. As a result, the immigration authorities along the Rio Grande stopped trying to stem the unceasing flow of illegals, turning their attention rather to keeping them out of the larger cities like Dallas and Amarillo; the creation of the *ipso facto* Mexican-American nation along the Rio Grande was under way. So the embittered Musquiz-Aspen Debates ended with a rousing victory for the Señorita. And the well-intentioned peasants from Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador, yearning for freedom and a decent life, continued to stream across the Rio Grande.

— From *Texas* by James Michener, Random House (1985), p. 1023.

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Canada — Troubled Neighbor

A Year-end Report

By Mark Wegierski

Though much of its territory remains barely habitable because of icy climate and poor soils, Canada is still a vast country with incredibly abundant natural resources, including the world's largest supply of fresh water. But it is in a very difficult position today because of its politics. The traditional Canadian deference to political authority has contributed to a situation of broad acceptance of whatever Canada's Ottawa-and-Toronto-centered managerial, media, and therapeutic elites dish out.

The Political Setting

Ottawa (with Hull across the river) is Canada's federal center, once carved out of the wilderness like Brasília, a place for politicians and civil-service mandarins. The greater Toronto area is Canada's largest metropolis (the final destination of four out of eleven immigrants) and media center, as well as the political capital of Ontario, Canada's second-largest but wealthiest and most populous province with 10 million people. Quebec, first in territorial size, second in population, tends to be one of the poorer provinces. Montreal is Canada's second-largest city, one of the largest French-speaking cities in the world, and relatively cosmopolitan, especially in relation to Quebec City, once the main fortress of old French Quebec and now the political capital. Vancouver, on the West Coast, is the only major truly international city in the Western Canadian region, having a flavor of Seattle or even California. With the large migration from Hong Kong, it increasingly looks to the Pacific Rim.

Canada is a federal constitutional monarchy of the British Commonwealth with a parliamentary system. The head of the national government and the primary decision maker is the prime minister, the leader of the party with the majority of members in the federal House of Commons which is divided into geographic "ridings" from which members are elected on a "first-past-the-post" basis. Executive and legislative functions are conjoined in the Canadian Parliament, and a prime minister with a full majority in the House of Commons is formally much stronger than an American President. The prime minister — for good or for ill — is effectively the epicenter of the Canadian political system, even though he or she exercises authority with the symbolic permission of the monarch (Queen Elizabeth II, who is represented by the governor-general at the federal level and by lieutenant-governors at the provincial level. There is a Senate, or upper house, which can only delay legislation, whose members are *de facto* appointed by the prime minister (effectively for life) as vacancies arise.

Canada is a federal state, a national government which has jurisdiction over the sparsely populated northern territories as well as the ten provinces with their own elected governments and premiers (who play a role similar to the prime minister's, within their own jurisdictions). Balancing off the competing regional interests of the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec, and Western Canada is a crucial aspect of Canadian politics.

The provinces are similar to American states, but, generally speaking, they are larger and have more extensive effective powers. The larger provinces would approximate major regions in the United States. A possible analogy for the importance — and potential disruptiveness — of the Quebec situation would be to try to envision the American South existing under one large and possibly independence-minded state government but having the combined number of representatives and senators in the federal Congress as it does today.

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National Identity Attenuated

Canada (including Quebec) currently has a population of 27 million. Its immigration policy foresees receiving about a quarter-million persons a year for many years to come. According to official statistics, 75 percent of all immigrants to Canada between 1981 and 1991 were from non-European countries. This trend is expected to continue or increase. (A quarter-million persons a year, incidentally, means that, over ten years, roughly 8 percent of the country's total population will consist of new arrivals, over 20 years, about 16 percent, and over 30 years about 22 percent, not including the children borne by these generally young immigrants, and a possibly quite-substantial illegal immigration.) Quebec's population now is around 7 million, with a non-French population of about 1.5 million. Some among the latter group, notably the English of Montreal and the Eastern Townships, have long-standing traditions in the province, but others are very recent arrivals.

"The Québecois increasingly desire a linguistically pure nation of their own..."

English-Canadian national identity, never very strong to begin with, has grown increasingly attenuated in the late twentieth century. Consequently, the French of Quebec have been able to exercise ever-increasing degrees of influence in the Canadian state, both by playing on English-Canadian guilt (French Quebec had been conquered by the British by 1760, and the French had been second-class citizens for many years) and through their own authentic cultural identity, which — once expressed in fervent Roman Catholicism — now has come to reside almost exclusively in their language. But the unfolding modernization of Quebec, like that in nineteenth-century Europe, has created a fully self-conscious Québecois people who, unlike their devout ancestors, no longer are able to accept playing an equal or even dominant role in a Canadian state. The Québecois increasingly desire a linguistically pure nation-state of their own, an impulse that former Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau had attempted to fight (in the late '60s, '70s, and early '80s) by offering French Quebec the aforementioned coast-to-coast influence.

In the last few years, the Québecois position has come under increasing attack, partly because of such actions as the anti-English language and education legislation, which have come to be seen as markedly intolerant by the rest of Canada (and by non-French minorities inside Quebec) as well as because of the very fact they seem very close to becoming a territorial nation-state themselves. They would move from looking like the oppressed minority in Canada to being seen as the oppressive majority in Quebec.

Canada had moved briefly into the international spotlight with the defeat of the nationwide referendum of October 26, 1992, and its aftermath. The referendum was based on expressing straight approval or disapproval for a new constitutional deal reached by then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (from the Progressive Conservative party), all ten provincial premiers, and aboriginal and northern-territorial representatives. The crux of the referendum was to bring Quebec into Canada by offering a constitutional package acceptable to the province, which still has not signed the new version of the Canadian constitution Trudeau "patriated" from Britain in 1982. The 1992 Charlottetown Accords had been reached in the wake of the failure in 1990 of a somewhat similar package: the 1987 Meech Lake Accord.

The irony is that the Québecois now effectively defend the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty or supremacy (that is, that a lawfully elected majority in Parliament generally is bound in its legislation by customary traditions, but not by having to conform to explicitly stated provisions of individual or other rights in a written document, as interpreted through judicial review). Quebec's language legislation clearly challenges the spirit of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was attached in 1982 to the other written and customary parts of Canada's constitution, most notably the British North America Act of 1867. The act formally constituted the federal state from the provinces and preexistent historical regions of Ontario (Upper Canada), Quebec (Lower Canada), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. Tiny Prince Edward Island (in the Gulf of St. Lawrence) joined in 1873. Except for Newfoundland (a Crown Colony until 1949), the other parts of the country — most notably the

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Western provinces of (going east-to-west) Manitoba (1870), Saskatchewan (1905), Alberta (1905) (these three called the Prairie provinces) and British Columbia (1871) — had come in by 1905.

Reflecting the deep-seated malaise of the Canadian polity, the proposed constitutional package of 1992 was solidly defeated. Forces for the "no" side included Quebec separatists (or *sovereigntistes*) and, among others in English Canada, critics from the Left such as feminist and aboriginal women's groups (and Trudeau), and critics from the Right (for example, Preston Manning's Reform Party, based largely in Western Canada). Since the "yes" vote was concentrated in the Maritimes (consisting of relatively small and poor provinces that traditionally look to the federal government for benefits and programs); Ottawa-Hull; West Montreal, where most of the non-French minorities of Quebec live; and the Greater Toronto area — it might be generally read as an inchoate revolt of the heartlands of the country against the elites who now run it.

"...since 1984, the numbers [of immigrants] — after about two years at 80,000 or so — suddenly exploded ... to about a quarter-million per year."

The 1993 election was called in early September by Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell. After Brian Mulroney's well-timed resignation after ten years as leader of the party, and nine years as prime minister, she had been chosen out of five contenders on June 13, 1993, as leader of her party (and thereby prime minister) at the party's leadership convention. The Tories were very unpopular because of their carrying through of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement over which the 1988 election was waged, and which won a second term for Mulroney (it had perceptibly deepened the impact of the onrushing recession), as well as for the implementation of the Goods & Services Tax (GST), the Canadian version of a value-added tax. Despite some sharp rhetoric, the opposition to NAFTA of Jean Chretien, the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister, has been minimal, as is seen in his choice of a pro-NAFTA Trade Minister and so-called fiscally-conservative ministers in his economic portfolios.

Open Refugee Policy

In immigration policy since 1984, the numbers — after about two years at 80,000 or so — suddenly exploded in a curious policy shift to about a quarter-million a year. This was exacerbated by a ridiculously open refugee policy, which meant that anyone claiming to be a refugee had to be given a full judicial hearing, and, during the time they were waiting for it, welfare, food allowance, free housing, free medical and dental care. It was the activism of Canada's Supreme Court which decided that anyone claiming refugee status had to be accorded an individual hearing, under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the Charter applied to any person being in Canada, citizen or not. It also established that any person born in Canada was automatically a Canadian citizen. A whole refugee adjudication infrastructure was brought into existence, with refugee-court judges receiving salaries of at least $80,000 *per annum*. The Canadian government has had to pay the legal costs for the immigration lawyers representing the refugee claimants — a figure running into the hundreds of millions. There were further expenditures such as paying legal aid for refugee-claimants that had committed crimes during their stay in the country — costs which have apparently already run into the tens of millions. It might finally be said that the rejection rate for refugees was very low, and that less than 1 percent of deportation orders were actually carried out. In other cases the refugee-claimant either became an untraceable illegal immigrant, melting into the grey economy, or even continued to collect government support in some different fashion.

Canada A Nation of Immigrants?

Canada's current immigration policies are related to its elites' embrace of multiculturalism as official state policy and *credo*. This promulgates the notion that Canada is and has always been "a nation of immigrants," and that therefore any opposition to large-scale dissimilar immigration is both racist and "un-Canadian." The fact is that the briefest glance at demographic statistics will show that Canada (or those historical regions in the East which would constitute the Canadian state) were, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, almost

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exclusively European, and that persons descended from the British Isles (most of whom explicitly defined Canada as a British North American country) constituted almost three-quarters of the population at the turn of the century, while the other quarter consisted mostly of French-Canadians. There is also the fact that, although Canada did receive large numbers of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe and other places during its history, these were generally people who neither asked for — nor were offered — government handouts of any sort. The embrace of high immigration levels, welfare for all, and multiculturalism — or what, more honestly, should be called multiracialism — was never really put to a popular vote or test. It basically came along in the baggage of the over-all welfare-state delivered to all Canadians by the Liberal and New Democratic parties.

"Canada's current immigration policies are related to its elites' embrace of multiculturalism as official state policy and credo."

One Party Talked Immigration

In English Canada, there was only one major political party which addressed these and related issues during the 1993 election, if in a *sotto voce* way: the Reform Party, which had emerged in 1987 as a Western-Canadian-based, populist protest-movement. The Reform Party did its best to embrace a deliberately moderate program, and quickly expelled members who were too blunt — perhaps the safest course to follow in a society like Canada's today. For example, William Gairdner (never formally a member of the Reform Party) who has published two controversial bestsellers, *The Trouble With Canada,* and *The War Against the Family* (both by Stoddart) is no longer invited to address Reform gatherings, because of one quote in one of his books — drawn to attention by the media — which suggested limiting Asian immigration to Western Canada. Recently, a campaign manager for a defeated Reform candidate, was quickly expelled after poublicity about his letter that referred to women's and minority groups as "parasites of society." Reform also got burned when members of Canada's tiny neo-Nazi group attempted to infiltrate several riding associations. Though they were booted out immediately upon discovery, the media did its best to tar Reform with the neo-Nazi brush. Yet, despite all the ongoing criticism and hand-wringing of the media about the allegedly "extreme right-wing and racist" Reform Party, in the federal election, held on October 25, 1993, Reform won 52 seats in the 295-seat national Parliament, and came in second in 79 other ridings — 56 in Ontario.

However, the really big story of the election was the annihilation of the Tories down to only two seats (including the defeat of Prime Minister Campbell in her own riding.) The recipients of a vast flood of votes were in fact the Liberals (in many ridings, Liberal candidates received more votes than all the other contenders *combined*) which allowed them to form a commanding majority in the House of Commons (177 seats), including 98 out of 99 Ontario seats.

Immigrants "Good" — Buy Cars

Despite their over-all victory, the Liberals had failed to win the support of the majority of French Canada, who voted for the Bloc Québécois, a party which was going to take the case for Quebec sovereignty to the federal Parliament. They won 54 seats in Quebec (which gives them Official Opposition status in the House of Commons), that being, of course, the only area in which they ran. (One ex-Tory running as an independent was also elected in Quebec.) Although their leader, Lucien Bouchard, said in the big televised debate (October 11, 1993) that he "loved immigrants," Quebec today exercises a far greater degree of independent control of its immigration policy than the rest of Canada. During that debate, it was suggested by three of the five participants that an immigration rate of 1 percent of a given country's population is virtually a scientifically infallible optimum. Taking compounding into account, this would mean that in 10 years, 10.5 percent of the population would be foreign-born, in 15 years, 16.1 percent, and in 20, 22 percent. (Since immigrants tend to be younger than the native-born population, their death-rate would also be lower, and they could probably have more children, thus further increasing their proportional weight in the country.) Preston Manning also professed to love immigrants, but suggested that immigration might now be lowered to about 150,000 a year, if it were to be

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generally driven by Canada's economic needs, and more geared to its absorptive capacity, in a time of severe recession. Chretien responded by stating categorically that immigrants are good for the economy, since every new immigrant is a new consumer, buying a car, fridge, etc.

The New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada's left-wing third party, had a bad showing in the election, being reduced from 43 to 9 seats, though virtually their entire vote went to the Liberals.

One could examine who voted for the Liberals as a way of analyzing Canada's current crisis. First of all, virtually all workers in government, including those in the expansive social sectors, teaching, etc., fearful of even the most minimal deficit-cutting — which would hurt their privileged position. (Canada has the second-largest over-all government sector *per capita* in the industrialized world — next to Sweden's.) Second, virtually all well-paid, highly-unionized blue-collar workers, fearful again of economic retrenchments that would hurt their position. Third, virtually all immigrants, especially recent immigrants, fearful of immigration cutbacks by either the Tories or the Reform Party. Fourth, virtually all persons receiving welfare, etc., fearful of cutbacks in social payments. Fifth, many seniors, who were frightened by Liberal scaremongering that they would lose their pensions and Medicare to Tory or Reform cutbacks. Sixth, virtually all erstwhile NDP supporters (partially coterminous with above groups), because of resentment at Ontario NDP Premier Bob Rae's so-called "social contract" cutbacks against government workers. Seventh, there were unemployed or underemployed persons who placed their hopes in the mirage of Liberal "job-creation." (The Liberals began backtracking on these promises in their first few weeks in office, pleading that they had no prior knowledge of the real size of the Tory deficit they had inherited.) Eighth, a surprising portion of Canada's big corporate elite swung its support behind the Liberals, as evidenced by such events as the $2,500-a-plate fundraising dinner in Montreal. Ninth, there were many young people, correctly brought up by Left-liberal-leaning education systems (particularly in Ontario where education is under provincial jurisdiction). Tenth, there were persons who, without examining issues, simply felt a change in government was due. Finally, there were those who still believed in the Liberal party that their forefathers had voted for of yore, and could not perceive the sea-change it had undergone.

The Québecois of French Canada — fervent in their nationalism — generally voted against the Liberals. In Alberta and British Columbia (the two westernmost provinces), the Reform vote extended across the entire social spectrum. However, in Ontario (where Reform won the single seat that didn't go to the Liberals), the main social sectors who by and large did not vote for the Liberals were the independent, thrifty, hardworking, modestly-living urban and rural small-property-holders (or lower middle-class) and part of the working-classes (including many of the working poor). They certainly had no interest in supporting higher taxes, bigger government, lax laws, and more immigration. Like them, the pensioners, white ethnics, blue-collar workers, and English-Canadians outside Southern Ontario (as well as the numerous, already too-well-qualified but unemployed or underemployed white-collar workers), who *did* vote mostly for the Liberals, likely will find themselves largely excluded from the new Liberal regime.

The new Liberal regime (in power for up to five years) will be driven by two main interests: following the megamedia trends set by Greater Toronto, and pacifying Quebec. It is unlikely to care very much about the rest of the country, or about social sectors outside of urban Southern Ontario and West Montreal. So Canada is in an age where English-Canadians outside Greater Toronto and Ottawa, small-property-holders, and white ethnics like Ukrainians, Poles, and Portuguese are "out" (the Chretien Cabinet has *no* Eastern Europeans, and only one, particularly liberal, Southern European, in charge of immigration). Urban elites, government bureaucrats, welfare activists, and persons of color are "in." The supposed "pincer-movement" of Reform from the West, and the Bloc Québécois from the East, is still many years away, if it will happen at all. Such is the condition of Canada at the end of 1993. ■

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The novel The Camp of the Saints *by Jean Raspail (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1973) has stirred new controversy recently having been cited in several stories in U.S. magazines and newspapers. To help our readers understand the author's perspective,* THE SOCIAL CONTRACT *asked advisory board member Gerda Bikales to translate from the French his preface to the third edition, 1985.*

The Camp of the Saints

By Jean Raspail

Published for the first time in 1973, *Camp of the Saints* is a novel that anticipates a situation which seems plausible today and foresees a threat that no longer seems unbelievable to anyone: it describes the peaceful invasion of France, and then of the West, by a third world burgeoned into multitudes. At all levels — global consciousness, governments, societies, and especially every person within himself — the question is asked belatedly: what's to be done?

What's to be done, since no one would wish to renounce his own human dignity by acquiescing to racism? What's to be done since, simultaneously, all persons and all nations have the sacred right to preserve their differences and identities, in the name of their own future and their own past?

Our world was shaped within an extraordinary variety of cultures and races, that could only develop to their ultimate and singular perfection through a necessary segregation. The confrontations that flow (and have always flowed) from this, are not racist, nor even racial. They are simply part of the permanent flow of opposing forces that shape the history of the world. The weak fade and disappear, the strong multiply and triumph.

For example, since the time of the Crusades and the great land and sea discoveries, and up to the colonial period and its last-ditch battles, Western expan-sionism responded to diverse motivations — ethical, political, or economic — but racism had no part and played no role in it, except perhaps in the soul of evil people. The relative strength of forces was in our favor, that's all. That these were applied most often at the expense of other races — though some were thereby saved from their state of mortal torpor — was merely a consequence of our appetite for conquest and was not driven by or a cover for ideology. Now that the relationship between the forces has been diametrically reversed, and our ancient West — tragically now in a minority status on this earth — retreats behind its dismantled fortifications while it already loses the battles on its own soil, it begins to behold, in astonishment, the dull roar of the huge tide that threatens to engulf it. One must remember the saying on ancient solar calendars: "It is later than you think..." The above reference did not come from my pen. It was written by Thierry Maulnier, in connection with *Camp of the Saints*, as it happens. Forgive me for citing yet another, by Professor Jeffrey Hart of Dartmouth, a literary historian and a famous American columnist: "Raspail is not writing about race, he is writing about civilization..."

"...my true character came through in this book, precisely in the coarse humor found in it, derisory humor, the comical under the tragic, a certain amount of clowning as an antidote to the apocalypse."

After all, *Camp of the Saints* is a symbolic book, a sort of prophecy, dramatized rather brutally by means of shipboards, at the rhythm of inspiration. For if any book came to me through inspiration, I confess that it was precisely this one. Where the devil would I otherwise have drawn the courage to write it? I came out of these eighteen months of work unrecognizable, judging by the photograph on the back of the jacket of the first edition in 1973: my face exhausted, older by ten years than my age today, and with the look of someone tormented by too many visions. And yet, my true character came through in this book, precisely in the coarse humor found in it, derisory humor, the comical under the tragic, a certain amount of clowning as an antidote to

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the apocalypse. I have always maintained that in spite of its subject matter *Camp of the Saints* is not a sad book and I am grateful to some, notably to Jean Dutour, who have understood that exactly: "That West of ours having become a buffoon, its final tragedy could well be a joke. That is why this terrible book is basically so funny..."

But, to go back to the action in *Camp of the Saints* — if it is a symbol, it doesn't arise from any utopia; it *no longer* arises from any utopia. If it is a prophecy, we live its beginnings today. Simply, in *Camp of the Saints*, it is treated as a classic tragedy, according to the literary principles of unity of time, place and action: everything takes place within three days along the shores of Southern France, and it is there that the destiny of white people is sealed. Though the action was then already well developed along the lines described in *Camp of the Saints* (boat people, the radicalization of the North African community and of other foreign groups in France, the strong psychological impact of human rights organizations, the inflamed evangelism of the religious leadership, a hypocritical purity of consciences, refusal to look the truth in the face, etc.) in actuality the unraveling will not take place in three days but, almost certainly, after many convulsions, during the first decades of the third millennium, barely the time of one or two generations. When one knows what constitutes a generation in our old European lands — a rump-generation in the image of a rump-family and a rump-nation — the heart constricts in anticipation, and is overwhelmed by discouragement. It's enough to go back to the scary demographic predictions for the next thirty years, and those I will cite are the most favorable ones: encircled by seven billion people, only seven hundred million of them white, hardly a third of them in our little Europe, and those no longer in bloom but quite old. They face a vanguard of four hundred million North Africans and Muslims, fifty percent of them less than twenty years old, those on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean arriving ahead of the rest of the world! Can one imagine for a second, in the name of whatever ostrich-like blindness, that such a disequilibrium can endure?

At this juncture, the moment has arrived to explain why, in *Camp of the Saints*, it is human masses coming from the far-away Ganges rather than the shores of the Mediterranean that overwhelm the South of France. There are several reasons for this. One pertains to prudence on my part, and especially to my refusal to enter the false debate about racism and anti-racism in French daily life, as well as my revulsion at describing the racial tensions already discernible (but for the moment not fit for discussion) for fear of exacerbating them. To be sure, a mighty vanguard is already here, and expresses its intention to stay even as it refuses to assimilate; in twenty years they will make up thirty percent, strongly motivated foreigners, in the bosom of a people that once was French. It's a sign, but it is only one sign. One could stop there. One could even engage in some skirmishes, all the while ignoring, or pretending to ignore that the real danger is not only here, that it is elsewhere, that it is yet to come, and that by its very size it will be of a different order. For I am convinced that at the global level things will unleash as at a billiard game, where the balls start moving one after the other following an initial shove, which can start up in this or that immense reservoir of misery and multitudes, such as the one over there, alongside the Ganges. It will probably not happen as I have described it, for the *Camp of the Saints* is only a parable, but in the end the result will not be any different, though perhaps in a form more diffused and therefore *seemingly* more tolerable. The Roman empire did not die any differently, though, it's true, more slowly, whereas this time we can expect a more sudden conflagration. It is said that history does not repeat itself. That's very foolish. The history of our planet is made up of successive voids and of the ruins that others have strewn about as they each had their turn, and that some have at times regenerated.

"It will probably not happen as I have described it, for* The Camp of the Saints *is only a parable, but in the end the result will not be any different..."

For the West is empty, even if it has not yet become really aware of it. An extraordinarily inventive civilization, surely the only one capable of meeting the challenges of the third millennium, the West has no soul left. At every level — nations,

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races, cultures, as well as individuals — it is always the soul that wins the decisive battles. It is only the soul that forms the weave of gold and brass from which the shields that save the strong are fashioned. I can hardly discern any soul in us. Looking, for example, at my own country, France, I often get the impression, as in a bad dream dreamt wide-awake, that many Frenchmen of true lineage are no longer anything but hermit-clams that live in shells abandoned by the representatives of a species, now disappeared, that was known as "French" and which did not forecast, through some unknown genetic mystery, the one that at century's end has wrapped itself in this name. They are content to just endure. Mechanically, they ensure their survival from week to week, ever more feebly. Under the flag of an illusory internal solidarity and security, they are no longer in solidarity with anything. or even cognizant of anything that would constitute the essential commonalities of a people. In the area of the practical and materialistic, which alone can still light a spark of interest in their eyes, they form a nation of petty bourgeois which, in the name of the riches it inherited and is less and less deserving of, rewards itself — and continues to reward itself in the middle of crisis — with millions of domestic servants: immigrants. Ah! How they will shudder! The domestics have innumerable relatives on this side and beyond the seas, a single starving family that populates all the earth. A global Spartacus... To cite but one example from hundreds, the population of Nigeria, in Africa, has close to seventy million inhabitants which it is incapable of feeding even while it spends more than fifty percent of its oil income to buy food. At the dawn of the third millennium, there will be a hundred million Nigerians and the oil will be gone.

But the petty bourgeois, deaf and blind, continues to play the buffoon without knowing it. Still miraculously comfortable in his lush fields, he cries out while glancing toward his nearest neighbor: "Make the rich pay!" Does he know, does he finally know that it is he who is the rich guy, and that the cry for justice, that cry of all revolutions, projected by millions of voices, is rising soon against him, and only against him. That's the whole theme of *Camp of the Saints*.

So, what to do?

I am a novelist. I have no theory, no system nor ideology to propose or defend. It just seems to me that we are facing a unique alternative: either learn the resigned courage of being poor or find again the inflexible courage to be rich. In both cases, so-called Christian charity will prove itself powerless. The times will be cruel.

— J. R.

Arthur F. Corwin, In Memoriam

Arthur Corwin, an immigration researcher who specialized in Mexican migration, "irredentist" movements, and economics, died on Oct. 28, 1993 in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He was 69.

A graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, the University of the Americas, and the University of Chicago (Ph.D.), Dr. Corwin served as an immigration specialist for Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee, and held faculty appointments teaching history and social sciences at the universities of Connecticut, Kentucky, California at Davis, Texas, Puerto Rico, and Nuevo Leon (Mexico).

His published works include: *Contemporary Mexican Attitudes Toward Population, Poverty, and Public Opinion; Immigrants — and Immigrants: Perspectives on Mexican Labor Migration to the United States;* and *Illegal Immigration: Job Displacement & Social Costs*. A frequent contributor to journals of scholarship and opinion, including THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Dr. Corwin was working with Donald Huddle on a book dealing with the economic aspects of immigration at the time of his death.

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This article appeared in the December 24, 1992 issue of La Presse, *published in Montreal. The original heading was "Immigration Must Be Stopped" with the sub-head: "According to a study by the French Language Council, this measure would prevent the decline of the French language in Quebec." It was translated from the French by Gerda Bikales, a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of* THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

Immigration to French Canada

By Francois Berger

A reduction in immigration is practically the only measure that can prevent the decline of the French language in Quebec, according to a study by the French Language Council.

The study of demographic and language trends, of which *La Presse* has obtained a copy, is part of a series of inquiries presented last month to the Council at a private seminar on issue related to Quebec's language policies. The Council must soon make recommendations to the Quebec government in connection with the revisions of its language policies.

Immigration to Quebec "exerts a major but negative impact on the percentage of French-speakers" whose decline is "inevitable" by the turn of the century, according to Marc Termote, the author of the study, a researcher at the National Institute of Scientific Research (NISR), affiliated with the University of Quebec.

Mr. Termote, who is himself of foreign origin, advocates a "more restrictive" immigration policy so that French-speakers don't end up as a minority on the island of Montreal in a little over fifty years. In 2046, only 47 percent of Montreal and Laval residents will have French as their everyday language (72 percent in all of Quebec) if immigration is maintained at present levels. Montreal is the preferred destination for nine out of ten immigrants.

Immigrants are more inclined to use English rather than French, according to documentation which also confirms that *allophones* (those speaking neither French nor English) disproportionately tend to keep their mother tongue. Two-thirds do so in Quebec (less than a third do so in the rest of Canada.)

In just two generations (in the year 2046), Montreal will have a multiethnic face similar to the urban masses in Toronto, Los Angeles, or Marseille, explained Mr. Termote in an interview yesterday at *La Presse*. By 2001, *allophones* who keep their native tongue as their everyday language will represent 21 percent of the population of Montreal and Laval islands, and a third of the population by 2046.

Soon after the turn of the century, there will be more *allophones* than English-speakers in Montreal. Currently, *allophones* are 13 percent of the population of Montreal and Laval. English-speakers are 24 percent of the region's population, but they leave Quebec for other Canadian provinces in the highest numbers.

According to the study, not only will the proportion of French-speakers decline "inevitably" in Quebec, and particularly in Montreal, but their actual numbers will also decline. Mr. Termote's statistical data show that, for the first time, the fertility of French-speakers is the lowest of all linguistic groups. Fertility rates for French-speakers in the Montreal region have even gone down below that of English-speakers. It is the *allophones* who are reproducing most rapidly.

"...the government is left only with immigration to tinker with as a way to stop the decline of the French language in Quebec."

As French-speakers have very low fertility, and it would be politically unthinkable to engage in pro-natalist policies addressed only to them, the government is left only with immigration to tinker with as a way to stop the decline of the French language in Quebec.

Professor Termote's study shows that immigrants, three-quarters of them speaking neither French nor English at their arrival in Quebec, favor the use of English over French (3 times as much).

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Resorting to French-speaking immigrants cannot be of much help in securing the [future of the] language in Quebec, said Mr. Termote, because it would be politically difficult, once again, to discriminate especially in their favor. Furthermore, it is precisely those coming from the French-speaking countries of Europe that most often leave Quebec after immigrating there.

Mr. Termote is "very skeptical" about the effectiveness of coercive measures such as the obligation of immigrant children to be schooled in French. "One doesn't change languages just like that, because of a law," he said, noting that this generally happens just once in a person's lifetime. Furthermore, the critical age for linguistic transfer is between 25 and 44, "when the transfer becomes quasi-final," according to the study.

For Mr. Termote, the only efficient and acceptable way to retain the proportion of French-speakers in Quebec is by restricting immigration. The changeover to French by immigrants is also an "unavoidable necessity," he said, but that "can only yield results in the long term" and it would require that the political measures of francization be very major (the language of work, of communication, of public administration, cultural policies, etc).

The study concludes that in the short or medium term, immigration must be stopped. Right now, the level of immigration to Quebec is historically very high, said Mr. Termote. Last year, Quebec welcomed more than 50,000 immigrants and the level of immigration has quadrupled in the course of the last five years.

In the interview, Mr. Termote stated that in relation to its number of inhabitants, "Quebec is beating world records" in immigration. Only Australia, which promotes a policy of "peopling" the land, beats Canada and Quebec on this score. ■

The Biologist's Corner

Alien Invasion!

One theory has it that they came in 1982 in the bilge of a Cuban ship trading with its then partner, the USSR. Since then, these aliens have multiplied rapidly, and have now taken over the territory!

"They" are the West Atlantic ctenophores, a jellyfish-like creature that reproduces rapidly and eats everything in sight: huge quantities of zooplankton, small crustaceans, and the eggs and larva of fish. Hence, they kill fish both directly and by depriving them of food. The "territory" they have taken over is the Black and Azov Seas.

In the absence of their natural enemies in the new location the number of jellyfish has mushroomed. In the Black Sea, they at times make up 95 percent of the wet biomass: there are virtually no fish left. In the shallow Azov Sea, which the *Encyclopedia Britannica* describes as having an extraordinarily high level of biological productivity, the fish catch dropped by 200,000 tons due largely to ctenophore predation. The fisheries have simply shut down.

Given the drainage pattern of the Black Sea, it is no surprise that the ctenophore has now appeared in the Mediterranean, from where it is only a small hop to the Red Sea, one of the richest salt water environments on earth. Does a similar fate await these bodies of water?

It is not hard to envision how the collapse of an important food source might effect human migration pressures. What will be hard to accept in many quarters is that this biological debacle is the result of the very type of economic activity — constantly expanding trade — that is now being widely touted as a *solution* to many of mankind's migration problems.

One of today's big mysteries: Where are the biologists when it comes to discussing and projecting the future under NAFTA, the Maastricht Treaty and the GATT talks? We hope they soon come out of hiding ... before the economists, cooped up in their theoretical world, collapse even more of the real world in which the rest of us must live. ■

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George High is a retired diplomat who served with the U.S. State Department for 30 years. He held positions in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil and concluded his career as a specialist in political asylum. Since August, 1992 he has been executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington, D.C. research institute.

Outlook Under the New Immigration Commissioner

By George High

Although she has only been in office several months, initial statements and earlier writings by the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Doris Meissner, provide indicators of the direction she is likely to take. These suggest concentration on management and procedures, and some adjustments in handling illegal immigrants, but no attention to the larger question of the number of legal immigrants to be allowed into the country each year.

Meissner has stated that her major priorities will be developing greater professionalism at the INS, controlling immigration with compassion, encouraging immigrants to naturalize, and assuming a larger role for the INS in policy leadership.

The Commissioner has stressed the importance of the family unification priority, claiming that this provides important skills to the work force and encourages cultural adaptation. She argues that immigration is a self-selecting process which brings to the United States hard workers and quality people. On the opposite tack, others, like labor economist Vernon Briggs, identify family unification priorities as a principal source of unskilled labor in a declining and already saturated unskilled job market.

Meissner cautiously claims that new immigrants do not "directly" displace large numbers of native workers "at the outset," but she acknowledges that they undermine overall working conditions and impede labor market adjustments. She seems to recognize the need for secure identification to strengthen employer sanctions against the hiring of illegal aliens, but she has said that the whole program needs to be reviewed.

While she supports INS efforts to speed up political asylum procedures (an effort apparently aimed at drawing support away from even stronger proposals by Congressman Romano Mazzoli and Senator Alan Simpson to address spurious claims), she fails to recognize that many claimants from Central America do not come from areas of conflict and are exploiting the asylum process to find work. The commissioner trusts that greater resources will allow INS to process asylum claims promptly and deal with a backlog of 329,000 cases, but so far the administration has not funded the required staff increases, and a number of elements in the program (like effective procedures to deport persons whose claims are denied) are only wishes.

In hopes of reducing the tensions building in the United States, the commissioner intends to expand the naturalization functions of INS to encourage legal alien residents to become citizens. She sees this as a way to absorb immigrants more effectively into the social structure.

"...Meissner also recognizes the importance of 'a new international imperative, the right of individuals to stay where they are.' How she would define and deal with that remains to be seen."

Papers that Meissner wrote previously for *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Trilateral Commission give insights into her views on migration, which she accurately describes as a defining issue of the post-Cold War world. She is critical of European national leaders, faced with a large number of legal and illegal immigrants, for closing down their borders and resisting migrant flows. She calls on them to recognize Europe as a

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region of immigration. In contrast, she applauds those Europeans responsible for measures to establish a more expansive European immigration policy and to recognize the continent's responsibility to welcome immigrants.

She might apply that same test to the United States, which she criticizes for having a narrow and legalistic interpretation of asylum claims. Apparently she is not comfortable with the wisdom of the authors of the post-war international conventions. They established asylum protection for a limited number of the most endangered migrants so that they would be well-received and so that host societies would not be overwhelmed by larger flows and react negatively.

Yet Meissner also recognizes the importance of "a new international imperative, the right of individuals to stay where they are." How she would define and deal with that remains to be seen. While there is hope that the Commissioner might come to a clearer recognition of the negative effects of large and uninterrupted flows of immigrants coming to the United States or of the relation of immigrant numbers to the job market, there seems to be little prospect that she will initiate an examination of our very high level of legal immigration. But such a review may be forced upon her by popular pressures and initiatives from Congress, such as the Reid Bill, which, *inter alia*, would cap legal migration at 300,000 annually, well below the present level of over 800,000 persons.

In summary, we can expect efforts aimed at more competent administration from INS Commisioner Meissner, and some tinkering at the margins of policy, but there are no signs that she will undertake a full-scale re-examination of the purposes and impact of legal immigration and its relationship to the national interest. ■



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Wayne Lutton is an historian and an associate editor of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. *He has written extensively in the field of immigration including articles and reviews for such journals as* National Review *and* Chronicles, *and the book,* The Immigration Time Bomb.

The INS Investigations Division:

A Neglected Contributor to Immigration Control

By Wayne Lutton

Immigration-related stories captured many of the headlines throughout 1993. Highlighting the year's events were three extraordinary incidents:

- The assassination of CIA employees at the entrance gate of the Agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, by an alien who had asked for "asylum";
- The bombing of the World Trade Center by Islamic terrorists who had likewise been permitted to stay in this country after petitioning for "asylum";
- The arrival in U.S. waters of five large freighters packed with illegal Chinese aliens, including one ship called the *Golden Venture* which ran aground off the coast of Long Island. This particular episode helped publicize the extensive smuggling trade controlled by foreign criminal organizations.

By the end of the year over 170 bills had been introduced in the U.S. House and Senate by members of Congress scrambling to impress their angry constituents with just how "realistic" and "tough" they are when it comes to immigration policy. Although this new concern over the topic was welcome, little effort was being directed toward enhancing the capability of one of the law enforcement components most directly responsible for dealing with the sort of persons responsible for the acts which had attracted the public's attention, namely the INS Investigations Division.

The Investigations Division is the INS' main enforcement unit in the interior of the United States. This relatively unknown part of the INS is responsible for the following broad categories: criminal aliens (including criminal organizations and terrorist deportation cases); fraud (including false or fraudulently-obtained documents, as well as visa, asylum and marriage fraud); anti-smuggling activities; maintenance of the INS Violent Gang Task Force, which cooperates with other law enforcement agencies dealing with ethnic gang-related problems in major metropolitan areas; participation in the federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces; and enforcement of employer sanctions.

With only 1,650 employees, called "special agents," the Investigations Division is the only INS law enforcement presence in large interior, non-border, urban areas, such as New York, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, St. Louis, and Chicago. They have to contend with the 2 million or more aliens who elude the Border Patrol and the hundreds of thousands who engage in violent criminal activities.[1] By contrast, there are approximately 1,200 Capitol Police to patrol an area measured in city blocks.

During the 1980s, the Investigations Division's responsibilities were vastly expanded. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) required Investigations to conduct on-site inspections of businesses to determine if they are in compliance with the Act, which prohibits the intentional hiring of illegal aliens. IRCA also called for expeditious deportation proceedings for aliens convicted of deportable offenses.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 revised U.S. immigration statutes to facilitate the deportation of aliens convicted of narcotics violations. It called on the INS to quickly respond to all law enforcement referrals of alien drug violators and to improve its computer capability to be able to respond to law enforcement agency enquiries concerning the identification and removal of alien narcotics violators.

In December, 1986, President Reagan included the INS in the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). This is a multi-agency effort to combat drug trafficking networks.

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The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created a special criminal alien category: Aliens Convicted of Aggravated Felonies. ACAFs are alien felons convicted of homicide, weapons law violations, or narcotics trafficking. The Act established a presumption of deportability for ACAFs, provided a "no bond" clause for ACAFs in INS custody, and mandated their prompt deportation.

While the INS Investigations Division has become a much more important member of the law enforcement community, it has not been given the resources to keep up with the three major areas of responsibility: criminal aliens, employer sanctions, and fraud. Yet the need for effective "interior enforcement" seems clear and self-evident, especially when viewed within the context of recent terrorist acts, the steady influx of people requesting asylum,[2] and the increasing activity of international organized crime syndicates.

"[The INS] has not been given the resources to keep up with the three major areas of responsibility: criminal aliens, employer sanctions, and fraud."

The Clinton Administration and various members of Congress have called for adding personnel to the INS Refugee and Parole Program as well as increasing the Border Patrol. With most of its resources located in close proximity to the northern and southern borders, the INS Border Patrol performs a critically important interdiction and border control function. There is no doubt that doubling its size (i.e. up to 9,900 as called for in Senator Harry Reid's Immigration Stabilization Act) would go far toward reducing the number of illegal aliens who steal across our land borders.[3]

However, it needs to be remembered that many of the aliens who engage in criminal activity do not simply slip over the border, risking interception by the Border Patrol. Rather, they walk right in through our ports and air terminals, often sporting tourist or student visas, or claim to be refugees seeking asylum. More attention and resources must be devoted to employing investigative techniques (informants, electronic monitoring, etc.) to apprehend those criminal aliens who succeed in entering the United States.

In an article in *Government Executive* magazine, author Dick Kirschten reports that John F. Shaw, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations

> *...has a force of 1,600 trained investigators to cover all 50 states but says he needs at least 1,100 more to really do his job.*
>
> *He understandably recoils when politicians rush to beef up the ranks of the Border Patrol, which already has nearly 5,000 employees, while ignoring his division, which is charged with ferreting out fraud, providing agents for federal crime task forces, starting deportation proceedings against convicted aliens, and enforcing sanctions against illegal immigrants.*

Kirschten's article goes on to quote Shaw as pointing out that

> *It's myopic to think we can draw a line around the country, reinforce it and call that border control*

and to argue for a multi-track approach that includes

> *border interdiction, internal investigations, and an effort to create a body of inspectors at airports who can really come to grips with fraudulent documents.*[4]

To be effective, immigration control must be comprehensive and balanced. Border security and interior enforcement are complementary functions. It is critical that both be enhanced. ■

NOTES

[1] Approximately 25 percent of the federal prison population is foreign-born, according to the Department of Justice. For example, during 1990, federal, state and local authorities arrested 226,080 foreign-born individuals for "aggravated felonies."

[2] In 1993, there were 147,200 new applications for asylum and the backlog grew by about 50 percent to 329,069.

[3] During 1993, the Border Patrol apprehended 1.25 million illegal aliens, an increase of about 4.4 percent over 1992.

[4] Kirschten, Dick, "Tempest-Tossed Task," *Government Executive*, October 1993, pp. 34-38.

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Mark O'Connor, a professional poet, is also vice-president of Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population AESP), and convener of Writers for an Ecologically Sustainable Population. This essay is an extract from a paper presented at the Bureau of Immigration Research conference on "The Politics of Immigration" held in Brisbane, Australia, May 24-25, 1993.

Immigrationism, Racism And Moral Monopoly

By Mark O'Connor

Immigrationism — First Sketch of an Ideology

The world average for net immigration is of course zero. Most countries take in about as many immigrants as they produce emigrants. Overpopulation may be the greatest current problem for most nations, yet a well balanced immigration program need contribute little to this.

Only a handful of countries, such as Australia and Canada, have seriously unbalanced immigration programs. In these countries many more thousands of people enter the country than leave it each year. The net influx then becomes a serious problem both for the economy and for achieving population stability and ESD, (Ecologically Sustainable Development).

The word "immigrationism" in my title is not a mere synonym for immigration. We are talking about an ideology — one that is currently omnipresent in the media. Immigrationism is the belief that a large surplus of immigrants over emigrants is a normal and healthy situation.

Like all ideologies, immigrationism is dangerous because it invokes our moral sense and then applies it to a simplified and perhaps misleading model of the universe. Yet, like all ideologies, it becomes less dangerous once one has a name for it. One can then keep long-term tabs on the creed, note and remember what sorts of people its leaders have been, and also which awkward facts its PR may have swept under the carpet.

Oddly enough, we have had till recently no common word for "immigrationism" and have had to speak clumsily and rather misleadingly of "the ethnic lobby" (as though most immigrants were immigrationists). It is even possible that I am the first person to coin or use the word "immigrationism" in the present debate. Yet if so, how have we done without it? Immigrationism is surely as vivid and identifiable a presence in Australian politics as environmentalism or monetarism.

There is now a second near-synonym which I will occasionally prefer: this is "the politically correct line on immigration," or PCLI for short. As this second term suggests, immigrationism is part of the wider problem of political correctness — that is, of orthodoxies and assumptions that may constrict debate.

The current PCLI often presents itself as self-evidently humane and altruistic, and its opponents as selfish and chauvinistic: end of discussion! However, our immigrant intake is not in fact dominated by refugees but by those whose skills are allegedly of value to us, and by those whose own ethnic groups, motivated by ethnic chauvinism ("racism") or family loyalty, have lobbied hardest. Further, a glance at the politically correct discourse of mainstream Australian media will show that it is in fact obsessed with materialist values, e.g. with ways to increase GDP, (Gross Domestic Product).

So let's take a closer look at one of the crucial code-words of the PCLI.

The Use of "Racism" to Inhibit Debate

Twenty-five years ago, in the Vietnam era, we Australians had a conservative establishment, a rather complacent, self-indulgent and self-perpetuating establishment. It saw itself as right-wing, and it far too readily dismissed its dissidents as pro-Communists or pink. Today we have a similarly complacent establishment, but one that sees itself as left-wing, and far too readily dismisses its dissidents as crypto right-wingers.

This I think is the explanation for the common

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cant use of the word "racism" in contexts which have little or nothing to do with race. Many of those who misuse this word are quite literate enough to know that "racism" is not a loose synonym for any and every kind of prejudice against minorities. (They may not realize, though, that by their mis-use of this word they merge cultural or ethnic differences into racial ones, and thus re-create a central plank of Nazi propaganda).

They use the word in this way because they need a "boo-word" — a word with such intensely negative connotations that, hopefully, no opponent in debate can shrug it off, yet so vague in its meaning that it can be applied to practically anyone who disagrees with them. As with the McCarthyites, who called anyone to their left "pro-communist," the trick is to loosen the original *denotation* of a word until it means less and less, while retaining the original intensely negative *connotations*. At the same time the true believer refuses to notice any degrees or gradations. To him or her "a pinko is a pinko," or "a racist is a racist."

"...for the past ten years we have kept refugees to a mere 11,000 odd per year, while we have taken in anything up to 160,000 <u>other</u> immigrants per year, mainly from countries whose populations have no real need to emigrate."

In recent months the news programs of Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), and Special Broadcasting Services (SBS) have run several items of Australian news each week that are introduced by the logo or title "RACISM" — a remarkable feat of political correctness considering that most of the items were in fact not about racial but about cultural or ethnic issues. Somehow the more accurate terms "ethnicism" and "ethnic chauvinism" don't seem to appeal to them, or to some newspapers that follow their lead.

Such witch-hunts, once launched, can go a long way. Once their term "capitalist running dog" or "communist fellow traveller" is extended to anyone who questions the politically correct orthodoxy, almost the whole population is at risk. Similarly, once "racism" comes to be a loose synonym for any kind of prejudice the war against "racism" can continue without limits — or it could in a dictatorship. The recent raids on the Immigration Department might be just a beginning.

As the McCarthyist and Fascist eras show, a witch-hunt in progress attracts misguided idealists. It also attracts the competitive egos of some mediocre writers and artists who, lacking original ideas of their own, seek to carry the pre-established views to new extremes.

Even democracy itself, a philosophy based on respecting the will of the majority, could be under threat since the true PCLI apparatchik is liable to brush aside the will of the majority as "revisionist" or "racist" or whatever.

The good news for environmentalists is that such outbreaks of ideology are a bit like boils. At least in a democracy they tend to come to a head and burst, leaving a painful slow-healing sore. We need to keep the pressure on them until they do.

So, to the larger issue of political correctness.

Immigrationism and Political Correctness

A central question for this conference is, I take it, *how could a democratic government introduce a policy as problematic and unpopular as Australia's recent immigration policy?*

- We have known for at least the last 20 years that we were headed for an age of automation and computers in which the last thing we would require was more labor. Instead we brought in a million migrants over the past 10 years, and wound up, perhaps not entirely unrelatedly, with a million unemployed and an economy half-ruined. (And as the economy sinks, more and more environmental standards are being abandoned.)

- We have long known that the present population of Australia (which refuses to contemplate any major change in its wasteful and destructive life-style) was already doing permanent and morally inexcusable damage to this nation's fragile environments. Yet we have set immigration levels that have kept our population on course to double at least every 50 years.

- We know that the population of those currently in world refugee camps greatly exceeds the total

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number of immigrants we could conceivably take in over many decades. Yet for the past ten years we have kept refugees to a mere 11,000 odd per year, while we have taken in anything up to 160,000 *other* immigrants per year, mainly from countries whose populations have no real need to emigrate. Indeed one of our largest sources of immigrants is a European country whose chauvinist government actually bribes its people to have more babies.

So we have a policy that is environmentally, economically, and morally a shambles, and which the Australian electorate has overwhelmingly rejected in all the opinion polls.

Yet you could tune in to a whole year's editions of the ABC's TV *NEWS* and *7:30 Report* and discover only that our high immigration policy is good and inevitable, and that anyone who questions it is probably a secret member of the Hitler Youth League.

Environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich and David Suzuki have condemned Australia's population growth as extreme by First World standards. They have also argued that the First World's population growth is actually far more of an environmental problem than that of the Third World. Granted that each Australian expects to use resources equivalent to at least 30 Third World citizens, Australia's 17 million is already the equivalent in environmental load of about 540 million Third World citizens — roughly the population of Africa, and almost all of it supported on our coastal rim.

Yet, for over a decade, parts of our national media, notably including some SBS and ABC TV programs, have been spreading an ideology according to which Australia's traditional culture and national identity are cripplingly narrow and inadequate; hence, only massive immigration from as many overseas countries as possible can restore Australia's credibility by turning us into a progressive multicultural nation. Persons opposed to population growth have often been accused of cultural chauvinism (what the illiterate calls "racism") and the effects of population growth on environment, urban problems, the economy, and on Aborigines, are either dismissed or are presented as benign. The SBS/ABC ideology sees itself as a progressive, egalitarian and international one.

The Dilemmas Our Opponents Are Facing

An advocate of high immigration rates obviously needs to believe that Australia can take millions more people. To defend this position, he or she may ask, "*How can you or anyone else presume to tell when Australia is overpopulated?*

The environmentalist's answer is very simple, "*If the current population, with the lifestyle it presently requires the government to provide, is already doing permanent and unacceptable damage to the farm-lands, the forests, the rivers, and the unique native species of which we are custodians, then we are already overpopulated.*"

Some immigrationists will wriggle further on that spike by demanding, "*But couldn't we all reduce our environmental impact on <u>everything</u> by 50 percent each, and so have twice as many people?*"

The environmentalist's reply is nothing less than devastating: "*We could, but we haven't. Australians today demand more resources per person than ever before. It will be time enough to re-open the case for more people if in a decade or so this pattern of consumption has been reversed.*"

"Environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich and David Suzuki have condemned Australia's population growth as extreme by First World standards. They have also argued that the First World's population growth is actually far more of an environmental problem..."

Some immigrationists are social optimists who claim that population isn't a problem any more because "we" are just about to introduce some much improved system for equitable distribution of wealth. But once again, the environmentalist may simply ask them (a) how they're so sure their system will work where Karl Marx's failed, and (b) just how soon are they promising to install it nationally or globally, and (c) whether better distribution will necessarily save the environment.

This leaves the committed immigrationist in a hopeless dilemma. Only ecological illiterates still believe in the "empty country" myth. Yet if Australia is already approaching its optimum population, or has exceeded it, immigrationism is irresponsible.

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The simplistic myth of Australia as a "land without people for people without land" has been tried and found wanting. Out of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who arrived after the Second World War from depressed agricultural areas in Europe, very few succeeded in finding land in Australia. Most of the land that was economically farmable (and much that wasn't) had long since been ruthlessly cleared. Post-war immigration to Australia did not mean finding a use for an "empty" land, it meant further overloading the balance of cityfolk to farmers — that is, of food and import consumers to food and export producers.

In short, for those emotionally committed to immigrationism the optimum-population debate is a morass. It involves issues many of them are either not expert in or simply don't care to think about. Many immigrationists prefer to see their creed simply in terms of human charity, of helping people. Yet, like the Unjust Steward in the Bible, they try to give away what is not quite theirs to give. In a more modern analogy, the would-be charitable immigrationist is a bit like someone who writes a check to the Salvos [Salvation Army] on someone else's account — and without even finding out if the account has the required funds.

The only way to avoid entering this debate is to deny your opponent speaking-rights — that is, to rule him or her out of court. How do you do that? Well, if you are unscrupulous you go for "moral monopoly."

The Art of Moral Monopoly

The essence of the moral monopolist tactic is to claim that you preeminently possess some virtue — which in reality is shared by almost the entire community — and that your opponents disgracefully lack it. (Respect for "motherhood" used to be a favorite choice.)

Claims to moral monopoly usually involve a conspiracy theory. In the U.S. in the 1950s the followers of Senator McCarthy obsessively denounced a supposed conspiracy to overthrow the government. This conspiracy was largely a myth, but the myth was a godsend to the accusers. It allowed them to turn the widespread and minimal virtue of allegiance to the national government into a sort of moral monopoly of their own. This helped free them from the responsibility to argue logically or to be nice people. It was also a great cover for vested interests.

The belief that all human beings are sharers in the brotherhood of humanity is a basic cherished view of our culture, for at least the last 30 years. Yet in Australia in the 1980s some members of the multicultural lobby attempted to make this commonplace virtue a peculiar possession of their own group. They did this by setting up a conspiracy theory that people who preferred lower rates of immigration were part of an omnipresent "racist" conspiracy.

"National boundaries, since the age of nationalism began, have been increasingly drawn along ethnic lines. It is a little hard to see why Australia ... has an obligation to radically change its ethnic mix, and become a sort of microcosm of the world..."

We can now see why the "racism" ploy forms such an essential part of the immigrationist position. Without it, the debate would largely turn into one on the environmental and economic carrying-capacity of Australia.

Conspiracy theories constructed by moral monopolists often rest on very odd assumptions. Some immigrationists claim that Australia is obliged to maintain high immigration until we have a roughly representative mix of the peoples of the world (or alternatively, of "Asia" or of "the Pacific region") right here in our own country. Needless to say, no such moral obligation exists. The people of Thailand, China, Finland, etc. are not ashamed of having a predominance of people of a particular ethnicity or culture in their country.

Indeed, national boundaries since the age of nationalism began, have been increasingly drawn along ethnic lines. It is a little hard to see why Australia alone or almost alone has an obligation to radically change its ethnic mix, and to become a sort of microcosm of the world — unless they mean to argue that Australia is not a real nation but a sort of international treaty area, like Antarctica. But then the moral monopolist doesn't debate; he or she assumes.

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Assumptions like these probably began as a salve to the wounded pride of many immigrants. The mere fact of landing in an alien country immediately devalues much of the cultural and linguistic skill an individual has built up over a lifetime. The resulting pain is basic to the Migrant Pride movement. (One needs to grasp that the real agenda here is ego and self-respect, but that since it would be humiliating to admit as much, the debate has to pretend to be about justice.) There is also a certain proud temperament that is galled to admit its own country of origin has failed it, and that it has had to be rescued by the charity of another.

Some immigrants came from intensely chauvinist backgrounds, where one's own culture was automatically considered enormously superior to all others. In contrast, most Australian writers are, like myself, too pluralist and too convinced that humanity itself is flawed to waste very much time on promoting the merits of one human culture over another. As well, many ordinary Australians (especially those of Irish stock) do, I think, understand and empathize with the humiliations that more recent immigrants often suffer. They do not demand extensive protestations of gratitude; though, of course, they do notice obvious expressions of ingratitude and arrogance.

Yet this very lack of opposition has tempted some migrant-pride zealots into more and more extreme statements, which have often gone largely unchallenged by an Australian intelligentsia terrified of appearing uncool. What the advocates did not realize is that their claims *were* noted and held against them by ordinary people. The Gallop Polls tell an unambiguous story.

The Roy Morgan gallup poll taken in May 1992 probably sealed Labor's abandonment of high immigration. Confirming the Saulwick poll of November 1991, the Morgan poll found that 71 percent of Australians, up 24 percent since 1990, believed that the previous year's intake of about 122,000 immigrants was too many. Only 4 percent thought it was too small. That is electoral-landslide territory! If either major party had campaigned strongly against high immigration in the last election, it would have won. ■



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Scip Garling is Chief of Research at FAIR (The Federation for American Immigration Reform) in Washington, D.C. With a double major in Latin and Greek from Dartmouth, and as former treasurer of the Classical Association of New England, Mr. Garling is well-qualified to produce the following "xendex," which is not entirely tongue-in-cheek.

'Xen' and the Art of Nomenclature Maintenance

New Labels for Advocates of Open-Ended Immigration Policies

By Scip Garling

Words can be used as tools or as weapons. *Xenophobia*, for example, continues to be used as a weapon (see Roy Beck's artuicle in the Spring 1992 issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT). To lighten the load on this overburdened word, I suggest some new terms for discussing immigration in America.

Before we meet these terms, a word to the linguistically squeamish: there is nothing wrong with creating new words. Words do not grow on trees; people make them up. *Xenophobia* is a made-up word from "phobia" — which is another made-up word. You will not find "phobia" in either a Latin dictionary or a Greek lexicon. It is a modern English word (with a Greek root and a Latin ending), invented within the last century by psychologists. If they can do it, so can we.

Many opponents of immigration reform pride themselves on being *xenophiles*, people with a fondness for the foreign. They may in fact be *xenomaniacs*, people with an obsessive devotion to the foreign. A xenophile is likely to perceive the good that a foreign culture or foreign person has to offer; a xenomaniac is unlikely to perceive anything else.

A xenomaniac might point out that xenophobia springs from insecurity: insecurity about one's safety. Likewise, xenomania stems from an insecurity: insecurity about one's worthiness. Such insecurity is certainly related to *dyspatriotism* (the belief that one's country is bad or wrong in any situation), *ethnoseverism* (the desire to cut oneself off from one's own culture), and *xenopathy* (overwhelming identification with foreigners).

"Xenophobia," to quote Louisa Parker of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, "is the *irrational* fear of foreigners. There is a very rational fear of the impact of immigration — legal and illegal" (*USA Today*, July 15, 1993). What we need is a word to describe that rational, reasonable fear.

Fortunately, the ancients were thoughtful enough to make a distinction between having an irrational fear (*phobein*) and a rational one (*deidein*). From those verbs come the names of the two sons of the Greek war-god, Ares: Phobos and Deimos. The astronomically-inclined reader may recognize these as the names of the two moons of the planet Mars (and Mars is the Roman name for Ares, the war-god).

"A xenophile is likely to perceive the good that a foreign culture or a foreign person has to offer; a xenomaniac is unlikely to perceive anything else."

So, if someone with an irrational fear of foreigners is a xenophobe, then someone with a rational fear is a *xenodeid*. Since xenodeidic concern usually focuses not on foreigners themselves but rather on their impact on society, we need a word to describe that impact. Try *xenotrauma*, the shocking effect of too much immigration on our societal systems.

The very use of roots like "philia," "phobia," and "mania" puts the immigration debate into

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"Xendex" of Immigration Labels

xenophobia	(zen-o-FO-bee-yuh)	irrational fear of foreigners
xenodeim	(zen-o-DAME)	reasonable concern about immigration
xenotrauma	(zen-o-TRAW-muh)	shock of too much immigration
xenophilia	(zen-o-FEE-lee-yuh)	fondness for foreign things and people
xenopathy	(zen-AH-puh-thee)	overwhelming identification with foreigners
xenomania	(zen-o-MAY-knee-yuh)	irrational foreign attraction, with little regard to effect on one's own nation
xenomels	(ZEN-o-mels)	people interested in immigration
xenosophs	(ZEN-o-sawfs)	people prudent in immigration matters
xenomores	(ZEN-o-mores)	people reckless in immigration matters

Armed with these labels, an immigration reformer accused of *xenophobia* might well answer: "I'm not a *xenophobe*. I'm much too rational, and I don't hate foreigners. In fact, I'm really quite a *xenophile* when it comes to an appreciation of foreign cultures and peoples, although I don't go to extremes; I'm certainly no *xenomaniac*. Like many *xenomels*, my *xenodeim* about the effects of mass immigration on our society leaves me no choice but to be a *xenosoph* by seeking prudent levels of immigration."

After accusers tried to sort out all the nuances of the suffixes, perhaps they would decide just to skip using "*xen*" words altogether.

emotional terms: loves, fears, madnesses. Perhaps it would be better to discuss the matter with more rational, intellectual terms. How much different the immigration debate seems when it is between *xenosophs* (those who are prudent in importing foreigners) and *xenomores* (those who are reckless). On the other hand, discussants could pride themselves on being *xenomels* (people who are concerned about immigration and how it affects them) from the Greek *melie*, "it concerns."

Xenomels would give thought to plans for limited immigration. But what could they call it? As immigration is not new, neither is the idea that it should be limited. So it should come as no surprise that the Greeks (the Spartans, specifically) had a word for it: *xenelasia*. [You may be wondering where the "o" is in the familiar prefix "xeno-" — in Greek word-formation, the initial "e" of the base word "elasia" overrides the final "o" of the prefix "xeno-."]

With xenelasia as an operative term, the supporters of laws to limit immigration could be called *xenelasts*. Bills to limit immigration would, of course, be termed *xenelastic* — although that might be stretching it a bit!

Dennis Meadows, of *Limits to Growth* fame, once told me: "If your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." If xenophobia is the only tool for describing attitudes of concern about immigration, everyone will look like a xenophobe.

If we expand our tool kit and use some of these new words as our instruments, it may become easier to debate and build a better immigration policy. ■

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Roy Beck is the Washington Editor of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Washington Notepad

By Roy Beck

Finally, An EPA Population Person

It was deep in the stacks of the federal Environmental Protection Agency's library where David Rejeski recently discovered his uniqueness as an EPA official. In an apparently revolutionary act, he checked out the report from the "Rockefeller Population Commission" and its volume of material on the linkage between population growth and the country's ability to meet its environmental goals.

At the librarian's desk, he made a remarkable finding: he was the first person at the EPA ever to check out the report released in 1972.

"I thought: this can't be true," said Rejeski, head of the EPA's fledgling Future Studies Unit. For years, environmentalists concerned about sustainability have pleaded for the EPA to have a population office or desk. Now, Rejeski has emerged as someone willing to use his EPA niche in something like that role.

His startling library anecdote is indicative of the way U.S. environmental policy has operated with near obliviousness to the population issues raised by the Rockefeller Commission. That joint presidential-congressional body conducted a two-year study at great expense and found no benefits to be had from future U.S. population growth. To those knowledgeable about the issue, it never seemed like the EPA was paying attention to the wealth of information gathered during the study. Rejeski's library experience seems to confirm that. The EPA has failed even to alert the public that each year's additional three million Americans adds to the costs and restrictions necessary to meet environmental goals. In the summer 1993 issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, I recounted my unsuccessful Diogenes-like search over the previous year to find one EPA official able even to talk about population-environmental links. Obviously, none of the people with whom I talked in various headquarters offices knew enough to refer me to Rejeski.

"The unfortunate thing is that this place has a very high level of demographic ignorance and bliss," Rejeski told THE SOCIAL CONTRACT in a pre-Christmas interview. "There simply is no demographer around here. I'm not a demographer, but I'm learning fast to represent that point of view. There will be a roomful of economists. But without a demographer, you can't have an enlightened environmental policy."

Rejeski is quick to emphasize that he believes the EPA to be no worse on this score than most federal agencies: "Except for the Census Bureau, the agencies don't have demographic expertise. So the necessary questions don't get raised when making policies."

The EPA's Future Studies Unit was started three years ago to look at underlying pervasive changes in the society that could have major impact on the way the EPA does its work over the next 30 to 50 years.

Rejeski has decided no trend needs more attention during the coming year than that of demographic change. He said about 80 percent of his unit's budget next year will be on demographics. That's not saying a lot, however, since the unit has only a three-member staff.

Nonetheless, it means that at least one small part of the federal government finally will be looking at ramifications of the Census Bureau's announcement in December of 1992 that this country's population will be more than 80 million higher in 2050 than had previously been thought.

"That probably was one of the most critical documents ever put out by the government," Rejeski said. "Every agency in Washington should have been meeting immediately to discuss how their plans would have to change because of the extra 80 million people." Instead, nobody seemed to have blinked an eye.

Rejeski, a U.S. native, is an EPA outsider, having come from Germany where he was an environmental planner and public policy analyst for the German government. His two EPA co-workers are a geologist and a philosopher. "The only way to

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EPA's Beginning Work On Population-Environment

The Future Studies Unit within EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation is beginning a project to examine demographic change in the U.S. and its implications for long-term environmental quality and policies. The project is designed to broaden our understanding of population-environment linkages and to facilitate the integration of population issues into long-range environmental policy and planning.

The project will focus on the following broad goals:

(1) Develop a comprehensive survey of the "state of our knowledge" on population-environment dynamics and issues (paying particular attention to the United States). Also illustrate conceptual models which could help structure our thinking about population-environment relationships.

(2) Break future U.S. population into its components (age structure, ethnicity, etc.) and drivers (fertility, immigration, mortality) and discuss the potential environmental implications of these characteristics at a macro (national) level within the context of global demographic change. Special attention will be focused on combining population projections with long-term trends and projections of human consumption (energy use, materials, etc.). Examples and issues will be linked specifically to EPA strategies and programs.

(3) Undertake two to three case studies which examine population-environment issues at a greater level of detail (micro-scale studies). These case studies may focus on areas such as migration and eco-system protection, aging and vulnerability, ethnic/racial diversity and environmental justice, etc.

(4) Develop a long-range research agenda and a set of policy recommendations.

The research support for the project will be provided by Battelle's Human Affairs Research Center in Seattle under a cooperative agreement with the Energy Department. Focus groups will be used during the course of the project to sharpen our understanding of specific issues, to structure the research, and to peer review and disseminate results. The findings and recommendations of the project will be made available for discussion and comment on the Internet system.

— from an EPA press release (Dec. 1993)

do this is through interdisciplinary research," Rejeski said. He has filled a file cabinet full of material gathered during the last few months of talking with non-governmental people in the population/environmental field. He plans to develop a few case studies that will make compelling arguments to the EPA that the population link is an important one.

Hypersensitivity about population issues in the previous administrations kept the EPA from dealing with that essential aspect of environmental protection, Rejeski said. "The EPA simply has to go back and read the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act to know we have to do this. It is a very eloquent statement on sustainable development."

The Carrying Capacity Network (a national environmental organization) has encouraged its members to contact EPA to back the unit's population work: "Request that they focus on the economic and environmental benefits of stabilizing the U.S. population in addition to enumerating the costs of continued population growth, and let them know that any rate of population growth eventually results in environmental degradation."

Support for the Future Studies Unit's work can be expressed to the EPA chief, Carol Browner, 401 "M" St. SW, Washington, D.C. 20460. Rejeski also can be contacted at that address, or by telephone at (202) 260-6523.

For people desiring to keep track of the unit's work through E-Mail, the pertinent information is: (rejeski.dave@epamail.epa.gov,GOPHER Server: futures.wic.epa.gov).

* * *

At Last, Legislation To Slow U.S. Population Growth

Some members of Congress aren't waiting for the EPA's studies; they believe they have enough evidence that burgeoning U.S. population growth is damaging the nation. Comprehensive legislation to move this country toward population stabilization has been introduced in the Senate and the House.

The key sponsor in each chamber is a Democrat from Nevada. Why Nevada? Perhaps the answer would be a bit clearer if one stood on the border and watched the volume of discontented Californians spilling into Nevada each week and pondered how

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many more of the 30 million people left behind will flee later as the federal government each year adds hundreds of thousands of foreign workers and their families to an already overpopulated California.

The very introduction of the bills by Sen. Harry Reid and Rep. James H. Bilbray ends a long drought in which not one member of Congress would propose action to allow the U.S. population eventually to stabilize. The bills recognize that the massive annual U.S. population growth each year is somewhat artificial, caused almost entirely by past congressional action that boosted immigration far above historical averages.

"If Congress does not act to change its immigration laws, the U.S.Census Bureau estimates, the current population of 258 million will soar to 392 million by 2050..."

If Congress does not act to change its immigration laws, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates, the current population of 258 million will soar to 392 million by 2050, with no peak in sight.

Key components of Reid's and Bilbray's Immigration Stabilization Act (H.R.3320/S.1351):

- Put an absolute cap on all immigrants, refugees and asylees at about one-third the present level. Reid's cap is 300,000; Bilbray's is 350,000.
- Make sponsors of family-based immigrants financially accountable for any social welfare costs.
- Reform asylum law to discourage bogus claims and expedite review of claims.
- Strengthen employer sanctions by creating a tamper-proof Social Security card and alien registration cards as means of ID while establishing a telephone verification system.
- Increase Border Patrol positions to 9,900, from 6,900 today.
- Establish border crossing fees to fund expanded border security.
- Streamline the process for deporting criminal aliens as soon as they finish their prison terms.
- Require cooperation of local and state law enforcement authorities with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- Ban from any future legal entry persons caught illegally crossing the border or overstaying visas.

For those U.S. interests which profit from high population growth and high immigration, Reid's cap of 300,000 a year represents a drastic cut.

But for environmental protection and other quality-of-life factors dependent on a stabilized population, the 300,000 cap remains very high. For example, if current fertility holds and immigration runs no higher than 160,000 a year, the Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will rise from the current 258 million and surpass 300 million before leveling off. Unfortunately under the Reid cap, U.S. population would balloon to considerably higher than 300 million, although far below the nearly 400 million under current immigration trends.

Reid is said to have chosen the "high" 300,000 cap for a couple of reasons: it may not be politically possible at this time to go any lower; it is near the 1820-1965 annual immigration average of 291,000.

Interestingly, during the 1820-1880 period of mass immigration before the American frontier was declared closed, annual average admissions ran only around 160,000.

Reid and Bilbray had begun to attract co-sponsors for their bills before the Christmas break. Backers thus far are:

In the Senate — Democrats James Exon of Nebraska and Richard Shelby of Alabama; Republican Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina.

In the House — Democrats Richard Lehman of California, Charles Wilson of Texas and James Traficant Jr. of Ohio; Republicans Duncan Hunter and Buck McKeon of California, James Sensenbrenner Jr. of Wisconsin and Robert Goodlatte of Virginia.

The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which early last year campaigned for an immigration moratorium (excepting spouses and minor children) is throwing its support behind Reid and Bilbray.

"The important thing right now is for people to contact their senators and member of the House," said Laura Uhl, senior government affairs associate for FAIR. "Most members of Congress just aren't

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familiar with the bills yet. They need to understand that these are the only comprehensive bills. Otherwise, Congress will have to deal with some 60 separate bills to do the same thing. We need to get enough co-sponsors on these bills to persuade members of the Judiciary committees to hold hearings next year."

Even though S.1351 and H.R.3320 would allow significant population growth for another half-century, they are the only immigration reform bills that would make major dents in current growth trends.

* * *

Art Exhibition Portrays U.S. Blacks' Move North After Immigration Cuts

Americans are exposed frequently to emotionally moving photographs in the news media of international immigrants, past and present. But a traveling exhibition of a 60-mural series by Jacob Lawrence turns the canvass over to internal migrants — the masses of rural southern blacks who migrated to the industrial North and West earlier this century.

Reviewers have praised the exhibit for showing American blacks and recent immigrants that they have had a common-ground experience.

Such reviews, however, have missed a much more interesting historical point that the exhibit makes no effort to hide: the opportunity for **domestic** southern blacks to migrate for higher-paying industrial jobs was only possible when the opportunity for **foreign** workers to migrate was reduced or shut off.

The exhibition at the Phillips Collection, a Washington gallery, will leave in January and appear in eight states during the next two years. The 60 paintings were split in purchases by the Phillips and the Museum of Modern Art in New York soon after they were completed in 1941, a time when the black migration to better jobs was continuing. It is interesting that the first time the paintings have been reassembled is now during a period when resumed high foreign migration apparently has once again shut blacks off from many job migration opportunities. Several researchers have documented the net migration of blacks out of higher-wage but high-immigration cities since the 1970s.

In 1940, a 23-year-old Lawrence (who is still living) secured a Harlem studio through a grant. He began to document the migration that had occurred around him all his life. Lawrence had been born in 1917 while his parents were *en route* north as an early part of that migration. Through his childhood he watched the northern cities fill up with the black migrants.

As his narration under Panel #2 explains, the migration began during World War I when immigration of foreign workers almost came to a halt and many young white workers went to Europe for the war. Faced with a labor shortage, northern industrialists finally made their jobs available to the horribly underemployed descendants of slaves in the South.

"Several researchers have documented the net migration of blacks out of higher-wage but high immigration cities since the 1970s."

Lawrence drew immediate acclaim for his historical perspective and what has been called his marriage of tempera technique with a synthetic cubist style. *Fortune* magazine catapulted the young artist into a position of pre-eminence among black artists when it published the 60-painting series in its November 1941 issue.

The magazine article introducing the series explicitly stated that the black migration was made possible by the shutting off of foreign immigration during World War I and during the decade of the 1920s by restrictive immigration legislation. (The restrictions held until 1965.)

"All other sources of labor having been exhausted, the migrants (southern blacks) were the last resource," reads the narration under Panel #4 showing a solitary black man driving a spike. American history is full of examples of moving the black worker to the back of the line. Lawrence Fuchs has written of the disappearance of black tradesmen in the North during the heavy foreign immigration following the Civil War. In the 1890s, Booker T. Washington pleaded with industrialists to hire freed slaves instead of importing workers from Europe.

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Lawrence's haunting panel testifies to the sad truth that black Americans could only get their chance when there was no other alternative for American employers. The next panels show that, given a tight labor market, industries not only actively recruited black workers but creatively found ways to match them to jobs. [See the summer 1992 issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, page 215, for an article by Roy Beck and Otis L. Graham, Jr. alluding to Booker T. Washington's famous "Cast Down Your Buckets" speech at the Atlanta Exposition of 1895.]

Gallery notes state that Lawrence's series has more in common "with a filmmaker's storyboards than a muralist's frescoes." Indeed, a viewer can feel transported by panels as if by a movie into poignant but not sensationalized scenes of the southern culture in which families of freed slaves had been trapped because of the 1880-1914 wave of foreign workers. They were stuck in a culture of low wages, economic and educational deprivation, injustice and even lynching. Viewing these panels today would be a healthy antidote to those with romanticized understandings of the Great Immigration Wave as a phenomenon with only positive effects on Americans. They are paintings of opportunity lost.

The second 30 panels reveal universal truths about migrations, whether internal or international. The first black migrants in the North found better housing and jobs. They wrote letters back home, telling of the better life. More migrants came. After awhile, the migrants began to crowd the existing facilities in the North. The migrants still came because worsening conditions there remained better than those fled in the South. The rapid arrival of a new population eventually created social tensions and resulted in violence. Lawrence is remarkably objective in his portrayal of resentment of the migrants by native northern workers who saw them as strikebreakers and wage depressors. There appears to be a recognition that through no intent on the part of migrants, it was possible for the employer class to exploit them at the expense of other workers.

Migrations have a way of perpetuating themselves. Under his last panel, Lawrence wrote: "The migrants kept coming." It is an observation surely on the minds of today's black residents of the great northern and western industrial cities where most of the 30 million foreign immigrants and their descendants have settled during the last 25 years. The re-emergence of Lawrence's work, "The Migration Series," raises a powerful question: How might today's marginalized American populations be emancipated if immigration again was shrunk and, "all other sources of labor having been exhausted, the American underclass was the last resource."

The Lawrence exhibition can be seen in Milwaukee (Jan. 28-March 20), Portland (April 19-June 12), Birmingham (July 10-Sept. 4), St. Louis (Sept. 30-Nov. 27), New York City (Jan. 12-Apr. 11, 1995), Atlanta (Apr. 25-June 27, 1995), Denver (July 15-Sept. 9, 1995), Chicago (Sept. 22-Nov. 26, 1995).

Who Pays the Bill?

It does not follow, however, that a state should bear the costs of educating children whose illegal presence in this country results from the default of the political branches of the Federal Government. A state has no power to prevent unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are reserved exclusively to the Congress and the Executive. If the Federal Government, properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens, fails to do so, it should bear the burdens of their presence here. Surely if illegal alien children can be identified for purposes of this litigation, their parents can be identified for purposes of prompt deportation.

— Chief Justice Warren Burger in his dissent,
Plyler v. Doe, 1982, which mandated public education
for the children of illegal aliens

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Robert McConnell is professor of environmental science and geology at Mary Washington College in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

Conference: Ethics of Immigration

Reportage by Robert McConnell

On November 5, 1993 nearly one hundred concerned citizens, minority spokespersons, social and natural scientists, journalists and philosophers gathered in Los Angeles for a landmark conference on the "Ethics of Immigration." The conference was organized and sponsored by the Washington D.C.-based Carrying Capacity Network, with the Fossil Fuel Policy Action Institute as co-sponsor.

Philosopher John Lachs of Vanderbilt University eloquently described moral problems in immigration policy. In his words,

> *With regard to immigration policy, those who maintain that we must respect everyone's right to free movement ... operate with abstract principles that fail to capture the complexity of the moral situation. One's own children cannot be told to get in line with all those needing to be fed; the fact that they are ours gives them priority and imposes overriding obligations on us ... [W]e cannot think clearly about ... ethical problems if we begin by asserting the moral irrelevance of nations ... [they] exist, and [provide] the defining context and the structuring elements of the moral problems that surround immigration.*

He suggested that the right to settle in a country is a privilege, not an entitlement, and declared that decisions on immigration are sound only if they express the nation's values and promote its interests.

> *We can be unapologetic in taking our own interest seriously for ... two reasons. First, we must not confuse morality with saintliness. The moral injunction is to take due account of others, not to refuse to take ourselves into account ... Second, self-interest in such cases is not morally selfish ...*

However, he went on to describe such an immigration policy, based on national values and economic self-interest, as open to "serious moral objection," due in part to the feeling of "the heartbreak of a dream denied." The pain of people denied the opportunity for self-improvement causes discomfort for us, and makes us feel "embarrassed at our undeserved good fortune."

In the long run, Lachs concluded, moral dilemmas (but realistic imperatives) such as limiting immigration have no fully satisfactory solutions.

> *Even with the best of intentions, we cannot revise the moral structure of the world. But we can be fair and forthright in our procedures, we can avoid ... discrimination and ... promote [community interests]. In a world in which more cannot be done, that should be enough.*

Some other highlights of the conference:

- In perhaps the most powerful presentation of the day, keynote speaker Richard Estrada of the *Dallas Morning News* (who is presently serving a six-year term on the Congressionally-mandated Immigration Reform Commission) maintained that "the American family needs time to heal itself." He focused on the impact of 1.5 million annual immigrants on America's Hispanic community, and reminded attenders that the United States is admitting more refugees than *the rest of the world combined.*

He further remarked that there are presently over 100 million people living in countries other than their birth country: can they all be accommodated in the United States should they desire to migrate here?

He countered the oft-stated opinion that "we can't stop illegal immigration, so why try" with the fact that deterrence works. At El Paso, illegal entries have dropped 95 percent since the Border Patrol switched from chasing illegals to interdiction. He described as a "false choice" the proposal to counter violence against undocumented migrants with completely open borders. To be effective, he declared, immigration control must be color-and ethnic/national-origin blind. Estrada proposed a plan to control the problem with the following elements:

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(1) stop illegal immigration, and (2) formulate a revised immigration policy in which the economic interests of the United States would be paramount.

Estrada proposed that we abandon the "family reunification" policy presently in force, which generates a false sense of "entitlement" on the part of potential migrants. Finally, he said, the *interests of potential newcomers must be weighed against the interests of present citizens.*

• Roy Beck, Washington editor of *The Social Contract,* described the agony of ethical choices: if we have enough life-saving drugs for 20,000 people but 100,000 need treatment, how do we decide whose life to save? He suggested that immigration presents a similar moral/ethical choice: since there are billions of impoverished people on the planet, should we admit them all? If not, how do we decide which ones to "save?"

Beck went on to report the results of surveys of religious groups on the subject of immigration. Based on Gallup Polls, a majority of members of all religious groups surveyed indicated they want reduced immigration; however, Beck pointed out that the leaders of the groups are often powerful spokespersons for increased immigration. Adding to the irony, many such leaders are among those who at the same time support U.S. population stabilization.

• Professor Donald Huddle of Rice University released a research report on the economic impact of immigration, which indicated that the net cost far outweighed the financial contribution of immigrants to the American economy. Huddle reported the net cost of immigrants since 1970 to California in 1992 alone was $18 billion, including $4.2 billion paid in 1992 to 914,000 Californians displaced by immigrant workers. The report, discussed in a *Los Angeles Times* article published the same day, was immediately challenged by "immigrant-rights" advocacy groups.

• At an early morning panel of activists moderated by Carrying Capacity Network Executive Director Monique Miller, members of local community-action organizations presented their views, often passionately, on the impact of legal and illegal immigration on their communities. Ezola Foster of Black Americans for Family Values described the impact of illegal immigration on the black community of Watts, based on her 29 years of residence in central Los Angeles. Calling for a halt to illegal immigration and a five-year moratorium on legal immigration, she spoke of the "culture wars" in Los Angeles schools, the breakdown of security on the U.S.-Mexican border, and a culture of lawlessness fomented by wholesale disregard for immigration law. Gil Wong of American Citizens Together concurred in the decay of L.A. attributable to undocumented migrants, and decried the "anarchy" along the border, saying "we are a nation of laws."

Sal Juarez spoke for Citizens for Responsible Immigration, and described the problems that immigration was imposing upon Mexico's social fabric. He spoke of cities of "women only," the men having gone to "El Norte."

A local activist, Juarez spoke vividly of his own migration to California with his father, who was a well-trained professional fleeing persecution of Catholics by a Mexican strongman, more than forty years ago — indeed, becoming a field hand to support his family.

• Former Senator Gaylord Nelson, founder of Earth Day and one of the nation's most respected environmentalists, gave the luncheon address in which he called passionately for an environmental ethic and detailed the progress made since that first Earth Day more than 20 years ago. Afterwards, I had the opportunity to ask the Senator whether we are continuing to make progress in enhancing public awareness of population and environmental issues. He agreed that the opposition is strong, but saw much cause for optimism, giving as an example the 1963 Surgeon General's report linking cigarette smoking with cancer and other diseases. It took 20 years to effect separate seating sections for nonsmokers, 25 years to ban smoking from airplanes. Moreover, today the airwaves are filled with environmental programs — in the 1960s there were none. "These things take time. We are making progress, especially with the young."

• Virginia Abernethy, editor of the journal *Population and Environment* and author of the newly released book *Population Politics*, suggested that, contrary to "conventional wisdom," economic development does not result in lower birth rates. She used data from several countries, notably Cuba, Algeria and India, where the perception of enhanced "quality of life" and the overthrow of colonialism

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actually resulted in higher birth rates. Her studies indicate rather that when people sense limits, the population tends to stabilize, illustrating that thesis with examples from Burma and from Sudan and other African countries during the 1980s. A corollary conclusion: the use of foreign aid to maintain consumption often leads to increased misery in recipient countries.

• David Pimentel of Cornell University documented the adverse impact of population growth on this country's ecosystem. We lose one million acres per year to urbanization and roads. We lose another 2.5 million acres to erosion. We dump one billion pounds of pesticides on our farmland and lawns each year. And we are rapidly depleting our precious groundwater: for example, 1 million gallons of water are required per acre to irrigate corn, and much of this grain is simply fed to livestock.

• The press's coverage of immigration and related issues was described by journalist George Bauer of *The Christian Science Monitor*, and by William Dickinson of the Biocentric Institute. Bauer related the growing national interest in these issues first to the Clinton administration's Haiti policy and the Zoe Baird hearings, then to the tragedy of violence against foreigners in Germany and the World Trade Center bombings. Studies linking the growing fiscal problem of California to the cost of immigrants helped focus national press attention on the issue.

Dickinson emphasized the critical link between immigration and population growth, itself a major factor in environmental degradation. And he decried as an example of a transcendentally cynical national policy the offer by the Bush administration of asylum to any Chinese who claimed "fear of persecution" due to the "coercive" policy of the Chinese government on population growth. (Would that have meant, Garrett Hardin wondered, that this country was offering to accept as refugees 1 billion Chinese?)

• Mark Nowak of Population/Environment Balance, and Rick Oberlink of Californians for Population Stabilization were featured in the closing session of the conference. Nowak echoed a dilemma that had been aired earlier. There are 2 billion impoverished people on the planet: how do we decide whom to accept? He agreed that it is imperative to consider immigration's growing role in U.S. population growth, and resultant environmental degradation. He advocated an immigration policy aimed at fairness, and in the best interest of both America and the migrant's home country.

Oberlink questioned what he described as an underlying assumption of U.S. population policy: that somehow this country has an obligation to accept immigrants, although no other country in the world takes this view. He and former INS Commissioner Alan Nelson deplored the use of such degrading terms as nativist, racist, xenophobic, immigrant-basher and the like, which are often applied to those who in good conscience question our present immigration policy. He pointed out that while we debate these issues, California's population is growing faster than India's, and mainly from immigration.

The Ethics of Immigration Conference provided a much-needed format for rational discussion of the thorny issue of immigration's impact. Additionally, the conference presented a refreshing and overarching concern for *community* — a call for a new and invigorated American community composed of all the strands which have formed the American tapestry over the past 400 years. And there was a plea for *time* — time for new arrivals to be incorporated into the American family ... time for this country to finally settle a debt with its African-American segment.

Social commentator and philosopher Os Guinness, in his new book *The American Hour*, calls for the collective formulation of a new public philosophy to reunite America. Such a public discourse is critically important but is extremely difficult to conduct if the composition of the American "focus group" is constantly changed by relentless immigration. Therefore the nation desperately needs *time*, in the form of an end to illegal immigration and a much-restricted legal immigration — time to forge a new civic philosophy and collective partnership, a new consensus on what it means to be America and an American. For if migration — both legal and illegal — were to continue at its present rate, the nation clearly would be unable to maintain the "American Dream" for all its citizens, potential and actual. ■

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Roy Beck served for four years as Washington bureau chief of Booth Newspapers before joining THE SOCIAL CONTRACT *as Washington editor.*

Problems On The World Frontier

UN Report: Curtailing Migration Now A Priority

Reportage by Roy Beck

The United Nations Population Fund, in its annual report, has confronted worldwide migration with a candor seldom found in population organizations — international or American.

Not all is steely-eyed pragmatism in "The State of World Population 1993"; the writing sometimes falls back into vague, idealized internationalisms, such as: "The point of departure should be the human right to live and work where one pleases, so long as it does not infringe on other people's rights to do the same." But implicit in most of the 54 pages is the hard reality that after the entire history of humankind in which significant segments of the population in one settlement could pick up stakes and migrate to some sparsely populated part of the globe, no frontiers remain.

"Migration has always been a feature of development; but today's migrants are pushing into territory already occupied by others," states the report, issued under the name of Dr. Nafis Sadik, UNFPA executive director.

The UN report finds that the urgency and sweeping effects of migration now make it "a priority issue equal in weight to other major global challenges such as the environment, population growth and economic imbalances between regions." The scale and diversity of today's migrations "are beyond any previous experience."

Migration Is More Harmful To Receiving Countries Than Numbers Suggest

Countries of destination understandably are resisting the growing tide of migrants seeking entry. "Migration has usually been seen as evidence of a thriving economy ... (but) in today's increasingly uncertain conditions, migration may be seen as a threat to the security and well-being of the local workforce and society at large," Sadik writes.

The report looks at both internal and international migration. The largest number of migrants are those moving from rural areas to the congested major cities of their own countries. But the impact of international immigration is much greater than the numbers would suggest, the report states. For one reason, migrants tend to arrive in the peak years of their fertility. "They introduce an element which sharply breaks the usual development pattern of a population," and even when the migrants integrate fairly well into the economies of a country, their social integration lags.

Unfortunately, the UN report notes, the economic gains from immigrants may benefit primarily the upper crust of a receiving country and reinforce existing gaps between rich and poor.

Migration Not Always So Helpful To Migrant

Although migrants may improve their economic conditions in their new home country, that success often is accompanied by the reality of being the most vulnerable members of the host community.

The plight of women is especially discouraging. "Most educated women end up in the low-status, low-wage production and service jobs as unskilled female migrants. ...Migrant women, especially refugees, are vulnerable to rape, abduction, sexual harassment and physical violence, and demands for sexual favours in return for documentation or obtaining goods. ...(Women migrants') status may be improved by migration, but the advantages are not clear cut."

Underdeveloped Countries Harmed In Several Ways By Migration

Humanitarian organizations in wealthy countries often promote immigration as a form of international aid to underdeveloped countries. But the UN report states repeatedly that the economic benefits to poor countries is uncertain.

"Migration draws off the skills and energy of the young, the talented, and the better educated," the report says. The poor countries lose their investment in the upbringing and education of its citizens who

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migrate. Meanwhile, rich countries obtain "ready-made workers without any investment."

For many advanced-degree graduates, their country does not offer a job in their expertise, the report notes. This is a legitimate reason for a brain drain to wealthy countries which can use the high skills. (But a reader might wonder about the wisdom of educating students in fields of no use to their home country.)

The brain drain, however, is not always so neutral. Migrants often take with them skills desperately needed by their poor home lands. "The loss of skilled professional, technical and business migrants creates skill shortages in key areas, higher costs and development bottlenecks; Africa, in particular, has lost an estimated one-third of its highly-educated manpower in recent decades."

"The UN report stresses that solutions for miserable people around the world in most cases must come in their home country..."

International migration also tends to break up families and communities. "Migration is transforming household structures in a way that increasingly leaves women with sole responsibility for dependent children and the elderly."

Remittances Huge But Of Mixed Value

There are some positive aspects of immigration to a sending country. The most visible is the remittances sent from the wealthy countries by migrants back to families in the home country. Migrants sent back some $66 billion of remittances last year. Only the sale of oil brings more world trade money into the developing countries.

Yet, the United Nations finds those remittances to be of mixed value. "To some extent the remittances of urban migrants relieve rural poverty. But remittances do little to redress the balance of resources between countries; nor do they diminish the concentration of power and wealth in the cities."

Studies demonstrate that "remittances are used for current consumption" and that they contribute to higher living standards for remittance households. But they do not contribute to national development that provides for permanent improvements for the population as a whole.

The burden migration places on women is demonstrated by studies documenting that "fewer than one in five wives has received any remittances" from husbands who migrate. And when remittances are received, they seldom account for as much as half of the family income.

Answers At Home, But Migration Fatalism Accepted

The UN report stresses that solutions for miserable people around the world in most cases must come in their home country, or at least home region. Even refugee and asylum problems "cannot be solved by simply opening doors. ...Recipient areas and countries are already under stress. More people are on the move, but options for successful migration are fewer than ever before."

Nonetheless, the report falls into a fatalism that high migrations are somewhat inevitable. "Where legal channels are closed, migrants will enter by whatever means are available to them," it states. It quotes without disagreement a report to a 1992 population conference that "international flows are inevitable. Rather than attempting to prevent the flows, policy-makers should be prepared to plan for them." Of course, the report probably was prepared before the U.S. Border Patrol knocked the wind out of inevitability with its experimental and highly successful Operation Blockade in El Paso, Texas.

A 1978 report is quoted suggesting an international moral obligation of wealthy countries to allow migration as a form of distribution of income. It also suggested that countries do not have the right to unilaterally act to halt the flow of migrants across their borders.

Despite those few glaring exceptions, the report is more infused with a basic pragmatism: "There is recognition that refugees have a right to seek asylum. At the same time, states reserve the sovereign right to grant or withhold it. The role of international co-operation is limited to mitigating particularly heavy burdens on countries of asylum."

It also is noteworthy, that in its final recommendations no mention is made of the need to persuade receiving countries to take more migrants or even to continue the current high level of admissions.

Receiving nations are assigned a major role in solving the migration problem, but in helping to change conditions in sending countries, rather than in

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making room for migrants.

Among the UN suggestions: countries might create systems of temporary refuge in which they withhold the right to permanent residence. The report also emphasizes that societies must treat the foreign-born in their midst humanely.

Population Stabilization Key

Perhaps the most important suggestion for dealing with the problems of migration is to help sending countries stabilize their population. "Both internal and international migration are driven by population growth, and by inequities between countries. ...The only effective means to reduce migration pressures over the long term are to slow population growth, to stimulate economic growth and job creation at home, and promote the development of the individual and the family as the basic economic and social unit."

The UN Population Fund disagrees fundamentally with those U.S. economists who insist that population growth is good for a country's economic health: "The perception that slower population growth is associated with faster development is not now seriously challenged. ...Some 90 percent of the peoples of developing countries live under governments committed to reducing the rate of population growth."

The report comments with approval on the reduced fertility in Southeast Asian newly industrializing economies and on how the resultant tight labor market has forced wages upward by 50 percent between 1987 and 1992 in Korea, for example.

Suggestions For Reducing Migration
Push Factors

Among the suggestions for reducing the pressure for migration:

- Help with the provision of family planning assistance. "An estimated 100 million additional women would use modern contraception if it were available."

- Reduce tariff and other barriers in rich countries that restrict developing countries' efforts to expand their share of world trade.

- Stop development aid to developing countries that exacerbates the draw of rural residents into the cities and that leaves countries saddled with debilitating debt and interest payments.

- The promotion of a "more liberal world trading regime so that developing countries could take advantage of their low labour costs and that industrial countries would not protect domestic industries against competition."

But the foundation of solutions is cutting worldwide fertility: "The aspirations for a better life that drive the movements of people cannot be solved by development assistance alone. Nor can they be solved by mass migration." ■

EFMS: Up and Running

The European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) held its first public function - a conference — on Nov. 25-28, in its headquarters city of Bamberg, Germany. Under a caption of "Migration Policies — a Comparative Perspective," views were presented by speakers from Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Ukraine, Switzerland, Australia and the United States. Our European colleagues are learning, as their countries shift from being ones of emigration to ones of immigration, that in migration matters it is truely more blessed to give than to receive!

The Forum was set up to fill the need for a centrist, rational European voice on migration matters. With an initial staff of three, it has developed a formal working relationship with the University of Bamberg. The Forum will conduct research, sponsor meetings and publish papers, including a newsletter. It may be contacted at Katharinestrasse 1, D-96052, Bamberg, Germany. Phone +49-951-37041 and FAX +49-951-32888.

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Lance Izumi is a fellow in California studies with the Pacific Research Institute. Previously he served as chief speech-writer for Governor George Deukmejian. This commentary appeared in The Sacramento Union *on January 2, 1994 and is reprinted by permission.*

Will L.A. be the Next Bosnia?

by Lance T. Izumi

Two months ago at an Asian American Lawyers convention, I sat on a panel that, among other things, attempted to predict the future of race relations in post-riot Los Angeles. As the panel's only conservative, it was interesting to watch my liberal counterparts perform all manner of mental and rhetorical gymnastics so as to avoid addressing the obvious reality that their self-created multiculturalist world was in shambles.

The L.A. riots exposed the fact that multiculturalism is based on a lie. Stripped of its euphemistic cliches, multiculturalism's fundamental characteristic is its hostility to the majority culture of white Americans. The liberal Asian American activists who sat on my panel, like their multiculturalist brethren in other minority communities, still cling to the bizarre belief that this hostility is enough to submerge all differences between the non-white races and unite them all in the liberal crusade.

This viewpoint is flawed for several reasons. First, many minorities, especially Asian Americans, have done extremely well in white capitalist America. As opposed to the liberal civil rights leaders who presume to speak for them, most Asian Americans do not spend their entire waking moments thinking about how oppressed they are. In Asian American communities, people are usually more concerned with making the most of the opportunities offered by the free enterprise system than in complaining about imaginary white bogeymen. Little wonder then that Republican candidates have always done well among Asians.

More fundamentally, the multiculturalists ignore the fact that the cultural gulf between various minority groups is often so large and deep that any minor resentments they may share against whites are overwhelmed by their differences with each other. The starkest example of this comes from Los Angeles where a recent confidential police report states that "there will be an upcoming race war between blacks and Hispanics."

The reasons for this probable race war are instructive. On one level, the rising conflict will be caused by black and Hispanic gangs warring over turf and drug-trafficking "rights." However, in a front-page article, *The Los Angeles Times* notes that, "Although the battle may be over money, authorities concede that race is intimately woven into the struggle. The prison gangs encouraging the fight are steeped in a separatist mentality forged from years of confrontation behind bars."

Conservatives have warned that the multiculturalist prescription of diversity at the expense of common culture would lead to tribalism and eventually to separatism and violence. Sadly, these predictions are now coming true.

Further, it appears that uncontrolled immigration is playing a key role in the building racial conflict. While black gang membership has slowed in recent years, such has not been the case for Hispanic gangs.

"Stripped of its euphemistic cliches, multiculturalism's fundamental characteristic is its hostility to the majority culture of white Americans."

According to the *Times* article, "Latino gangs have been rejuvenated by a new generation of Mexican and Central American immigrants. On the streets and behind bars, they have come to the realization that — if only through sheer numbers — they have the potential to dominate the underworld." As one Los Angeles police officer observed, the Hispanic gang members' attitude is, "Why appease any other group when you can just take things over yourself?"

Uncontrolled immigration must therefore be stopped, not only because of the negative fiscal

Indian beating drama in appt., Sec. III, Jan. 94

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impact it is having on state and local governments, but also because it is literally tearing apart the social fabric of our society. Indeed, the ultimate effect of uncontrolled immigration has been to turn California's urban areas not into the multicultural fantasy land of brown, black and yellow brotherhood, but into our own budding version of Bosnia.

This disastrous situation has been brought to us courtesy of our liberal elites, both white and minority, who have waged war against the common Western culture that has held our nation together for two centuries.

This common culture, made up of Judeo-Christian tradition, democratic capitalism, and the teachings of a whole slew of politically incorrect dead white males, created an environment that allowed ethnic group members to prosper as long as they were willing to assimilate into the mainstream.

Today, though, liberal elites view assimilation as evil. Consequently, we have become a nation of unconnected racial groups characterized not by what we share in common with our fellow countrymen, but by increasingly hostile ethnocentrism. A race war is therefore the natural, if somewhat ironic, outcome of our current multicultural madness.

In this election year, it is time for politicians to stop talking about our diversity, and start talking like William Bennett, about the common American culture that we at one time all shared. ■

Feature Sections of Prior Issues

You are holding in your hands the fourteenth issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. If your collection is not complete, you may wish to order one or more of the previous editions which are for sale at $7.50 each. Here is a listing of the feature sections of those issues:

Fall 1990	The Tragedy of the Commons
Winter 1990-91	The Uses and Misuses of History
Spring 1991	A World Without Borders?
Summer 1991	Politically Correct on Immigration
Fall 1991	Immigration and Free Trade With Mexico
Winter 1991-92	Getting Past the Immigration Taboo
Spring 1992	Words, Symbols and Roadblocks in the Immigration Debate
Summer 19292	Twenty-Years Later: A Lost Opportunity Remembering the 1972 Report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future
Fall 1992	Revealing the Costs of Immigration
Winter 1992-93	The Role of the Churches in Population Growth, Immigration and the Environment
Spring 1993	Crime and Immigration
Summer 1993	What Makes a Nation?
Fall 1993	NAFTA and Immigration

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Don Feder is a nationally syndicated columnist. This item appeared in The Boston Globe *on December 2, 1993 and is reprinted by permission.*

Citizenship Won't Alleviate Alien-nation

By Don Feder

In his response to growing outrage over failed immigration policies, Bill Clinton, Mr. 43 Percent, again shows how little he understands the concerns of average Americans.

The administration has announced an initiative to deal with the unassimilable masses swamping our society: confer citizenship on them. Washington will encourage the estimated 10 million legal aliens who are permanent residents of America to become citizens.

Doris Meissner, commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, believes this will check the troubling "anti-immigration feelings we see in various parts of the country and in Congress." So the INS, which has fewer than three agents to patrol each mile of our border, will invest its resources in selling citizenship.

Many thus recruited will be motivated more by pragmatism than patriotism. Citizens can immediately bring spouses, minor children and parents here.

The real objection to uncontrolled immigration has less to do with immigrants' status (illegal/legal, resident alien/naturalized American) than the apprehension that, whatever their designation, recent immigrants essentially are foreigners who happen to be living here. Citizenship papers won't make Americans of those who feel little affinity for our heritage.

The week before Thanksgiving, Boston's Martin Luther King Middle School celebrated the 500th anniversary of Puerto Rico. Students danced the limbo and merengue and sang songs in Spanish. It was part of the school's multicultural curriculum, which infects all disciplines. (In math, students are taught how certain African tribes used beans for counting.)

One-third of the school's teachers are bilingual. The principal recruits personnel directly from Puerto Rico. "I'm glad the current superintendent wants to acknowledge our existence and celebrate our diversity," comments School Committee member Luis Velez.

What happened to celebrating unity? When my mother, the child of Russian immigrants, was in school, the week before Thanksgiving was devoted to Pilgrim pageants, reciting "The Courtship of Miles Standish" and studying the impact of early settlements on the development of American democracy.

Now its limbo and merengue. Last year, a gang of multiculturalists in Long Beach, Calf., proposed changing the holiday's name to "Diversity Day," arguing that students whose roots are in Latin America and Southeast Asia can't relate to that Mayflower jive.

"We spend a billion dollars annually instructing immigrant children in foreign languages, so they won't have to learn English."

We spend a billion dollars annually instructing immigrant children in foreign languages, so they won't have to learn English. In New York City, applicants for a driver's license can take their written test in one of 22 languages. Can multilingual road signs be far behind?

In July, a naturalization ceremony in Tucson was conducted in Spanish. A spokesman for the INS said that since many of the participants were exempt from the English requirement for citizenship, the service felt the ceremony would be "more meaningful" for them in their own language.

A *New York Times* article of June 29, "A Fervent 'No' to Assimilation in New America,"

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reported on a survey of 5,000 eighth and ninth graders with foreign-born parents. Of the Mexican-Americans, 56 percent said they preferred their parents' native tongue to English, as did 49 percent of Vietnamese-Americans. Only 35 percent of Haitian-Americans consider America the best country to live in.

Therein lies a tragedy in progress. The old immigrants were touching in their eagerness to adapt. They were grateful to be here, eager to demonstrate their allegiance to their new land, determined to shed old ways as fast as possible.

As a whole, the new immigrants are decidedly ambivalent. They want the economic/political advantages of living here while maintaining their own cultural/national identities. They have formed alien enclaves in our major cities. They demand that their children be educated in Spanish, French, Chinese, or Lao, and taught ethnic pride.

They insist that the nation adapt to them, with bilingual ballots and interpreters in social service agencies.

But if their homelands are so swell that they must maintain ancestral ties, why did they come here? If immigrants have to be coaxed to become Americans, via a federal outreach program, what sort of citizens will they make?

In the Canadian province of Quebec, French is the official language. Posting signs in English is illegal. Following the last election, the province sent a solid separatist delegation to Ottawa.

Here is our fate, and sooner than you may think. Immigration accounts for one-third of America's annual population growth. Your grandchildren may grow up in a country that celebrates Cinco de Mayo with more gusto than Thanksgiving.

Clinton's feeble attempt to cash in on concern over our porous borders is doomed to have the same impact as Gerald Ford's WIN (whip inflation now) buttons on the economic malaise of the '70s. ■

World Population and Work Force Growth

The world's population is almost 5.5 billion, the world's work force is 2.5 billion, and both numbers are increasing by almost 100 million annually. About 90 percent of the world's population and work force growth occurs in developing nations, which create "real" jobs for perhaps half of their annual crop of workers. In addition to creating more jobs for the youth who every year join the work force, developing nations face three catch-up job creation tasks: they must find nonfarm jobs for ex-farmers, as some of the world's one billion farmers seek nonfarm jobs; they must create jobs for adults who are not now in the work force, such as urban women; and they must reduce currently high levels of un- and under-employment.

— Philip L. Martin in *Migration World*, Vol XX, No. 5, p. 11.

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Economic Rationalism and Sustainable Development

A Book Review by Evonne Moore and Joseph Wayne Smith

GREEN MARKETS: THE ECONOMICS
OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
By Theodore Panayotou
San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1993
169 pp., cloth $29.95, paper $14.95

Theodore Panayotou's *Green Markets* is concerned with presenting an economic analysis of environmental degradation and an outline of the reforms necessary for the achievement of sustainable development. Panayotou maintains that there are underlying causes of environmental degradation common to countries in different geographical localities, as varied as the rain forests of South America and the stagnating lands of sub-Saharan Africa. The cause of environmental damage is not economic growth, which by itself "neither causes nor remedies environmental degradation" (p.1) but rather, "bad" economics arising from flawed government policies and disturbed markets that inappropriately price natural resources.

Panayotou is an "economic rationalist" in the sense in which that term is used in Australia: that market mechanisms produce the most efficient allocation of scarce resources relative to alternative mechanisms of allocation. The economic rationalist believes in the virtual infallibility of the invisible hand of the market, and is hostile to government intervention to regulate markets or to central economic planning.

This view, which we may call "naive economic rationalism," is open to a number of criticisms. Market mechanisms do not mechanically generate fair or just outcomes: an economy may be economically efficient, even though the distribution of incomes is highly inequitable. Market economies cannot guarantee stability and full employment: indeed market capitalism goes through roller-coaster rides of booms and slumps. Finally there is the question of *externalities*. The market mechanism often does not adequately take into account the cost and benefits of environmental resources such as clean air and water, and these resources are often degraded.

Panayotou is not a naive economic rationalist. He does believe that markets are normally efficient mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources, but he also is well aware of the problem of externalities. Panayotou is a sophisticated economic rationalist. He notes that market failure can arise from a number of factors such as:

- ill-defined or non-existent property rights
- unpriced resources and absent or weak markets
- spillover effects or linkages between sectors of the economy operating outside the sphere of market mechanisms
- high transaction costs and market imperfections such as lack of competition, monopolies, oligopolies and segmented markets

and other factors such as uncertainty and risk aversion, and irreversible decisions (p.34). Panayotou presents a detailed account of why these factors dull the efficiency of market mechanisms. This, however, is not taken to constitute an argument against sophisticated economic rationalism: rather it shows that governments must act as economic mechanics to clean the sludge from existing economies so that markets can operate freely and economic growth can occur at greater rates. Sustainable development — "[the] alleviation of poverty, a decline in fertility, the substitution of human capital for natural resources, effective demand for environmental quality, and a responsive supply" (p.14) — cannot occur without economic growth.

Panayotou is dismissive of the limits-to-growth

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tradition (*limitationism*) in ecological economics:

> *The alarmist prediction that continued economic growth must lead to ecological disaster or that sustainability will eclipse growth, as well as utopian prescriptions to ban growth and change people's values, derive from a fixation on the physical manifestations and symptoms of environmental degradation: hectares of forests lost, tons of soil eroded, species endangered, tons of pollution generated. The way to attain sustainable growth is to dispense with a preoccupation with the symptoms of environmental degradation and to look for root causes rather than proximate cause (p.142).*

To prevent environmental degradation, most resources must be owned and rationally priced so that responsible ecologically sustainable economic activities occur.

Those of us who are "alarmists," who believe that life on earth is being threatened by human economic activity, would be rightly dismissive of Panayotou's key argument. If sustainable development does require endless economic growth, then limitationists would conclude that "sustainable development" is a contradiction in terms. If the full environmental costs of growth are to be paid for, then limitationists would conclude that economic growth is not possible. What, after all, is the economic cost of destroying ourselves? Surely markets require a habitable planet: the value of life is a more basic value than economic value for it is necessary to be alive to have any perception of valuable things at all. Panayotou, unlike most economic rationalists, understands this. He admits that if economic growth occurs by appropriating other people's resources or transferring costs onto others, then the growth economy cannot continue. However, he maintains that increased efficiency and innovations arising from human knowledge and capital will transcend those limits. This argument is not defended at any length in the concluding pages of Panayotou's book and the book falls suddenly flat at the point where one would expect the peak of argument.

Population expansion is mentioned by the author on page 70 only in passing. He would appear to believe in the demographic transition theory, namely that reductions in population growth in the Third World will be the outcome of increased economic growth and rising living standards. Supporters of this theory seldom deduce the logical consequence of this position, namely that even if a rise in living standards will ultimately lead to a reduction in population growth, uncontrolled population growth can also lead to a decrease in living standards and destruction of the environment. Even if the demographic transition theory was correct, it is by no means clear that increased economic growth is a sufficient measure to control global population growth. Population growth may well outstrip any benefits allegedly contributed by an expanded economy.

Australians and Americans are told by the economic rationalist to "become more efficient," "to deregulate," "to introduce more labor market reforms," "to increase levels of foreign investment and immigration" and "to be more internationally competitive." The evidence is clear, at least in the Australian case, that economic rationalism is an economic and social disaster. (See: S. Rees, G. Rodley, and F. Stilwell (eds.), *Beyond the Market: Alternatives to Economic Rationalism*, [Pluto Press, Australia, 1993].) "Economic efficiency," "deregulation" and "labor market reforms" reduce barriers such as workers' conditions and environmental protection in the names of *profitability* rather than the abstract concept of "efficient" use of scarce resources, and "international competition" flattens American and Australian working conditions until they are comparable to competing nations in the global market. How can Western nations compete with countries such as China, which uses the slave labor of its prisoners to produce goods for the global market? It is arguable that economic rationalism has failed to solve even basic economic problems such as the problem of employment, so *a fortiori* it would seem hardly capable of dealing effectively with the issue of the global environmental crisis. Panayotou considers none of these questions. His book is consequently flawed and cannot therefore be viewed as a major contribution to the ecologically sustainable development debate. ■

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Paul Gottfried is professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania and editor-in-chief of This World.

Yes, Cultures Differ

A Book Review by Paul Gottfried

BANGLADESH: REFLECTIONS
ON THE WATER
By James Novak
Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993
256 pp., $24.95

James Novak's study of Bangladesh, where he resided for three years as Resident Representative of the Asia Foundation, combines a number of merits. The book is written with poetic grace, particularly the sections describing the landscape and people, is factual without being dull, and ends with dispassionate judgments about a country that the author has come to know well. Remarkably enough, Novak went to Bangladesh and studied its economy and society after his older brother, Richard, a Catholic priest and missionary, had been stabbed to death there. Despite this introduction to the Muslim Bengalis inhabiting what used to be called East Pakistan, but what since 1973 has been the free republic of Bangladesh, Novak speaks with unvarnished affection about most of the subjects of his book. He stresses their dignity in the face of grinding poverty (and a per capita annual income of about $500), their devotion to Muslim traditions without being swept into the oppressive features of Islamic fundamentalism, and the honored place of women in Bangladeshi households.

Though Novak is a deeply committed Catholic, he writes about Islam with enormous sympathy. The "though" may be redundant; at least two other pious Catholics of my acquaintance, Anthony T. Sullivan and Thomas Molnar, do exactly the same. They and Novak all find examples in Islamic society of the social deference and family loyalties that have eroded in modern America. None of them stresses the possible correlation between Muslim culture and the political turmoil and related economic problems present in most if not all Muslim countries. To his credit, Novak is not uncritical of the material effects of an established Islamic religion, but he plainly does not view that as a decisive retarding factor for economic growth in Bangladesh. He believes that Bangladeshi society can mobilize its own resources, cultural as well as material, to overcome its economic hardship. And Novak notes with satisfaction the fall from political power of the quasi-Marxist Awami League — the ruling coalition after independence which saddled Bangladesh with corruption and disastrous centralized planning.

Despite obvious good will, Novak does not try to prod Americans into investing in the country he has studied in such depth. He is honest in pointing out that "as a market it needs everything but has relatively little means of payment." (Indeed, Novak resists even the impulse to propagandize on behalf of Bangladeshi tourism. He lets it be known that travel in Bangladesh is a learning experience that will probably require the renunciation of creature comforts.) Novak does not hide the vices of Bangladesh's political class: he shows it to be grasping, captive to "bureaucratic xenophobia," and non-supportive of foreign investors once they put the money into a native enterprise. He described this political class as being typical of the rulers of a developing Third World country only twenty years removed from independence. If this ruling class does not change its character or habits in the next ten years, Novak observes, the results may be more ominous.

In any case, Novak does not look for progress in Bangladesh to come primarily from foreign sources and guidance. It is the indigenous population that he believes will sink or swim on the basis of what it does to and for itself. A political and cultural pluralist, as opposed to a multiculturalist, Novak describes a Third World society without prescribing an American globalist remedy. *The Wall Street Journal* will certainly not like this book which teaches humility, not ideological arrogance, in the face of cultural differences. ■

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Mark Wegierski is a Toronto-based writer, historian and permanent associate of the Canadian-Polish Research Institute.

Limiting Growth: Unheeded Prophecies

A Retrospective Double Review by Mark Wegierski

POPULATION VERSUS LIBERTY
By Jack Parsons
London: Pemberton Books, 1971
417 pages, $19.00

POPULATION FALLACIES
By Jack Parsons
London: Elek/Pemberton, 1977
286 pages, $19.00

Although these books were written roughly two decades ago, they contain interesting insights, and continue to seem quite fresh and breezy. Professor Jack Parsons, who is now happily retired in Wales, had a successful career in engineering before studying philosophy and politics at Keele as a Mature State Scholar. After getting his degree in 1955, he did research for London University and the National Coal Board. At the time of his first book he was a lecturer in Social Sciences at Brunel University. He also did a documentary about the effect on a small village of the closing of a mine, and was a long-time officer of the Conservation Society. At the time of the second book, he was a Senior Lecturer in Population Studies, and Deputy Director of the David Owen Centre for Population Growth Studies at University College, Cardiff.

Population Versus Liberty contains a fairly extensive bibliography (pp. 380-392), two appendices (pp. 393-395), a Name Index (pp. 397-403), a Subject Index (pp. 404-417), as well as numerous charts and tables, all these listed on pages ix-xii.

In the preface, Parsons succinctly states his thesis:

> *The three basic points*
> *1. The population explosion started over three centuries ago.*
> *2. It presents a world problem and embraces Europe and the United Kingdom, both directly and indirectly.*
> *3. It cannot possibly go on much longer because the Earth is finite.*
>
> *The three basic questions*
> *1. When will population be controlled?*
> *2. By what means will it be controlled?*
> *3. How much suffering will be involved in the control process? (p. xx)*

He then explicitly makes the connection between population control and liberty, the central point of his book:

> *Population control is essential for the preservation of all that we hold most dear, including individual liberty, and I hope the facts and arguments put forward here add up to a satisfactory intellectual and moral basis for its acceptance by libertarians. In the final analysis there can be no question whether we have population control but only when and by what means (p. xxii).*

In Part One, "Freedom from Ignorance," Parsons asserts the legitimacy of demographic endeavor, but also states in Chapter 1, "A Cautionary Note", that "population can by no means be entrusted solely to the hands of demographers" (p. 6), as it is a pressing global issue. In Chapter 2, "The Arithmetic of Growth," Parsons strongly argues for the overwhelming power of the sexual and reproductive instinct, and that population growth, if unimpeded, would be geometric in pattern, citing the disturbing statistic that a four-child family would theoretically lead to 245,000 billion people by the 46th generation. Even a rate of 2.02 children per family (one-one-hundredth above replacement rate) originating in only *one* human family would eventually lead to stupendous growth. He then takes the reader into the actual population history of the

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world and the United Kingdom, showing that population growth on both the world and U.K. levels has indeed followed a geometric curve — that is, growing very slowly up until three centuries ago, and then shooting drastically upward. At the end of the section, Parsons states categorically "that an increase of only one ten thousandth of 1 per cent per annum is impossible [i.e. untenable to human existence] in the long run" (p. 62).

"Virtually all primitive peoples have limited population in sometimes very brutal ways, and preventative controls are necessary today to prevent such drastic solutions later on."

In Part Two, "The Meaning of Liberty," Parsons makes his contribution to a long-standing debate in a commonsense approach to true freedom consisting of a balancing of various "microfreedoms". He proposes the formula, "Liberty = Macrofreedom = the Sum of all Microfreedoms" (p. 96). He also argues "that individual liberty is produced by social control" (p. 97), as only the social conditioning to respect the rights of others can make the working out of competing microfreedoms possible. In Chapter 7, "The Arithmetic of Liberty," Parsons argues that many of the most pressing social problems have their roots in excessive population, and that the more people there are, the more willed or unwilling cooperation there must be, because of increasing complexity. In Chapter 8, "The Law of Liberty," Parsons looks at possible precedents in British law that would lend themselves to effecting population control. In Chapter 9, "The Ecology of Liberty," he makes some interesting points about the need for personal living space and working space for the individual.

Part Three, "The Freedom Game," proposes a kind of simulation of the problems of an ever-increasing number of pieces occupying and trying to move through, the same, limited size checker-board. This is then related to the overall situation in the United Kingdom (with the area available per person rapidly shrinking); to "freedom of the road" — where traffic goes increasingly slower; and to "freedom to enjoy yourself" where the increasing stress on recreational facilities is shown through increasing numbers of recreational vehicles and sports and golf club memberships, as well as through some tragicomic news-stories about the overcrowding of recreational areas.

Part Four points out that people have "The Freedom to Choose" what kind of society they want to live in. Population growth at or below replacement level is certainly the best (Chapter 14, "Optimum Populations"). Virtually all primitive peoples have limited population in sometimes very brutal ways, and preventative controls are necessary today to prevent such drastic solutions later on (Chapter 15, "Population Policies"). Population control can work, and even small changes can bring great dividends (Chapter 16, "Freedom from Fatalism").

In the "Summary and Reflections," Parsons expresses the hope that an "era of self-control" is dawning, and wisely says that

> *the great problem facing humanity ... is to evolve a philosophy of life which is expansionist with respect to every good thing in life (things which need not necessarily be reflected in the gross national product) while becoming restrictionist in those spheres where self-indulgence is becoming catastrophic (p. 376).*

Population Fallacies, although published in 1977, had largely been written before the earlier book, but various unforeseen difficulties resulted in the delay. It contains a preface (pp. ix-x), some tables and charts throughout the text (listed on pp. xiii-xv), endnotes (pp. 253-262), a bibliography (pp. 263-271), a Name Index (pp. 272-274), and a Subject Index (pp. 275-286).

Part One, "A Recapitulation," restates the argument against considering population control as a violation of individual liberty.

In Part Two, Parsons examines numerous fallacies concerning population growth, and demolishes them one-by-one in workmanlike fashion, by straightforward logic and argument.

Among the fallacies: that statistics are generally unreliable; that future growth cannot be predicted; the now rather antiquated-sounding argument that large populations are needed for military strength;

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that persons from heavily populated regions can migrate to other countries or into outer space (Parsons is particularly good in showing that there are no empty places left anymore and that the outer space solution is wholly utopian); and that larger families are generally happier (in which he probably somewhat overdoes his anti-large-family position).

In Part Three, he argues against the 'scientific' fallacies of the biological growth curve and of a supposed population cycle. He makes a telling argument in this passage:

> *Can any moral or rational creature — let alone one claiming a touch of divinity — deliberately opt out and allow the world population's growth-curve, or any other, to be flattened out by brutish natural processes rather than by sympathetic involvement, foresight, and applied intelligence?*

However, the population cycle he criticizes as flawed has indeed reached the predicted stage of population growth below replacement rate in the Western world today. This is a paradox that would confound Parsons (and Malthus) — the very wealthiest, best-educated, and most well-nourished people in the world today — rather than reproducing as much as they realistically can — in fact have the fewest children. The plethora of means of birth control available in the West must have something to do with this (as one suspects that there is *more* sexual activity — at least in certain circles — with *less* sexual reproduction — the state of what could be called "sterile promiscuity"). Other factors are undoubtedly the breakdown of the traditional family, the emergence of feminism, and the increased profile of homosexuality, as well as the clearly ennervating nature of that very prosperity in general. One might also speculate on the cultural factors that make this largely an Anglo-American and European phenomenon, as other visible ethnic groups continue having relatively large numbers of children, whether in the West or not.

Parsons then goes on in Part Four to list the economic fallacies, some of which are clearly influenced by the context of the superprosperous period of the time. (The reviewer remembers being told in junior high school in the 1970s that, in the future, hardly anyone would have to work, and that the main social problem would be how to spend our leisure time happily.) The somewhat related fallacies are that more people = more wealth = more lives; that a declining population results in a shortage of labor; that an aging population creates a burden of dependency; that economies of scale create ever-increasing efficiency (he draws attention to possible *dis*economies of scale); that an increasing population creates an increasing demand; that technology can always increase production (he shows that there are more people living in poverty than ever before in history); and finally, the fallacy of unlimited economic growth (Chapter 16), which is probably the best chapter in the book. Referring also to the Club of Rome Report, he shows, on the one hand, that unlimited economic growth is *theoretically* ridiculous (as in a few hundred years, everyone becomes a billionaire) and also *practically* unrealizable because of the necessity to conserve the physical environment, the need for open space, etc. He overoptimistically suggests that economic growth will have to stop at the stage where everyone is a millionaire — influenced in this by the 1970s mindset. He concludes with a "Summary and Reflections."

Though the reviewer certainly agrees that a steady-state situation is optimal, in the context of the world of the 21st century, this would undoubtedly mean some degree of rationing of such resources as high-quality food, potable water, high-tech healthcare, energy consumption, and personal living-space, as well as population control.

The reviewer does not really accept the thesis combining population control and individual liberty. The situation is simply too far gone today and the pronounced divergences between population growth in the West and the Third World are most striking. While East Asia, buttressed by its various ancient hierarchical traditions, has achieved spectacular economic growth, and also constitutes almost a naturally — if not philosophically — "ecological" regime (as seen, for example, in its comparatively low rates of waste output, and high rates of recycling), sub-Saharan Africa, for example, appears to lead only in rates of human reproduction. While the transition of East Asia to a steady-state society appears possible, the West must realistically prepare to establish meaningful barriers to Third World immigration, as North America, if not already heavily-populated Europe itself, will be subject to incredible demographic pressures in the coming

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century. Historically-speaking, we might witness — under severe environmental strain — the return of hierarchical, hydraulic or hydraulic-ecological civilizations, certainly in East Asia, and possibly in Europe. It will be up to these societies to maintain ecological control over the entire planet. The place of a stubbornly individualistic, avowedly multicultural, and grossly hyperconsumptionist America, in such a world, is difficult to envision. ■

[Both of these now difficult-to-find books are available from THE SOCIAL CONTRACT at $19.00 each, or $35.00 for both, including postage and handling.]

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Population Fallacies by Jack Parsons

Mr. Parsons examines in detail how over-population interferes with personal freedom, that treasured possession which we too often take for granted.

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This first book by Jack Parsons argues in favor of the paradoxical conclusion that a population control policy is not a *violation* but a *condition* of individual liberty.

Jack Parsons is a former Senior Lecturer in Population Studies and Deputy Director of the David Owen Center for Population Growth Studies, University College, Cardiff in the United Kingdom.

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Brief Reviews

By Wayne Lutton

CHINATOWN: A PORTRAIT
OF A CLOSED SOCIETY
by Gwen Kinkead
HarperCollins Publishers, 215 pp., $12.00

As a consequence of the 1965 Immigration Act, Chinese are streaming into the U.S. as never before. Aside from those legally admitted, a hundred thousand or more enter illegally, their passage arranged by professional smugglers at a cost of $30,000-$50,000 per person. Since Chinese wages average around $500 a year, the illegal aliens have to pay back their debt to the smugglers, which they do by working in sweatshops, through drug dealing, gambling, prostitution, or serving as "muscle" for gangs.

Gwen Kinkead, a Harvard and Cambridge educated journalist whose work often appears in *The New Yorker*, has written a remarkable account of New York City's Chinatown--the largest Chinese colony in the Western Hemisphere. She quite frankly admits that "crime is woven into the social fabric, into the institutions that keep Chinatown cohesive and isolated...." Chinatown is controlled by criminal *tongs*, which front as benevolent and fraternal associations. "The crimes that take place here are often so serious and so bizarre," she writes,"that the area sometimes resembles Hong Kong at its wildest. In Chinatown, there is a social order so ruthless that its very existence seems to be against the law. . . but most of the people who live here accept it as normal."

Garment factories are the economic backbone of Chinatown. Manned by a steady flow of illegals, the sweatshops' piecework rates are so low that Hong Kong factories have moved to the U.S. Child labor and cheating workers out of their meager pay is common.

The author devotes four chapters to "The Chinese Connection," wherein she describes the workings of the international heroin trade, now largely controlled by the Chinese Triads. Half the heroin entering the U.S. annually comes through NY's Chinatown. Their biggest customers are blacks, Dominicans, and Mexicans. She cites law enforcement officials who predict that the new smokeable variety of heroin, known as "China White," may displace "Crack" cocaine as the drug of preference in the 'hoods.

The portrait of Chinese society we see here is not a flattering one. Yes, many Chinese are frugal and work long hours but, despite all of the capital some of them accumulate here, Chinatown has no privately endowed hospitals, libraries, museums or other philanthropies. And far from being stereotypical academic whiz kids, too many youngsters join street gangs. Kinkead admits that she was asked *not* to describe Chinese cuisine in detail, as they didn't want her to alert conservationists to the fact that they have a "culinary craving for wild animals" — including black bears. Chinese feared she might provoke a reaction from *low faan* [white barbarians] "anxious to stop the slaughter."

Chinatown is an eye-opening report. One is very much reminded of former Senator Eugene McCarthy's observation that the United States is being colonized by people who are simply planting their alien cultures within our midst. The questions remain: why have we allowed this to happen? And will we ever have the fortitude to stop it?

* * *

THE NATURAL LAW OF RACE RELATIONS
Laszlo F. Thomay
Scott-Townsend Publishers
146 pp., $15.00

L.F. Thomay, a Hungarian who migrated to Canada after World War II, has written a timely and useful book which explores how people think, how they behave, and why they behave the way they do when living in a multi-national or multi-racial environment. He takes his readers to various countries around the world, including South Africa, Nigeria, Burundi, Belgium, the former Czechoslovakia, the former Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States. He also considers how Asians have fared in the East African states of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as well as Swedes living in Finland, Croatians in Western Hungary, and

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Slovenes in Austria.

The primary characteristics of groups that result in majority/minority clashes are visibility [inhabitants of the same area who look different], language, and culture-religion.

He finds that when a minority exceeds a certain limit — 1 percent to no more than 5 percent — in relation to the majority, strife is inevitable and persistent, as the experiences of the United States, the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and various African states testifies. Ethnic strife has been less pronounced where the minority is willing, eager, and capable of being absorbed by the majority.

For a country inhabited by multiple nationalities, the best solution is separation of the components into their own ethno-states. As the author observes, "present-day borders which do not correspond to ethnic realities should not be considered sacred and final; they should be adjustable in accordance with the wishes of the people living within them."

Massive immigration of different nationalities into other countries inevitably leads to tension and conflict. Immigration can only occur safely when the immigrants are closely related to the host population and enter in small numbers. Consequently, it makes no sense to insist that existing immigration patterns continue. Indeed, government policy should actively *prevent* the establishment of *new* ethnic enclaves.

Thomay reconsiders the ethical basis of migration. He reaffirms that

> *there exists no right to be able to move into and occupy someone else's country. People may be* accepted *to another country, even* encouraged *to immigrate, but it is always up to the receiving country to determine whom, how many and on what conditions they would admit [them].... The right to control immigration is an important one, since immigration can become a form of conquest... It is not right that future generations should be doomed to live in continuous turmoil and confrontation... Creating new minorities by encouraging large-scale immigration that would tear the fabric of a society apart is a crime against humanity, against future generations of humanity.*

The Natural Law of Race Relations is a well-argued book which shows how ethnic tensions may be lessened and individual security ensured. Positive steps should be taken to see that "diversity" and "multiculturalism" are not perpetuated.

* * *

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: EMERGING THREAT TO US SECURITY

by Roy Godson and William J. Olson
National Strategy Information Center
[1730 Rhode Island Avenue,NW, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036]
72 pp., $15.00

Roy Godson, a professor of government at Georgetown and director of the NSIC, and William Olson, a former Defense and State Department official who has specialized in international narcotics matters and low intensity conflict, are co-authors of a monograph which discusses the threat to U.S. security presented by international organized crime. Over the past decade, organized criminal groups have become much more powerful, economically and politically. Many are trans-national, in the sense that they operate globally and are not necessarily dependent upon one "home base." And the profits they gain from illegal activities, especially drug dealing, dwarf those commanded by national groups, such as the American Mafia.

The authors provide a thumbnail sketch of the key international criminal organizations, including the Colombian drug cartels, the Chinese Triads, Japanese *Yakuza*, Koreans, Jamaican Posses, and various nationals from the former Soviet Union. They point out that these criminal organizations follow immigration streams, which provide cover and concealment, as well as pools for new recruits. They are particularly difficult for law enforcement agencies to deal with, given that they are often ethnically based and operate in many jurisdictions.

This study provides a useful introduction to the topic. As the authors observe in their conclusion:

> *Neither the United States, nor any other country is aware of the full magnitude of the threat. Nor has any government been able to neutralize major international criminal organizations...Criminal groups are becoming stronger and are likely to expand their coalitions with ethnic and religious groups in conflict. As a result, in the future, criminal*

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terrorist networks are likely to have an even greater effect on the quality of life in the United States and abroad.

* * *

SCHOOL AGE DEMOGRAPHICS: RECENT TRENDS POSE NEW EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES

By Linda Morra
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C., 1993
91 pp., single copy, free

Linda Morra, director of Education and Employment Issues at the GAO's Human Resources Division, reviewed the changing demographics of the U.S. school age population. Her study, based on Census Bureau data, confirms that immigration is responsible for virtually all of the growth in the U.S. population of low-achieving children in high poverty areas.

During the decade 1980 to 1990, the school age population — children aged 5 to 17 — declined by 2.3 million. But during this period, the number of poor school age children increased by nearly 6 percent. The white school age population declined by more than 4 million children and composed less than 70 percent of the total school age population in 1990, down from about 75 percent in 1980. The black school age population decreased by around 250,000 (about 4 percent). Overall, the number of poor white children declined and the black school age poverty population showed little change in the decade.

The growth in the number of school age children and children in poverty took place among Hispanics and Asians — either immigrants or the children of recent immigrants. The decade of the 1980s witnessed a 57 percent increase in Hispanic and an 87 percent increase in Asian school age children. "At risk" children from immigrant and limited English proficiency households increased by almost 26 percent and now account for more than 9 percent of the total school age population.

Single copies of this report [# GAO/HRD-93-105 BR] are available free by calling (202) 512-6000 or writing to the U.S. General Accounting Office, P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. ■

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Postscript

Closing Frontiers

The World's Columbian Exhibition was held in Chicago in 1893 — a year late, thanks to delays — celebrating the 400th anniversary of the discovery of the Americas by Columbus. To combine business with pleasure, many organizations scheduled meetings in Chicago at this same time so those attending could take in the Exhibition.

Among these groups was an international congress of historians, and among those invited to speak was Frederick Jackson Turner, at 32 a full professor of history at the University of Wisconsin. To this assembly he presented his now-celebrated essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." In it he laid out a theory, later to be called the "frontier thesis" of historical interprepation, in which American culture and institutions were not seen as just extensions of the European. Rather, he saw the existence of a constantly moving and expanding frontier, together with free land under the Homestead Act, as prime factors in the development of American institutions.

Professor Turner was also interested in the immigration of his time. In the September 25, 1901 edition of the *Chicago Record-Herald* he wrote:

> *The immigrant of the preceding period was assimilated with comparative ease, and it can hardly be doubted that valuable contributions to American character have come from this infusion of non-English stock into the American people. But the free lands that made the process of absorption easy have gone. The immigration is becoming increasingly more difficult of assimilation. Its competition with American labor under existing conditions may give increased power to the producer, but the effects upon American social well-being are dangerous in the extreme.*



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

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